State v. Hankins, 62307

Decision Date03 December 1982
Docket NumberNo. 2,No. 62307,62307,2
Citation642 S.W.2d 606
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ronnie HANKINS, a/k/a Cecil Hankins, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

J. Miles Sweeney, Springfield, for appellant.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Nancy Kelley Baker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

ALDEN A. STOCKARD, Senior Judge.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of capital murder, § 565.001 RSMo 1978, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for fifty years.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. This necessitates a rather detailed statement of the evidence.

On February 12, 1979, when appellant returned to his home in Springfield, Missouri he saw police cars at his house. He then drove to his brother's house and called Sharon Walburn, with whom he had resided for several years, and asked her why the police were after him. During the conversation appellant stated to Sharon that he was "tired of running" and that he would "just go out and get drunk," and if the police stopped him, he would "have it out with them." He also stated that he "thought about doing a guy in * * * a guy off the railroad tracks, but that he couldn't do it because it wouldn't look like him."

On February 14, appellant and his brother, Billy Hankins, drove to Sparta, Missouri, where appellant withdrew $800 from his savings account at the Citizens Bank of Sparta, leaving a balance of $36.17. He also made two withdrawals from a checking account, one for $63.00 and the other for $200, leaving a balance of $15.25. Appellant and his brother then returned to Springfield, and appellant called his mother and asked her to "watch his two kids." He "indicated that he was going to do an armed robbery." Appellant's brother took the children to his sister's home in Springfield where his mother was staying.

Appellant had a 3/4 ton black Ford pickup truck and he asked his brother to follow him. Billy was driving a yellow Charger. They drove to Oldfield, then to UU Highway about seven miles from T Highway to a wooded area. Appellant backed the yellow Charger into the woods, and he and Billy then got into the Ford pickup and returned to Billy's home in Springfield, arriving about 6:15 p.m. Appellant again called his mother and Billy heard appellant again ask her if she would "take care of his kids" and he "indicated to her that he was going to do an armed robbery," and that "he'd just shoot it out with them." He then left in the pickup truck. While returning to Springfield, Billy noted that there was "a .30-.30 rifle, a shotgun and a gas can" in the pickup truck. Appellant returned to Billy's home about 2:30 or 2:45 the next morning. According to Billy, appellant "smelled a little like gas." Appellant took a bath and changed clothes. When he returned to Billy's house he was driving the yellow Charger which he and Billy earlier that day had left on Highway VV in a wooded area. He did not say anything as to the whereabouts of the pickup truck. Appellant and Billy drove to Sharon's house in Springfield, but did not stop, and they then drove to Fort Leonard Wood to the bus depot where appellant bought a ticket for Twin Falls, Idaho, and gave his name as Michael Hatcher. Billy left appellant at the bus station and returned to Springfield in the Charger arriving about 10:00 a.m. on February 15. About 4:00 o'clock that afternoon appellant called Billy from Kansas City and said that if anyone asked, he, Billy, was to say that he "hadn't seen [appellant] or talked to him since 3:00 o'clock Wednesday afternoon."

Oliver Hankins, appellant's father, lived in Springfield with Sara Fara, his former spouse, during the winter of 1979. Oliver was well acquainted with Otis Ray whom he considered to be an "awful good friend." These two men would frequently drink together. On February 14, they purchased some wine at the Brown Derby Liquor Store on Grant and Commercial Streets, and went to the end of a viaduct to drink the wine. When it was "just getting a little dusky," they decided to go to their respective homes. Oliver saw Ray walk towards the Brown Derby, cross the street, and then get into a black pickup truck which had pulled up as Ray was walking towards the Brown Derby. Oliver never saw Otis Ray again although it was their custom to see each other once or twice a week.

About midnight of February 14, 1979, Randy Hodges was on his way home when he observed a black Ford pickup truck on Highway VV about a half a mile from his house which was burning, and he called the sheriff. He searched the path the truck had taken from the highway but was unable to find anyone. He could not go near the truck because of the intense heat. Bill Ramsey from the Christian County Sheriff's office arrived at the scene about 2:00 o'clock a.m. The cab of the truck was then completely burned, and inside the cab on the floor was what appeared to be a badly burned human body. A 2 1/2 gallon gasoline can was in the cab. The coroner later removed the body from the truck, and the truck was towed to a garage.

Appellant's first point is that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the testimony of Oliver Hankins because "it had been gained through the coercion of [him] by the Associate Circuit Judge during the preliminary hearing, and by the coercion of [him] by the prosecuting attorney in that the prosecuting attorney kept [him] in jail on a perjury charge until he submitted to a deposition [in which he recanted] his testimony at the preliminary hearing."

The transcript of the preliminary hearing has been filed with this Court, but not as an exhibit in the trial. Its status with this Court is not clear. In the transcript of the trial the court noted that there was before the Court "a stipulation as to certain facts, and * * * a motion to suppress, and [that] this stipulation as to certain facts goes to this motion." The Court then commented that the parties agreed that it could look at the motion and read the stipulation in order to make its ruling. We do not have before us the contents of the motion to suppress, nor do we have a copy of the stipulation of facts.

We have read the parts of the transcript of the preliminary hearing referred to by appellant in his brief. It is there shown that Oliver Hankins, appellant's father, testified that he had been acquainted with Otis Ray for more than fifteen years, and that they would "drink a lot together." He testified that in February of 1979 he and Otis Ray went under a railroad overpass and "drank pretty near a pint of wine" and then parted, he going to the north and Otis Ray going back towards the Brown Derby. He testified that he "never seen him [Otis Ray] after he come out of the subway," and that he did not see him get into an automobile with anyone.

At trial, Oliver Hankins was not available to testify, but a deposition previously given by him was read to the jury. The propriety of its use is discussed infra. In that deposition, Mr. Hankins testified that Otis Ray was an "awful good friend" and that they frequently drank together. He further testified that the last time he saw Otis Ray they drank a little over a pint of wine together at "the end of the subway," and that he then saw Otis get in a black pickup truck which was being driven by appellant.

On cross-examination Oliver Hankins testified by deposition that after his testimony at the preliminary hearing he was charged with perjury, was then put in jail, and had remained in jail until the day of the deposition. He further testified that he did not know what the prosecutor would do as the result of his testimony on deposition. On redirect examination he testified that no threats had been made or promises given to him for his testimony. It was stipulated that on the day his deposition was taken, he appeared before the Associate Circuit Judge and was released on his own recognizance, and that no preliminary hearing on the perjury charge had been held.

The allegations of appellant that Oliver Hankins was improperly coerced to change his testimony are based on speculation and conjecture and are not supported by the record before this Court. We note that appellant does not assert that the testimony of Oliver Hankins given on his deposition was false. We find no basis in appellant's first point for reversal of the judgment.

Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred on two occasions when it refused to declare a mistrial when he was "viewed by members of the jury in handcuffs and chains." Appellant argues that a jury "would naturally be more inclined to view [him] as guilty if he was [so] displayed."

The first incident occurred prior to trial. Appellant was taken by the sheriff from the Christian County Court House in Ozark, Missouri to the Douglas County Court House in Ava, Missouri. During such transportation he was placed in handcuffs with a chain around his waist. He was taken to the main entrance of the Douglas County Court House and up the steps. Appellant testified that "there was jurors standing on the steps all the way around when I came through." We note the jury had not yet been selected. Appellant was then taken into the courtroom where the handcuffs and chain were immediately removed. Appellant testified that there were "people" in the courtroom but he did not know whether they were jurors. No one said anything to him and he said nothing to anyone. The second incident occurred the following day at the break for lunch when appellant, while wearing handcuffs, was taken on the way to the sheriff's office down to the north entrance of the courthouse where four or five of the jurors were standing.

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