State v. Hamon
| Decision Date | 11 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 12 CAA 12 0089.,12 CAA 12 0089. |
| Citation | 28 N.E.3d 139 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Timothy S. HAMON, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Douglas Demolt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Carol Hamilton O'Brien, Delaware, OH, for plaintiff-appellee.
Stephen Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, Columbus, OH, for defendant-appellant.
W. Scott Gwin, P.J., Patricia A. Delaney, J., and Craig R. Baldwin, J.
GWIN
, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Timothy Hamon [“Hamon”], appeals from the November 21, 2012 judgment entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas declaring a mistrial and granting appellee State of Ohio a new trial.
{¶ 2} On December 22, 2011, Hamon was indicted on three counts of rape of a child felonies of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2907.02
and three counts of gross sexual imposition with a child less than 12 years of age, felonies of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2907.05(B).
{¶ 3} On June 22, 2012, Hamon filed a motion requesting the trial court order the state to stipulate to the use of a polygraph test and for permission to submit polygraph evidence. The trial court not only considered Hamon's written motion, but also heard arguments from counsel. The court advised counsel that evidence of a polygraph examination was not admissible and ruled that Hamon could not bring up the polygraph issue before the jury. The trial court reasoned, “the Court can't order you or the state to participate in a polygraph.” (T. July 6, 2012 at 37–38).
Judgment Entry filed July 19, 2012 at 4.
{¶ 5} A jury trial had begun in Hamon's case. During the state's case, while Defense Counsel was cross-examining Detective Kester, counsel asked the investigative officer the following questions:
{¶ 6} The prosecutor requested permission to approach the bench. (4T. at 492). During the side bar conference, the state objected to the questions asked by Hamon's attorney. The jurors were then returned to the jury room so the matter could be addressed in open court and outside the hearing of the jurors.
{¶ 7} Outside the presence of the jury, the court reminded Hamon's counsel that polygraph evidence is not admissible without a stipulation by the parties, and defense counsel admitted that there was no such stipulation in this case. The court asked the counsel for the state if they wished to continue, or wished to have a mistrial, and counsel asked for time to confer, so the court called another recess.
T. at 501–502. After the trial court ruled, defense counsel told the court “I would submit I have a proposed curative instruction.” 4T. at 503.
{¶ 10} On November 2, 2012, Hamon filed a motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice on the grounds that the mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity. The trial court denied the motion. This Court dismissed the appeal pursuant to State v. Crago, 53 Ohio St.3d 243, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (1990)
, for lack of a final order. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted Hamon's discretionary appeal, and remanded this case to this Court for further proceedings pursuant to State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23. State v. Hamon, 139 Ohio St.3d 314, 2014-Ohio-1927, 11 N.E.3d 1152.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 11} Hamon raises one assignment of error,
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} Generally, the state is afforded only a single opportunity to require a defendant to stand trial. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978)
. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, “protects individuals from being tried for the same offense more than once,” providing, in pertinent part: “ ‘nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’ ”
{¶ 14} In evaluating whether the trial judge acted properly in declaring a mistrial, the courts have been reluctant to formulate precise, inflexible standards.
Rather, the courts have deferred to the trial court's exercise of discretion in light of all the surrounding circumstances:
State v. Conley, 5th Dist Richland No. 2009–CA–19, 2009-Ohio-2903, 2009 WL 1709306, ¶ 22.
{¶ 15} When a mistrial is premised on the prejudicial impact of improper evidence, the trial judge's evaluation of the possibility of juror bias is entitled to “great,” but not unlimited, deference by a reviewing court. State v. Gunnell, 132 Ohio St.3d 442, 2012-Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 243, ¶ 33
; Ross v. Petro, 515 F.3d 653, 661 (6th Cir.2008) ; Washington, 434 U.S. at 514, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717. A trial court must act “rationally, responsibly, and deliberately” in determining whether to declare a mistrial. Gunnell at ¶ 33. However, a trial court's failure to make an explicit finding of “manifest necessity” does not render a mistrial declaration invalid, as long as the record provides sufficient justification for the ruling. Washington 434 U.S. at 516–517, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717.
{¶ 16} In Gunnell, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether a juror's outside research, i.e., a handwritten definition of the word “perverse” and an instruction on “involuntary manslaughter” that the juror had printed off the internet, constituted grounds for a mistrial. Gunnell at ¶ 9–10. The materials had been intercepted by the bailiff when the juror arrived in the morning to continue jury deliberations and had not been shared with other jurors. Id. at ¶ 8. After learning of the juror's possession of this information, the trial judge conducted a brief hearing during which the trial judge first informed the parties of the issue that had developed regarding the juror's outside research and then proceeded to question the juror regarding her research, including what information she had found, why she had...
To continue reading
Request your trial