State v. Hammonds

• Decision Date: 14 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 40,40
• Citation: 224 S.E.2d 595,290 N.C. 1
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Henry Frank HAMMONDS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 595

224 S.E.2d 595

290 N.C. 1

STATE of North Carolina v. Henry Frank HAMMONDS.

No. 40.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 14, 1976.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten, Asst. Attys. Gen. Charles M. Hensey and Archie W. Anders, Raleigh, for the State.

Larry E. Harrington, Monroe, and James E. Ferguson, II, Charlotte, for defendant-appellant.

MOORE, Justice.

Defendant first assigns as error the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Dr. Hinson, a private psychiatrist who examined defendant prior to trial, and Dr. Rollins, Director of Forensic Services at Dorothea Dix Hospital, where defendant was sent for pre-trial examination, testified that in their opinions defendant, as a result of mental illness and defect in reason, was not able to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the alleged crime. Each further testified that this inability to distinguish right from wrong resulted from physical disabilities, more specifically, cerebral arteriosclerosis, pre-senile dementia, chronic brain syndrome and malignant hypertension. Dr. Rollins also found that on a scale of zero to five for measuring brain damage, defendant had a disability of 3.5, which he described as 'moderate to severe brain damage.'

Defendant presented testimony through his wife and several witnesses that he and his wife had operated a lunchroom in Wadesboro for many years. He had never been in trouble before, and his character and reputation in the community were good. This testimony further showed that for the last three months before the shooting his appearance, dress and behavior had deteriorated. Defendant's ability to manage his lunchroom and his behavior toward his customers had also deteriorated. During this time he experience difficulty in sleeping, and spent a large part of his time gazing blankly out the window.

Detective Tommy W. Allen, Jr., of the Wadesboro Police Department, a witness for the State, Testified that he saw defendant at approximately 10:00 a.m. on 21 May 1975 at the police station in Wadesboro, he had known defendant for some six months, he appeared to be normal, what he said made sense, and that he appeared to be the same as he had been for the last six months.

Lieutenant Ed Hightower of the Wadesboro Police Department testified for the State that he had been a police officer in Wadesboro for eighteen years and had known defendant for approximately twenty-five years, having seen defendant frequently over the years. He further testified that he had been defendant and had talked to him many times since February 1975, that he was present for approximately one hour at the time defendant gave his statement to Detective Allen on 21 May 1975, and that in his opinion defendant was normal on that day. Hightower stated that he didn't notice any difference in his condition on that day as compared with the many other occasions when he had seen and talked with him, and that he was the same Henry Hammonds he had known for a long time.

A motion for a directed verdict of not guilty has the same effect as a motion for nonsuit. State v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 204 S.E.2d 817 (1974); State v. Glover, 270 N.C. 319, 154 S.E.2d 305 (1967). On such motion, the evidence for the State is taken to be true, conflicts and discrepancies therein are resolved in the State's favor and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E.2d 679 (1967).

It is well settled that the test of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of and in respect to the matter under investigation. State v. Cooper,286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305 (1975); State v. Humphrey, 283 N.C. 570, 196 S.E.2d 516 (1973), Cert. den., 414 U.S. 1042, 94 S.Ct. 546, 38 L.Ed.2d 334 (1973); State v. Jones, 278 N.C. 259, 179 S.E.2d 433 (1971).

Testimony as to mental capacity is not confined to expert witnesses alone.

"Anyone who has observed another, or conversed with him, or had dealings with him, and a reasonable opportunity, based thereon, of forming an opinion, satisfactory to himself, as to the mental condition of such person, is permitted to give his opinion in evidence upon the issue of mental capacity, although the witness be not a psychiatrist or expert in mental disorders.' This has been settled doctrine in North Carolina since the pioneer case of Clary v. Clary (24 N.C. 78 (1841)), and under it lay opinion may be received as to the mental capacity of . . . a defendant in a criminal case. . . . ' 1 Stansbury, N.C. Evidence § 127 (Brandis Rev.1973); State v. Nall, 211 N.C. 61, 188 S.E. 637 (1936); State v. Hauser, 202 N.C. 738, 164 S.E. 114 (1932); State v. Journegan, 185 N.C. 700, 117 S.E. 27 (1923).

Defendant has the burden of proving that he was insane. However, unlike the State, which must prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant must only prove his insanity to the satisfaction of the jury. State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975); State v. Cooper, supra; State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969), Rev'd as to death penalty, 403 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 2283, 29 L.Ed.2d 859 (1971). In State v. Swink, 229 N.C. 123, 47 S.E.2d 852 (1948), Justice Ervin, speaking for this Court, said:

'Since soundness of mind is the natural and normal condition of men, everyone is presumed to be sane until the contrary is made to appear. This presumption of sanity applies to persons charged with crime, but it is rebuttable. (Citations omitted.) these considerations give rise to the firmly established rule that the burden of proof upon a plea of insanity in a criminal case rests upon the accused who sets it up. But he is not obliged to establish such plea beyond a reasonable doubt. He is merely required to prove his insanity to the satisfaction of the jury. (Citations omitted.)'

In order to convict a defendant of murder in the first degree, when the killing was not perpetrated by one of the means specified by G.S. 14--17 and was not committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was with premeditation and deliberation. G.S. 14--17; 4 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Homicide § 4, and cases cited therein. It is well established that a specific intent to kill is a necessary ingredient of premeditation and deliberation. State v. Cooper, supra; State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 174 S.E.2d 526 (1970); State v. Robbins, 275 N.C. 537, 169 S.E.2d 858 (1969). If a defendant does not have the mental capacity to form an intent to kill or to premeditate and deliberate upon the killing, he cannot be lawfully convicted of murder in the first degree, whether such mental deficiency be due to disease of the mind or some other cause. State v. Cooper, supra.

The basis for defendant's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty was that at the time the alleged offense was committed the defendant was insane and therefore not criminally responsible. Obviously, the evidence was sufficient otherwise to require that the charge of murder in the first degree be submitted to the jury. Considering the testimony of the police officers concerning defendant's concition immediately after the fatal shooting, together with the presumption that every man is sane, we hold that the question of defendant's insanity as a defense to the charge was for the jury under proper instructions by the court. The motion for a directed verdict of not guilty was properly overruled.

By Assignments of Error Nos. VIII, IX and XXI, defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial court to impose upon the State the burden of proving each and every element of the offense, including malice and the sanity of the defendant, and his refusal to instruct the jury that evidence of defendant's mental condition could be considered on the question of the required Mens rea. Defendant contends that the court's instruction to the jury contravenes the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975).

In present case, the jury was instructed:

'(I)f the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed Herman Capel with a deadly weapon, or intentionally inflicted a would upon Mr. Capel with a deadly weapon that proximately caused his death, then if no other evidence is presented, the law raises two presumptions, first, that the killing was unlawful, and second, that it was done with malice.

'Now, second degree murder differs from first degree murder in that neither specific intent to kill, premeditation, nor deliberation is necessary. In order for you to find the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally shot Mr. Capel with a deadly weapon thereby proximately causing his death, then nothing else appearing, the defendant would be guilty of second degree murder.'

Substantially similar instructions have been approved by many decisions of this Court. State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 185 S.E.2d 221 (1971); State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 185 S.E.2d 129 (1971). In State v. Williams, supra, Justice Branch, speaking for the Court, stated:

'The identical question presented by this assignment of error was before us in State v. Sparks, 285 N.C. 631, 207 S.E.2d 712 (decided 30 August 1974) Petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1974) (No. 669), and this Court unanimously rejected defendant's contention that presumptions of malice and unlawfulness arising from the State's proof that the deceased's death was proximately caused by the defendant's intentional use of a deadly weapon were constitutionally impermissible. However, defendant strongly urges that the rule approved in Sparks has been overruled by Mullaney v. Wilbur...