State v. Hamlin
Decision Date | 17 January 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 74--936,74--936 |
Citation | 306 So.2d 150 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Joe Mack HAMLIN, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Stephen R. Koons, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Kenneth J. Scherer, Asst. Public Defender, and Martin H. Colin, Legal Intern, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
The trial court dismissed a criminal information. The State of Florida appeals. We reverse.
Joe Mack Halin was charged in that information with larceny of a motor vehicle on March 25, 1974, same being the property of Roger Savald.
Defendant, Joe Mack Hamlin, filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190, F.R.Cr.P., with this sworn allegation:
In response, the State Filed its sworn traverse under Section (d) of the mentioned Rule and said:
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for two reasons:
1. The State's traverse was insufficient in that it was signed by the State Attorney who lacked personal knowledge of the facts; and
2. The subject matter of the sale and title to the vehicle in question concerns a transaction which ought to be considered by the civil courts rather than the criminal courts.
The State appeals.
It is clear that had the State not traversed the defendant's allegation, the information would necessarily have to be dismissed because the defendant could not be guilty of stealing his own vehicle. However, the State's traverse placed the material facts in dispute in the sense that it said there had been no sale and no transfer of title to the defendant and explained that the $200 said to have been the purchase price were in fact for the purposes of rent.
Rule 3.190(d), F.R.Cr.P., provides:
(Emphasis supplied.)
And now to the trial court's reasoning. We have neither been shown nor been able to find any authority for the proposition that the State's traverse must be based on personal knowledge on the part of the State Attorney who files it. the mentioned Rule nowhere requires it. As a practical matter, it would be unrealistic to think that the State Attorney would have been present and have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime. Further,...
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State v. Johnson, 80-1903
...1979); State v. Cook, 354 So.2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 359 So.2d 1212 (Fla.1978); Ellis v. State, supra; State v. Hamlin, 306 So.2d 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In addition, viewing the allegations in the traverse most favorably to the state, State v. Davis, 243 So.2d 587 (Fla.1971......
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State v. News-Press Pub. Co.
...motion to dismiss, nor must the State Attorney have personal knowledge of the facts in order to make a sworn denial. State v. Hamlin, 306 So.2d 150 (Fla.4th DCA 1975). Nevertheless, any facts stated in a motion to dismiss filed under Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.190(c)(4) are deemed admitted unless they a......
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State v. Terma
...by the affidavit of the victim or other witness." Ellis v. State, 346 So.2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see State v. Hamlin, 306 So.2d 150, 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (a traverse "need not be based upon personal knowledge on the part of the State or shored up by affidavit of the victim"). ......
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State v. Skofstad, 85-2380
...to dismiss. See State v. Hunwick, 446 So.2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Wale v. State, 397 So.2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Hamlin, 306 So.2d 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Cummings v. State, 378 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 635 (Fla.1980). See also State v. Alford, ......