State v. Haney
| Decision Date | 25 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 105,685.,105,685. |
| Citation | 299 Kan. 256,323 P.3d 164 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Charles HANEY, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. Pursuant to K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–3424(e)(4), a convicted criminal defendant has the right to present to the sentencing court any evidence in mitigation of punishment.
2. An erroneous denial of a defendant's motion for continuance to obtain and present mitigating evidence in support of a motion for a durational departure sentence is not harmless where the sentencing court denies the departure motion based upon the defendant's failure to present evidence in support of the departure.
Gerald E. Wells, of Lawrence, was on the brief for appellant.
Amy L. Aranda, assistant county attorney, Marc Goodman, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
After being charged with numerous sex offenses involving his teenage stepdaughter, Charles Haney agreed to plead nolo contendere to one count each of aggravated sodomy and attempted aggravated sodomy. In exchange for the plea, the State dismissed the other charges and agreed to a sentencing recommendation that permitted Haney to seek a shorter prison term through a durational departure, but he could not seek probation. Although the district court knew that the Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS) had approved Haney's request to fund a sex offender evaluation to use in support of his motion for a durational departure sentence, the court denied Haney's request to continue the sentencing hearing to allow for the completion of that evaluation. The Court of Appeals found the district court's continuance denial was erroneous but harmless. State v. Haney, No. 105,685, 2012 WL 3135719, at *4 (Kan.App.2012) (unpublished opinion). We granted review.
Finding that the district court committed reversible error by denying Haney's motion to continue the sentencing hearing, we vacate his sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Given our disposition, Haney's request for a remand pursuant to State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, Syl. ¶ 2, 716 P.2d 580 (1986), for a hearing on the effectiveness of his counsel is rendered moot.
The circumstances giving rise to the numerous sex offenses Haney allegedly committed against his teenage stepdaughter are not germane to this appeal. The important fact is that the agreement prompting Haney's nolo contendere plea permitted him to file a motion for a durational departure from the sentence recommended in the plea agreement. The State's agreed-upon recommendation was consecutive sentences of 155 months for the aggravated criminal sodomy charge and 61 months for the attempted aggravated criminal sodomy charge. Although the agreement allowed Haney to ask the court for a reduced prison term, he could not seek a dispositional departure to probation.
At the plea hearing, Haney requested that the district court approve funding for an expert to conduct a sex offender evaluation to support his motion for a durational departure. Specifically, Haney believed that expert testimony could establish that the acts he committed were aberrational and that he posed no risk for committing similar offenses in the future. The district court did not object to Haney's request for an expert opinionbut instructed Haney to seek the evaluation funding through BIDS.
Prior to the sentencing date that had been set by the court, Haney filed a motion to continue, claiming that he was still awaiting funding approval from BIDS for his sex offender evaluation. At the hearing on the continuance motion, Haney's trial attorney advised the district court that BIDS had since approved the funding; the evaluation could be conducted in the following 2 weeks; a report would be issued 10 days after the evaluation; and, accordingly, Haney was requesting a 1–month continuance of the sentencing hearing. The district court denied the motion, finding that the sex offender evaluation would only be relevant to the type of treatment that Haney would need if he obtained probation, which was not an option in his case. Furthermore, the court opined that the purpose of a professional sex offender evaluation could be fulfilled through another method, to-wit: “Or we can put Mr. Haney on the stand and he can testify, and I [the district judge] could look him in the eye and determine whether he's telling the Court the truth or not and determine whether that's an appropriate sentence or not.”
After the court refused to continue the sentencing hearing to allow Haney to obtain the departure evidence he sought, Haney filed a written motion for departure, simply arguing, inter alia, that the crimes of conviction were completely out of character for him; that he had no record of sexual or physical violence; and that the evidence did not suggest that he was a danger to the community at large or to the victim. The district court denied the departure motion, ironically declaring that “there's really no evidence, only argument, as to whether a departure should be granted.” Subsequently, the district court sentenced Haney to consecutive terms of 155 months and 61 months, pursuant to the State's recommendation.
Haney filed a timely appeal, arguing that the district court erred in refusing to continue sentencing so he could present evidence in mitigation of his punishment, pursuant to K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–3424(e)(4), and to support his motion for downward departure, pursuant to K.S.A. 21–4716. Haney argued that the sex offender evaluation would have provided the court with scientific evidence to support a lesser sentence.
In addition, Haney requested the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the district court in order to conduct a Van Cleave hearing on his claim that his sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the judge recuse himself. That claim was founded upon Haney's sworn statement that his trial counsel had advised him that the judge presiding over his case was biased against defendants charged with sex offenses, giving two specific instances where the judge had displayed his prejudice.
The Court of Appeals found that “the district court abused its discretion in denying Haney the additional opportunity to present mitigation evidence under K.S.A.2011 Supp. 22–3424(e)(4),” but it opined that the allocution error was harmless. Haney, 2012 WL 3135719, at *4. The panel also refused to remand Haney's ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the district court for a Van Cleave hearing, apparently because it found no merit to his allegations of ineffectiveness. 2012 WL 3135719, at *5. We granted Haney's timely petition for review.
Haney challenges the district court's denial of his motion to continue the sentencing hearing in order to permit him to obtain a sex offender evaluation to use as evidence in support of his departure motion. Haney claims that denying the continuance effectively denied him the right under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 22–3424(e)(4) “to present any evidence in mitigation of punishment” and foreclosed the court's consideration of any mitigating circumstances that might have been revealed by the evaluation. See K.S.A. 21–4716(c)(1) ().
K.S.A. 22–3401 provides that the district court may grant a continuance “for good cause shown,” and that provision is applicable to sentencing hearings. See State v. Beaman, 295 Kan. 853, 862–63, 286 P.3d 876 (2012). In a criminal case, the decision to continue a case lies within the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Cook, 281 Kan. 961, 986, 135 P.3d 1147 (2006). Accordingly, we generally review a denial of a continuance on an abuse of discretion standard by determining whether the ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. But an abuse of discretion can occur where the ruling is based on an error of law, i.e., the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion, or where the ruling is based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the...
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State v. Brown
...arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e ., no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Haney , 299 Kan. 256, 259, 323 P.3d 164 (2014). An abuse of discretion may also occur when the trial court's "ruling is based on an error of law, i.e. , the discretion......
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...under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3424(e) is a statutory right. And if any error exists, it can be harmless. See State v. Haney , 299 Kan. 256, 261-62, 323 P.3d 164 (2014) (applying harmless error analysis for violation of statutory rights for failure to comply with K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3424 [e][4......
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