State v. Hampton
| Decision Date | 06 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2011–1473.,2011–1473. |
| Citation | 983 N.E.2d 324,134 Ohio St.3d 447 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HAMPTON, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, Chief Counsel, Appellate Division, for appellant.
Tyack, Blackmore, Liston & Nigh Co., L.P.A., and Jonathan T. Tyack, Columbus, for appellee.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, Lauren S. Kuley, Deputy Solicitor, pro hac vice, and Morgan A. Linn, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Valerie Kunze, Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender.
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Public Defender.
[Ohio St.3d 447]{¶ 1} The issue in this appeal is whether a judgment of a court purporting to grant an acquittal based on lack of venue is a “final verdict” as that term is defined in R.C. 2945.67(A), which authorizes the state to appeal certain trial court decisions either as a matter of right or by leave of court. In accordance with well-established case law, the Tenth District Court of Appeals concluded here that the order purporting to acquit Emmanuel Hampton for failure to establish venue was a final verdict and could not be appealed. We affirm the court of appeals' judgment.
[Ohio St.3d 448]{¶ 2} The failure to establish venue in a criminal felony trial is a basis for acquittal, and therefore, an acquittal order based on the failure to establish venue is a final verdict, and the state may not appeal from the order.
{¶ 3} On the evening of December 30, 2005, Byron Woods and his family were the victims of a home invasion in which Woods suffered serious injury from gunshot wounds. The assailant escaped. In August 2008, DNA recovered from a coat at the scene was found to match the DNA of Emmanuel Hampton, who was 17 years old on December 30, 2005.
{¶ 4} On March 5, 2010, following a bindover from Franklin County Juvenile Court, a Franklin County grand jury indicted Hampton on a number of charges including attempted murder, felonious assault, aggravated burglary, and two counts of kidnapping, all with firearm specifications, and an additional count of having a weapon while under disability. The indictment alleged that he committed the offenses in Franklin County. Hampton waived a jury trial, and the case was tried to the court.
{¶ 5} After trial began, but before the state rested, the investigating detective testified that he had just learned that these offenses had occurred in Fairfield County, not in Franklin County. When the state concluded its case-in-chief, the defense moved for acquittal based on the lack of evidence identifying Hampton as the person who had committed the crimes and based on a lack of venue. The court then denied the motion for acquittal based on lack of identification, withheld its ruling on acquittal for failure to establish venue, but permitted the parties to conduct further research on the venue issue. The defense rested its case without presenting any evidence and with the understanding that the court had not yet rendered a decision on its acquittal motion. The defense renewed its motion for acquittal, and in response, the state moved to dismiss one count of kidnapping and the weapons-under-disability charge, and the court dismissed those charges with prejudice. At a hearing on the venue issue, the court denied the state's motion for a mistrial, concluded that the state had not proved venue, and granted the defense motion for acquittal.
{¶ 6} The state appealed as of right and also moved for leave to appeal. The appellate court concluded, “A judgment of acquittal is a final verdict for purposes of R.C. 2945.67(A) and cannot be appealed by the state.” 2011-Ohio-3486, 2011 WL 2739523, ¶ 20. It therefore denied the state's motion for leave to appeal and dismissed the state's claimed appeal as a matter of right.
{¶ 7} We accepted the state's discretionary appeal, State v. Hampton, 130 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2011-Ohio-6124, 957 N.E.2d 1167, and now consider three propositions of law:
[Ohio St.3d 449]Proposition of Law No. 1. In determining whether a trial court ruling is a “final verdict” because it is based on Crim.R. 29, an appellate court must review the actual nature of the ruling, not just the label the trial court attached to the ruling. If the record shows that the trial court's ruling went beyond the sufficiency-of-evidence review allowed by Crim.R. 29, the State can appeal pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A).
Proposition of Law No. 2. Lack of venue cannot result in an “acquittal” under Crim.R. 29 because motions under that rule are limited to claims of lack of proof of one or more material elements of the offense. Venue is not a material element of the offense.
Proposition of Law No. 3. A trial court's granting of a Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal is not a “final verdict.” The State can appeal such a ruling by leave of court under R.C. 2945.67(A) when such an appeal does not violate double jeopardy. ( State ex rel. Yates v. Court of Appeals for Montgomery Cty., 32 Ohio St.3d 30, 512 N.E.2d 343 (1987), overruled.)
{¶ 8} Hampton urges that the Ohio Constitution provides a right to have a criminal case heard in the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed and contends that the state's failure to present any evidence of proper venue in its case-in-chief should result in an acquittal because evidence of venue is required to sustain a conviction. He maintains that a reviewing court should not look beyond the court's judgment to determine whether or not that court has acquitted an accused and claims that an attempt to appeal an order purporting to acquit a defendant for lack of venue violates double-jeopardy protections.
{¶ 9} Thus, we are asked to consider whether a judgment purporting to grant an acquittal based on lack of venue is a “final verdict” as that term is used in R.C. 2945.67(A).
{¶ 10} The state's first and third propositions of law are interrelated and will be discussed together. In these propositions, the state argues that the judgment of acquittal issued by the trial court under Crim.R. 29 is appealable under R.C. 2945.67(A). The state then argues that the longstanding precedent found in State ex rel. Yates v. Montgomery Cty. Court of Appeals, 32 Ohio St.3d 30, 512 N.E.2d 343 (1987), and its progeny should be overruled.
[Ohio St.3d 450]I. An Order of Acquittal Is Not Appealable
{¶ 11} R.C. 2945.67(A) provides that the state “may appeal as a matter of right any decision of a trial court in a criminal case * * * which decision grants a motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment, complaint, or information * * * and may appeal by leave of the court to which the appeal is taken any other decision, except the final verdict, of the trial court in a criminal case.”
{¶ 12} In State v. Keeton, 18 Ohio St.3d 379, 481 N.E.2d 629 (1985), and Yates, 32 Ohio St.3d 30, 512 N.E.2d 343, we examined whether a judgment of acquittal is a “final verdict” for purposes of R.C. 2945.67(A). In Keeton, a trial judge directed judgments of acquittal on the basis that the chain of evidence was not properly established and preserved. The state sought to appeal the ruling of law underlying these judgments but did not appeal the judgments of acquittal. The appellate court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the state's appeal. On review, we held that a directed verdict of acquittal was a “final verdict” within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67(A) and that the state could not appeal as a matter of right or by leave pursuant to R.C. 2945.67. Two years later, in Yates, on petition for a writ of prohibition, we examined whether a judgment of acquittal entered by a trial court pursuant to Crim.R. 29 was a final verdict within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67. Following Keeton, we stated: “A judgment of acquittal by the trial judge, based upon Crim.R. 29(C), is a final verdict within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67(A) and is not appealable by the state as a matter of right or by leave to appeal pursuant to that statute.” Yates, syllabus.
{¶ 13} Crim.R. 29(A) states: “The court * * * shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” The trial court's judgment entry granted an acquittal and discharged Hampton “pursuant to Rule 29 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure based strictly on the issue of Venue.” Thus, the trial court granted Hampton's motion to acquit pursuant to Crim.R. 29 because the state had failed to prove that any of the alleged offenses had been committed in Franklin County as alleged in the indictment.
{¶ 14} Similar to the issue in Yates, the issue in this case is whether a court's order purporting to grant an acquittal for lack of venue is a “final verdict” for purposes of R.C. 2945.67(A).
{¶ 15} The Tenth District Court of Appeals properly dismissed the state's appeal of an order of acquittal. “A court of record speaks only though its journal and not by oral pronouncement or mere written minute or memorandum.” Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109, 113 N.E.2d 625 (1953), paragraph one of the syllabus. Here, the trial court plainly entered a “final verdict” within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67(A), a judgment that is “not appealable by the state as a [Ohio St.3d 451]matter of right or by leave to appeal pursuant to that statute.” Keeton, 18 Ohio St.3d 379, 481 N.E.2d 629, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 16} The Tenth District Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the state's appeal. The state had no right to have the order of...
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