State v. Hansen, A11-2260
| Decision Date | 19 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | A11-2260 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Duane Charles Hansen, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Clay County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Gregg S. Jensen, Assistant County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)
Charles F. Clippert, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Chutich, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his convictions of fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, disorderly conduct, and possession of an open container of intoxicating liquor, arguingthat (1) his inadequate jury-trial waiver violated his Sixth Amendment rights; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his fourth-degree assault-of-a-peace-officer conviction; (3) the conduct and speech giving rise to his disorderly-conduct conviction was protected by the First Amendment; (4) the evidence was insufficient to charge him with possession of an open container of liquor; and (5) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because appellant did not validly waive his right to a jury trial on the amended charge of fourth-degree assault and the failure to do so affected his substantial rights and denied him a fair trial, we conclude that he is entitled to a new trial on that charge. Because appellant validly waived his right to a jury trial on the disorderly-conduct charge and that charge did not implicate his First-Amendment rights, we affirm his disorderly-conduct conviction. Because the facts are wholly insufficient to support the open-container charge, we reverse that conviction. We also conclude that appellant waived his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial on the charge of fourth-degree assault.
On June 10, 2011, Hawley police chief Glen Hanson and four other officers were approached by appellant Duane Charles Hansen as they were working at a rodeo. Appellant told the officers that they should spread throughout the grounds rather than stand at the top of a hill overlooking the event. Ten minutes later, appellant again approached the officers and began yelling and swearing at them, accusing them of wasting taxpayer dollars and abusing their positions to watch the rodeo for free. Appellant became increasingly confrontational, moving closer to Chief Hanson as he wasyelling. Hanson instructed appellant to leave the rodeo, and along with the other officers, he escorted appellant down a hill toward the exit. As they made their way, appellant "belly-bumped" Hanson several times, and Hanson had to brace himself to absorb each bump. Near the exit, appellant told Hanson he was going to "beat the living sh-t out of him," clenched his fists, and "squared up" to Hanson. Interpreting this as a threatening gesture, the officers arrested appellant.
In the search incident to appellant's arrest, the officers discovered a flask in appellant's pocket that contained a liquid that had an odor of alcohol. Appellant did not smell of alcohol, nor did he exhibit any visible signs of intoxication, and the record does not show that police verified that the liquid was alcohol.
Appellant was initially charged with gross misdemeanor obstruction of legal process, fifth-degree misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor disorderly conduct. At his June 30, 2011 arraignment, the district court informed appellant generally of his right to a jury trial and other constitutional rights. There was no discussion of the composition of the jury, the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict, or disclosure that the judge would act as fact finder if appellant waived his right to a jury trial. Appellant stated that he wanted a bench trial because "judges know the laws a lot better than juries[,] . . . and juries can become confused." The district court advised appellant to consult with his attorney, but appellant's counsel indicated that consultation was unnecessary because appellant had decided to proceed with a bench trial. Appellant again stated that he wanted to "waive a jury trial" on the charged offenses.
On August 10, 2011, the state filed an amended complaint to add one count of fourth-degree gross misdemeanor assault and, under the Hawley city code, one count of misdemeanor possession of an open container of intoxicating liquor. Nothing was put on the record about the appellant's rights relative to the new charges, and no objection was posed by appellant or his counsel.
A bench trial was held on August 17, 2011. The state called Chief Hanson and three other officers as witnesses, and appellant testified on his own behalf. The district court found appellant guilty of fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, disorderly conduct, and possession of an open container of intoxicating liquor. The district court imposed a 365-day sentence, stayed, for the fourth-degree assault offense. This appeal followed.
Validity of jury-trial waiver. An accused is guaranteed the right to a jury trial under both the state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. In Minnesota, "[a] defendant has a right to a trial by jury for any offense punishable by incarceration." Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(1)(a). "Whether a criminal defendant has been denied the right to a jury trial is a constitutional question that we review de novo." State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 848-49 (Minn. 2011).
A defendant may waive his right to a jury trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 88, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1899 (1970). A defendant must personally waive the right to a jury trial "in writing or on the record in open court,after being advised by the court of the right to trial by jury, and after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel." Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a). The waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn. 1991). Before accepting a jury-trial waiver, the district court must be satisfied that the defendant was informed of his rights, that the waiver was voluntary, and that the defendant "understands the basic elements of a jury trial." Id. at 654.
Appellant argues that his jury-trial waiver to the original charges of obstruction of legal process, fifth-degree assault, and disorderly conduct was invalid because the district court made no inquiry to ensure that his waiver was voluntary or that he understood the basic elements of a jury trial. Although the record contains no discussion of the basic elements of a jury trial, appellant's counsel indicated that consultation was unnecessary because appellant had decided to proceed with a bench trial. On review, we must consider whether appellant had sufficient understanding of his constitutional right to voluntarily waive a jury trial.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has encouraged district courts to engage in a colloquy with defendants to ensure that they understand their jury-trial rights and that waivers are not coerced, but it has stopped short of mandating such an inquiry. See State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn. 1979); State v. Johnson, 354 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Minn. App. 1984). In Pietraszewski, the supreme court ruled that an inadequate jury-trial waiver inquiry did not mandate reversal when the defendant's numerous contacts with the district court and "ability to express himself and participate in theproceedings" were sufficient to demonstrate a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right. Id.
Likewise here, appellant had prior criminal convictions and demonstrated by his actions that his waiver of the right to a jury trial was an informed one. See, e.g., State v. Hansen, No. C9-90-998, 1991 WL 21617, at *2 (Minn. App. 1991) (). At appellant's two bail hearings, appellant participated actively, even asking the judge to recuse himself from one bail hearing on the basis that the judge had recused himself "many times" in prior matters involving appellant. Before his arraignment, appellant also submitted two pretrial motions. In addition, appellant gave valid reasons for preferring a bench trial to a jury trial. Because of appellant's frequent prior contacts with the criminal justice system, his active and competent participation in pretrial proceedings, and his plausible explanation about why he preferred a bench trial, the district court did not err in upholding the validity of appellant's jury-trial waiver to the original charged offenses.
First Amendment challenge. Appellant specifically challenges his conviction of disorderly conduct, arguing that his speech and conduct were protected by the First Amendment. He asserts that his speech and conduct were "expressions of frustration with what he perceived as a waste of government resources." In reviewing a First Amendment challenge to a disorderly conduct conviction, we "review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and then determine, as a matter of law, whether the defendant's language under that set of circumstances falls outside the protection of the First Amendment." In re Welfare of M.A.H., 572 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App. 1997).
Appellant repeatedly bumped into Chief Hanson as he was being escorted from the rodeo. After threatening to "beat the living sh-t" out of Chief Hanson, appellant clenched his fists and faced Chief Hanson in a confrontational fashion. This behavior resembles the behavior portrayed in State v. White, 292 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 1980), where the defendant swore at a group of...
To continue reading
Request your trial