State v. Hamrick
| Decision Date | 03 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2179,97-2179 |
| Citation | 595 N.W.2d 492 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Chad A. HAMRICK, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Matthew S. Sheeley of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn & Montgomery, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, and Barbara Edmondson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
We have taken discretionary review of this case pursuant to Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(e) (1997). Defendant, Chad A. Hamrick, challenges the State's alleged breach of a plea agreement and its filing of additional charges. To the extent the defendant's claims raise constitutional issues, our review is de novo. State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Iowa 1994).
On September 15, 1995, the Washington county attorney filed charges against the defendant of false imprisonment, harassment, and assault. On October 24, 1996, the State dismissed all the pending charges against Hamrick pursuant to a plea agreement into which the parties had entered. That plea agreement, among other things, required Hamrick to (1) plead guilty to simple misdemeanor charges of harassment and assault; (2) serve twenty days in jail and pay a $100 fine; (3) participate in a sixteen-week batterers' education class; and (4) enter the United States army for a minimum of four years. The agreement further required Hamrick to plead guilty to the false imprisonment charge; however, the State agreed to defer its prosecution as long as Hamrick complied with the armed service requirement. That agreement stated:
As part of this agreement the Defendant must enter the U.S. Army or other full-time military service and serve a term of active duty of at least four years. For whatever possible reasons, whether within his control or outside his control, if Defendant is unable to enter the U.S. military within five months of the State's dismissal of Count III of the Trial Information, the same shall be a breach of his obligations under this agreement, and shall be grounds for the State to proceed to refile the charge contained in Count III and to file Defendant's written guilty plea....
Count III was the charge of false imprisonment.
No branch of the armed services was willing to take Hamrick, though, because of his participation in the batterers' education program. Apparently, the services would not accept any individual with a history of domestic abuse, which they interpreted the batterers' education classes as signifying.
Based on Hamrick's failure to enter military service and consequential breach of the plea agreement, the State filed a second information charging him with false imprisonment. It subsequently dismissed the charge pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(1).
Then, on August 1, 1997, the State filed a third information against Hamrick charging him with third-degree felony kidnaping in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1 and 710.4. The new heightened charge was based on the same facts as the previous false imprisonment charges.
The defendant moved to dismiss the kidnaping charge arguing that it violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because the previous dismissals of the false imprisonment charge constituted acquittals of a lesser-included offense. He also maintained that the plea agreement violated his due process rights because the State imposed an impossible condition, i.e., entry into the military by an individual who has attended the batterers' education program.
The court denied the motion to dismiss finding that, for purposes of double jeopardy, kidnaping and false imprisonment were separate and distinct crimes. Following this ruling, the defendant filed an application for discretionary review which we granted.
In his appeal, Hamrick asserts the kidnaping prosecution offends double jeopardy under the United States and Iowa Constitutions and Iowa Code sections 816.1 and 816.2. He further contends the kidnaping charge is vindictive and a violation of his due process rights under both the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
The plea agreement at issue here was entered into by the defendant and the county attorney for the State on February 6, 1996. The State, apparently relying on the efficacy of the plea agreement that defendant would enter the army, moved to dismiss all charges on October 24, 1996, in the interest of justice. The court entered its order the same day dismissing all counts. When the county attorney learned of the failure of the plea agreement, a new charge of false imprisonment was filed on June 27, 1997. On being advised by an assistant attorney general that Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(1) might bar the prosecution of the false imprisonment charges, the county attorney moved to dismiss the charge. Noting the dismissal as occurring under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(1), the court dismissed the charge "in the furtherance of justice."
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(1) provides:
The court, upon its own motion or the application of the prosecuting attorney, in the furtherance of justice, may order the dismissal of any pending criminal prosecution, the reasons therefore being stated in the order and entered of record, and no such prosecution shall be discontinued or abandoned in any other manner. Such a dismissal is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense if it is a simple or serious misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense charged be a felony or an aggravated misdemeanor.
Subsequently, a new charge alleging third-degree kidnaping was filed.
We have previously ruled on the effect of dismissal under rule 27(1). In State v. Fisher, 351 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Iowa 1984), we held the State was not precluded from refiling previously dismissed charges when the dismissal had been in the furtherance of justice and not to avoid the bar of the speedy trial rule. The "furtherance of justice" includes " 'facilitating the State in gathering evidence, procuring witnesses, or plea bargaining.' " Fisher, 351 N.W.2d at 801 (quoting State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Iowa 1974)). 1
Although we are not concerned in the instant case with the speedy trial rule, the analysis in Fisher of rule 27(1) provides the appropriate framework for addressing the issues raised and now considered. Each of the two dismissals of the false imprisonment charge was done, on application of the county attorney, "in the furtherance of justice." The State dismissed the first charge on its belief that the terms of the plea agreement would be fulfilled. The reason for the second dismissal was the failure of the plea agreement, the language of which was plain and unambiguous. It provides that a breach occurs if the defendant does not enter the army within five months of the dismissal of the false imprisonment charge, "for whatever possible reasons" and "whether within his control or outside his control." This language excludes any exception based on the army's election not to accept the defendant in the army.
We conclude that when the plea agreement failed, the State was free under rule 27(1) to file the new charge of third-degree kidnaping because this felony charge was not the "same offense" as the previously dismissed false imprisonment charge. See Iowa R.Crim.P. 27(1). In fact, rule 27(1) would not have posed an obstacle to the State's attempt to reinstate the original misdemeanor charge since the State was entitled to be returned to its original position upon the defendant's failure to perform the plea agreement. See State v. Foy, 574 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1998) ().
Defendant makes further claims of being subjected to double jeopardy and vindictive prosecution. The language of rule 27(1) itself belies the double jeopardy argument by stating that a dismissal in the furtherance of justice is not a bar to prosecution of an offense charged as a felony or aggravated misdemeanor. See State v. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa 1159, 1167, 157 N.W.2d 128, 133 (1968) ().
In State v. Henderson, 537 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Iowa 1995), we approved of the application of a good faith standard to these questions. In Henderson we found:
[T]he trial court's standard was effective in protecting the defendant from abusive tactics by the State. The district court reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties and found that the State had filed the ... charge in good faith. This procedure will protect a defendant when the state files inflated charges merely to avoid the potential...
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