State v. Hamlin

Decision Date30 April 2014
Docket NumberNo. 40026.,40026.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Denvil R. HAMLIN, Defendant–Appellant.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

Denvil R. Hamlin was convicted of three counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, felony, Idaho Code § 18–1505B. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred when it denied various motions relating to Hamlin's competency, a motion to suppress his confession, and a motion to dismiss asserting constitutional claims. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.BACKGROUND

Mountain Home police officers received a report from a social worker indicating that Hamlin may have sexually abused and economically exploited that social worker's client. The alleged victim, a forty-six-year-old mentally retarded man1 with psychiatric infirmities, was interviewed at Children at Risk Evaluation Services (CARES) in Boise.

He indicated that Hamlin had touched him inappropriately. CARES conveyed the information to police officers who made arrangements to speak with Hamlin at the police station. Once there, Hamlin admitted that he had touched the victim's penis with his hand, performed oral sex on the victim, and engaged in anal sex with the victim.

Hamlin was charged with three counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. Hamlin, who is also mentally retarded, raised various motions asserting that he was incompetent to stand trial, that his confession should be suppressed, and that the statute he was alleged to have violated was unconstitutional. After the district court had denied each of the motions, Hamlin entered a conditional guilty plea preserving these three issues for appeal. Hamlin was sentenced to three consecutive, unified sentences of ten years with two years determinate, for an aggregate sentence of thirty years with six years determinate, but the court suspended the sentence and placed Hamlin on probation.

On appeal, Hamlin contends that the district court erred by finding him to be competent to stand trial, denying his motion to suppress his confession based on an alleged violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and denying his motion to dismiss the charges on grounds that the statute under which he was charged was unconstitutional. With respect to the constitutionality of the statute, he asserts that the enforcement of I.C. § 18–1505B, prohibiting sex with a vulnerable adult, denies him due process and violates equal protection.

II.ANALYSIS
A. Competency

It was apparent early in the pretrial process that Hamlin might not be competent to stand trial because he is mentally retarded. On September 3, 2010, the parties stipulated to having a competency evaluation performed by Dr. Chad Sombke. He diagnosed Hamlin with mild mental retardation

and gave him a formal assessment to determine competency, the Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation (CAST–MR). At that time, the assessment showed that Hamlin was probably not competent. Beyond the skills measured by that instrument, an informal assessment showed that Hamlin did not understand the role of various court personnel and would have been of limited help to counsel. However, Dr. Sombke opined that "with some education and training of the court process, Mr. Hamlin could become competent in the future."

On the basis of that report, the magistrate court ordered Hamlin to undergo competency training through the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. The training consisted of at least ten hours of didactic training and twenty hours of review that focused on legal concepts, court personnel, skills that might aid in Hamlin's defense, and courtroom decorum. After this training, the CAST–MR was administered again. This time, the assessment indicated that Hamlin was competent to stand trial. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare examiner, Blake Brumfield, opined that Hamlin had an "elemental knowledge of the legal system and the basic understanding that certain behaviors result in legal consequences." He also recommended supportive strategies such as providing clear and concise explanations, prompting Hamlin to determine if he had questions, and repeating complex concepts when Hamlin did not understand them.

In a later report, Brumfield indicated that he had given Hamlin an IQ test on which he scored a 62 on the Full Scale Intelligence Scale. This later report also indicated that Hamlin's score on the CAST–MR assessment had declined in some areas, but improved in others. The aggregate scores still indicated that Hamlin was competent.

At the request of Brumfield, an additional expert from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Dr. Susan Stumph, evaluated Hamlin. She also administered the CAST–MR test and Hamlin's scores continued to show he was competent. She opined that Hamlin was competent but might benefit from supportive efforts or accommodations.

Hamlin's counsel had an additional evaluation performed by Dr. Dave Sanford. Dr. Sanford noted that Hamlin had very limited abstract reasoning skill, limited knowledge of current events, and some memory limitations. He also administered a formal assessment, the MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool–Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT–CA). Dr. Sanford also used the Rorschach Inkblot Test

. In his opinion, these assessments indicated that Hamlin was not competent. In preparation for an evidentiary hearing, Dr. Sanford submitted a second report with substantially similar results. Dr. Sanford opined that "Because of Mr. Hamlin's limited capabilities it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for him to provide adequate assistance to counsel and follow court proceedings knowledgably."

On January 28, 2011, the magistrate court held an evidentiary hearing at which Brumfield, Dr. Stumph, and Dr. Sanford testified. Brumfield reported that Hamlin was able to engage in numerous activities that demonstrated some level of competence. For example, he had obtained a driver's license, had purchased a vehicle, and had maintained and paid for the trailer he and his wife lived in. Dr. Sanford testified that Hamlin had very limited abstract reasoning skills, a limited ability to read, and other cognitive deficits. As to the issue at bar, Dr. Stumph and Brumfield opined that Hamlin was competent to stand trial and Dr. Sanford opined he was not.

The experts' disagreement largely focused on which of the employed assessment instruments was the proper measure of competency. Brumfield argued that the CAST–MR was the proper assessment because it was designed for use with mentally retarded adults and had been validated for that use. He opined that the MacCAT–CA test was not indicated for use with mentally retarded adults, but was designed to be used with adults with psychiatric illnesses. Brumfield was asked if the improvement of Hamlin's score on the CAST–MR test was due to chance or due to being repeatedly asked the same multiple choice questions, and Brumfield indicated he did not believe that repetition was the cause of the improvement. Dr. Sanford disagreed; he believed that the MacCAT–CA test was the more appropriate test because it closely mirrored real court proceedings. However, on cross-examination, he admitted that the test had not been validated with respect to mentally retarded adults. In addition, some of Dr. Sanford's responses on cross-examination showed that Hamlin's score on the MacCAT–CA was low because the assessment requires specific answers to open ended questions, because it uses questions that require abstract reasoning through comparing oneself to a hypothetical person, and because it does not permit the evaluator to follow up on responses. Dr. Sanford also admitted he was not particularly familiar with the literature pertaining to the CAST–MR though he did have access to the instrument. Finally, Dr. Sanford acknowledged that competency determinations were not a significant portion of his practice.

In an oral ruling, the magistrate court said it gave more weight to Hamlin's scores on the CAST–MR than to his scores on the MacCAT–CA, finding that the former was "the accepted instrument in this circumstance." The court also indicated that it would ensure the trial proceedings were properly managed to minimize the effects of Hamlin's disability. The Court instructed that the parties were to be patient and to "do their best ... to use terms that are simple to understand and to be prepared to take recesses as necessary to ensure that the Defendant understands the proceedings." Thereafter, the court found that Hamlin was competent to stand trial and after additional proceedings, bound Hamlin over to the district court.

In the district court, Hamlin moved for another competency evaluation, and the district court appointed Dr. Sombke to reevaluate Hamlin for competency. Once again, the CAST–MR test was administered and it indicated Hamlin was competent. A second formal assessment was given, the Georgia Court Competency Test—Revised (GCCT–R). Hamlin's score on that test similarly demonstrated competency. Dr. Sombke noted that Hamlin might have difficulties testifying because he "is easily confused by questions and he tends to answer questions even though he does not know what he is being asked." For example, when asked if his crime was serious, Hamlin indicated it was not. When asked if what he was accused of doing was bad, he indicated that it was. This discrepancy resulted from Hamlin not knowing the meaning of the term " serious." Hamlin did understand that he faced the possibility of significant prison sentence, understood the role of various court personnel, and could explain the plea bargain process. Dr. Sombke opined that Hamlin was "...

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