State v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 19 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 90811–7.,90811–7.
• Citation: 184 Wash.2d 656,361 P.3d 734
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Matthew Alexander HAMPTON, Respondent.

184 Wash.2d 656

361 P.3d 734

STATE of Washington, Petitioner,

v.Matthew Alexander HAMPTON, Respondent.

No. 90811–7.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 26, 2015.

Decided Nov. 19, 2015.

Mary Kathleen Webber, Prosecuting Attorney Snohomish, Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney, Everett, WA, for Petitioner.

Washington Appellate Project, Kathleen A. Shea, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Opinion

OWENS, J.

¶ 1 On the eve of Matthew Hampton's trial, Hampton moved to replace his appointed counsel with a new private attorney on the condition that the trial be continued so his new counsel could prepare. The trial court denied the continuance, so Hampton proceeded with his previously appointed counsel. He was ultimately convicted of third degree rape. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the trial court's decision violated Hampton's constitutional right to his choice of counsel because it considered Hampton's reasons for wanting a new attorney. State v. Hampton,182 Wash.App. 805, 332 P.3d 1020 (2014). The Court of Appeals relied on a United States Supreme Court opinion that held that when a defendant's right to choice of counsel is erroneously denied, a defendant need not show prejudice in order to obtain relief. Id.at 810, 332 P.3d 1020(quoting United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez,548 U.S. 140, 146, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006)).

¶ 2 We reverse the Court of Appeals. A trial court has wide latitude to grant or deny a motion to delay trial related to a defendant's request to change counsel.State v. Aguirre,168 Wash.2d 350, 365, 229 P.3d 669 (2010). In making such a decision, trial courts should consider the factual context for the motion, which can include—among other factors—a defendant's reasons for dissatisfaction with existing counsel. The United States Supreme Court explained that its Gonzalez–Lopezdecision did not affect or undermine its previous rulings to that effect. 548 U.S. at 151, 126 S.Ct. 2557. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hampton's request to delay trial to allow him to replace his counsel given that (1) he did not make his request until the day his trial was scheduled to start, (2) his trial had already been continued once, (3) the victim/witness opposed the continuance, and (4) he did not explain his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel.

FACTS

¶ 3 For an incident that occurred with an 18–year–old female friend of his son, the State charged Hampton with indecent liberties, which charge was later amended to rape in the second degree. His trial was originally set for July 13, 2012, but the parties jointly moved for a continuance until August 31, 2012.

¶ 4 On August 31, 2012, Hampton moved to replace his appointed counsel with a new private attorney. The replacement was contingent on the trial court granting a continuance to allow the new private attorney to prepare for trial. Hampton explained that he had not had a good relationship with his court-appointed counsel and that he had recently obtained funds to hire a private attorney. The State opposed the motion, contending that it was untimely and would delay the trial. The State also indicated that the victim opposed the continuance and that the State had concerns about the defendant interfering with a witness.

¶ 5 The trial judge indicated that she would allow the substitution of counsel but not the continuance. She explained, “I don't think that a compelling record has been made as to why the Court essentially on the day of trial should grant a continuance of a case that has already been continued.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Aug. 31, 2012) at 8. She indicated that Hampton's appointed counsel was “a very capable attorney” and that she was not “being given much reason other than apparently some other source decided to provide the funds today.” Id.at 7–8. She also noted that the court was being asked to take the victim's position on the continuance into account. She concluded, “I'm not inclined to grant this continuance at this late of stage when there is competent counsel who is prepared to go forward.” Id.at 9.

¶ 6 Hampton proceeded to trial with his original appointed counsel and was convicted of third degree rape. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the trial court's decision violated Hampton's right to his choice of counsel. Hampton,182 Wash.App. at 825–26, 332 P.3d 1020. The Court of Appeals relied on Gonzalez–Lopezfor the proposition that when a trial court is deciding whether to delay trial to allow a defendant to choose different counsel, it cannot consider a defendant's reasons for desiring new counsel. Id.at 822, 332 P.3d 1020(citing Gonzalez–Lopez,548 U.S. at 144, 126 S.Ct. 2557).

¶ 7 The State petitioned for review, which we granted.¹State v. Hampton,182 Wash.2d 1002, 342 P.3d 327 (2015).

ISSUE

¶ 8 Did the trial court's decision to deny Hampton's motion for continuance violate Hampton's right to his choice of counsel?

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally includes the defendant's right to his or her choice of private counsel.Aguirre,168 Wash.2d at 365, 229 P.3d 669. However, a defendant's choice has limitations, particularly when a defendant's desire to choose new counsel affects “the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Id.The balancing of a defendant's right to choice of counsel with a trial court's need to efficiently administer justice “falls squarely within the discretion of the trial court.” Id.The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion because it considered, among other factors, Hampton's reasons for desiring new counsel. The Court of Appeals based its decision on a United States Supreme Court case, Gonzalez–Lopez.As explained below, that reliance is misplaced. As many other courts have held, Gonzalez–Lopezdid not affect the factors that a trial court can consider when deciding whether to grant a defendant's request to replace his or her attorney. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Hampton's reasons for wanting new counsel.

1. Overview of the Right to Counsel of Choice

¶ 10 As part of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, defendants with private attorneys generally have the right to the counsel of their choice. Id.; Gonzalez–Lopez,548 U.S. at 144, 126 S.Ct. 2557. In contrast, indigent defendants with appointed counsel do not have the right to their counsel of choice. Gonzalez–Lopez,548 U.S. at 151, 126 S.Ct. 2557(“the right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them”). Instead, indigent defendants can move to substitute counsel when there is an “irreconcilable conflict” with appointed counsel. In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson,142 Wash.2d 710, 723–24, 16 P.3d 1 (2001). As noted by the Court of Appeals, that “irreconcilable conflict” standard relates only to defendants with appointed counsel and does not apply to defendants retaining private attorneys. Hampton,182 Wash.App. at 821 n. 13, 332 P.3d 1020.

¶ 11 However, even for defendants with private attorneys, the right to counsel of choice is not absolute. Gonzalez–Lopez,548 U.S. at 151, 126 S.Ct. 2557. For instance, a defendant does not have the right to be represented by a person who is not a licensed attorney. Id.at 151–52, 126 S.Ct. 2557. Relevant to this case, the United States Supreme Court has explained that one of the basic limits on the right to counsel of choice is “a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice ... against the demands of its calendar.” Id.at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557. We have characterized that balancing by the trial court as “weigh[ing] the defendant's right to choose his counsel against the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Aguirre,168 Wash.2d at 365, 229 P.3d 669. “The resolution of this balancing exercise falls squarely within the discretion of the trial court.” Id.

¶ 12 This balancing often occurs in cases like this, where a defendant desires new counsel but requires a continuance to do so. The United States Supreme Court has explained that we review a trial court's denial of a continuance to determine whether it was “so arbitrary as to violate due process.” Ungar v. Sarafite,376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). At issue in this case is what factors a trial court can consider when deciding whether to grant a continuance to allow substitution of counsel and, in particular, whether a trial court can consider a defendant's reasons for wanting a different attorney.

2. Factors That Trial Courts Can Consider When Ruling on a Continuance Related to a Defendant's Choice of Counsel

¶ 13 We have not previously addressed what factors a trial court can or should consider when deciding whether to grant a continuance related to a defendant's choice of counsel. As described below, the Court of Appeals previously identified four factors a trial court should consider, but it overruled that precedent in this case. Hampton,182 Wash.App. at 820–24, 332 P.3d 1020. The Court of Appeals held that two of those previously identified factors conflicted with a subsequent United States Supreme Court case (Gonzalez–Lopez) and should no longer be considered by trial courts. Id.We reverse the Court of Appeals. Like most other courts that have considered this issue, we hold that Gonzalez–Lopezdid not limit the factors that trial courts can consider when balancing a defendant's right to choice of counsel and a trial court's need to manage its calendar.

A. The Court of Appeals' Previously Adopted Four–FactorRoth Test

¶ 14 In 1994, the Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's denial of a defendant's second motion to continue the trial to allow his lead counsel to be present during jury selection....