State v. Hancock
| Decision Date | 01 July 1976 |
| Docket Number | CA-CR,No. 1,1 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Carol L. HANCOCK, Appellant. 1604. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Carol L. Hancock (Hancock), pled guilty to one count of burglary and one count of grand theft. At the time of sentencing, the trial court sentenced her as follows:
'No legal cause appearing to the court, and by reason of your plea of guilty, it is the judgment of this court that you are guilty of the crime Count One, Burglary, a felony, and Count Two, Grand Theft, a felony.
On appeal, Hancock contends that the sentence did not specifically designate the sentence for each offense and was therefore ambiguous and invalid. She also contends that the sentence was excessive. Because we agree with her first contention and remand this cause for resentencing, we do not reach the second issue.
As to the first issue, the maximum sentence that Hancock could have received for the burglary conviction was 5 years. A.R.S. § 13--302. 1 The maximum that she could have received for the grand theft count was 10 years. A.R.S. § 13--671. Thus the sentence imposed exceeds the maximum permitted for the burglary count, but is within the permissible range for the grand theft count.
The State argues that the sentence was imposed only for the grand theft conviction and no sentence was imposed for the burglary conviction. However, we are unable to interpret the trial court's actions in this manner. First, it is clear that the trial court was aware that Hancock had pled guilty to two separate counts. There is simply no rational explanation for the trial court to overlook sentencing her for one of these counts. Second, it appears to us that the trial court's reference to 'this crime' refers to the entire episode which led to both the burglary and the grand theft counts. We do not think that it can fairly be interpreted to refer simply to the grand theft offense. Finally, the signed minute order imposing the sentence does not differentiate between the counts and imposes the 7 to 10 year sentence for both counts. Consequently, it is unclear whether the burglary count is to run concurrently with the grand theft count or whether the 7 to 10 year sentence is the result of consecutive sentence being imposed for the grand theft and burglary. The trial court, in effect, imposed a general sentence for both counts and did not specifically designate how the sentence was to be apportioned.
There is little dispute that a sentence must be certain and definite in order to be valid. State v. Owen, 2 Ariz.App. 580, 410 P.2d 698 (1966); State v. Robinson, 6 Ariz.App. 419, 433 P.2d 70 (1967). There is no doubt that this sentence is ambiguous. The question is whether it is sufficiently ambiguous to justify a remand for resentencing.
There is a split in authority regarding the validity of a single sentence for several counts of the indictment. This single sentence is referred to as a 'general sentence'. See Annot. 91 ALR2d 511 (1963).
The majority rule is that such a general sentence is permissible. Ray v. United States, 372 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1967); Johnson v. United States, 276 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1960); Vandegrift v. State, 226 Md. 38, 171 A.2d 173 (1961); Annot. 91 ALR2d 511 (1963); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1597(4). The majority concludes that the practical consequences to the defendants are precisely the same no matter how the court chose to apportion the sentence. The majority view is that there is no practical reason to remand such cases for resentencing.
However, even the cases upholding such sentences criticize the procedure and concede that it is a better practice for the court to specify the sentence for each individual count. Ray, supra, (the loose practice of imposing a general sentence is definitely to be discouraged); Johnson, supra, (we are persuaded that by far the better practice is for the trial court in its sentence expressly to apply the punishment it awards to the separate counts upon which prisoners have been convicted . . .)
The rationale behind the minority view is clearly set forth in Benson v. United States, 332 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1964). After concluding that the other federal circuit courts had adopted a view that general sentencing was permissible, the court reasoned as follows:
'The question is now before us whether a different conclusion should be reached. In doing so we do not repudiate what has been decided previously. We start with the universal recognition that the practice, while permissible, is unsatisfactory. What this case presents is an indication that this unwise, unsatisfactory practice is becoming so frequent that this presents a new factor calling for reexamination which likewise frees the Court from any notion that decision of the present problem has been foreclosed.
'There is first the basic idea that a criminal sentence should be plain, unequivocal, and so free from doubt that those concerned--accused, sentencing Court, reviewing Court, and prison authorities--will know precisely what the punishment is. One thing sure about the so-called 'general sentence' for a total term greater than the maximum of one count but less than the aggregate of all maximums is that no one--accused, reviewing Court, prison authorities, or sentencing Court--knows what the real sentence is. A sentence is passed not because the defendant is a social outcast or needs chastisement generally. It is the law's punishment for specific trangressions of its formalized standards. It seems to us that everything points to the importance of an articipate, identifiable sentence being imposed. If that is what the law reasonably requires and prefers, then a sentence varying from that standard is, in the words of F.R.Crim.P. 35, 'illegal.'
The court also reasoned that a general sentence foreclosed the use of the concurrent sentence doctrine 2, and thus required unnecessary effort by the courts with regard to both direct appeals and post conviction motions.
The court concluded:
'All recognize that one of the most important functions to be performed by criminal law and its integral component, the prison system, is rehabilitation of the offender. Viewed in this context, the general sentence is undesirable because it does not clearly indicate to the offender what sentence has been imposed for what conviction. We can appreciate fully the likelihood that those experienced in this field have found that a clear understanding by the prisoner of the sentence imposed for the particular offense involved is most helpful in the rehabilitation process.
'Although we have never before undertaken to...
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State v. Quinonez
...not specify which sentencing range applied, Defendant argues that he received an illegal "general" sentence, citing State v. Hancock, 27 Ariz.App. 164, 552 P.2d 220 (1976). We agree that the trial court should have specified which sentencing range it applied, but we do not agree that the re......
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State v. Munoz
...must be sentenced such that "the defendant will know . . . the order in which the sentences . . . are to be served." State v. Hancock, 27 Ariz. App. 164, 166 (1976) (quoting Benson v. United States, 332 F.2d 288, 292 (5th Cir. 1964)). Here, the sentencing order is unclear as to which senten......