State v. Hampton
| Decision Date | 08 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-0509-CR.,01-0509-CR. |
| Citation | 683 N.W.2d 14,2004 WI 107,274 Wis.2d 379 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Corey J. HAMPTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by Jennifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general.
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral argument by Melinda A. Swartz, assistant state public defender.
¶ 1.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Hampton, 2002 WI App 293, 259 Wis. 2d 455, 655 N.W.2d 131. The court of appeals reversed an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, denying the defendant's postconviction motion to withdraw his plea without first conducting an evidentiary hearing on the motion. At the earlier plea hearing, the circuit court neglected to advise the defendant personally that the court was not bound by his plea agreement with the State. Later the court imposed a longer stayed sentence and a longer period of probation than the State had agreed to recommend. The court of appeals concluded that the defendant had made a prima facie showing under State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea.
¶ 2. This review presents three issues. First, in taking a plea of guilty or no contest from a criminal defendant, must the circuit court advise the defendant personally on the record that the court is not bound by a plea agreement and ascertain whether the defendant understands this information? We conclude that the answer is "yes," thereby affirming the decision in State ex rel. White v. Gray, 57 Wis. 2d 17, 203 N.W.2d 638 (1973).
¶ 3. Second, what is the appropriate way for a circuit court to advise the defendant personally that a plea agreement is not binding on the court? We conclude that there is no single, inflexible way for the court to discharge this duty, but the most logical, consistent, and efficient method is for the court to personally deliver an explanation to the defendant and then ascertain whether the defendant understands that the court is not bound by a plea agreement. The court may not discharge this duty by anything less than a personal dialogue.
¶ 4. Third, is the circuit court required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a defendant's motion to withdraw his plea when the motion points to the court's failure in the plea colloquy to advise the defendant personally that the court was not bound by the plea agreement, and the defendant also alleges that he did not understand that the court was not bound by the plea agreement? We conclude that the answer is "yes," because the defendant will have made the requisite showing for an evidentiary hearing, as provided in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).
¶ 5. On the facts presented, we conclude that the circuit court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Corey Hampton's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Consequently, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for action consistent with this opinion.
¶ 6. The relevant facts are not in dispute. On September 16, 1998, Corey J. Hampton was charged with second-degree sexual assault of a child, a felony that carried a potential prison term of 20 years. See Wis. Stat. §§ 939.50(3)(bc), 948.02(2).1 On December 8, 1998, Hampton entered an Alford plea to that charge.2
¶ 7. Prior to the plea hearing, Hampton's attorney negotiated a plea agreement with the State. He also met with the defendant to review a two-page plea questionnaire.
¶ 8. Item 10 of the plea questionnaire read: Immediately below this language the questionnaire listed the charge against Hampton and noted, "Years: 20" and "Fine: $10,000."
¶ 9. Item 15 of the questionnaire stated: "I have read (or have had read to me) this entire questionnaire, and I understand its contents." Below this statement, Hampton signed his name and wrote in the date. Hampton's attorney also signed the questionnaire, attesting that "the defendant acknowledged his understanding of each item in this questionnaire."
¶ 10. The questionnaire was dated December 6, 1998. Two days later, at the plea hearing, Hampton acknowledged that his counsel had read the information in the plea questionnaire to him and that Hampton had signed both sides of the form.
¶ 11. The plea hearing on December 8 generated a 28-page transcript, with a lengthy plea colloquy, which the court of appeals later described as "exemplary ... with one exception." Hampton, 259 Wis. 2d 455, ¶ 7. ¶ 12. Circuit Judge Mel Flanagan elicited information about the defendant's age, his six years of post-high school education, his history of mental problems and voluntary commitments, his medications, the offense, the victim, and potential charges outside the county. The court also asked questions about the appropriate plea. Because the court had received a letter from Hampton in which he denied an element of the offense, the court questioned whether Hampton truly wished to enter a no-contest plea. The court asked defense counsel to take a moment to discuss with Hampton whether he wanted to enter an Alford plea instead. After a discussion with the defendant off the record, defense counsel informed the court that Hampton wanted to enter an Alford plea.
¶ 13. The court also engaged in extensive discussion of a plea agreement in which the State offered the defendant an option on the State's sentencing recommendation. In essence, the State offered the defendant a choice between a recommendation to the court of a seven-year prison sentence stayed, with seven years of probation and nine to twelve months in the House of Correction as a condition of probation; or a recommendation to the court of an imposed and stayed sentence of incarceration and probation with a period of time in the House of Correction, leaving the length of all terms to the court's discretion. By asking probing questions, the court clarified the plea agreement. In the discussion, the district attorney corrected his description of the agreement, and defense counsel explained to the defendant: Hampton answered, "Yes."
¶ 14. In the colloquy, the court addressed both the maximum penalty for the offense and the defendant's understanding of the terms of the plea agreement:
¶ 15. The court engaged in extensive discussion with the defendant. At no point, however, did the circuit court personally advise the defendant that it was not bound by the plea agreement, or ask the defendant whether he understood that the court was not bound by the plea agreement. The State does not contend that the court's statements about "leaving it up to the Court to determine what the imposed and stayed sentence is" or "the length of those sentences would be up to the Court" were anything more than summaries of part of the State's second...
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