State v. Hansen

Decision Date07 April 2020
Docket NumberDocket: And-19-186
Citation228 A.3d 1082
Parties STATE of Maine v. Gabriel J. HANSEN
CourtMaine Supreme Court

James P. Howaniec, Esq. (orally), Lewiston, for appellant Gabriel J. Hansen

Andrew S. Robinson, District Attorney, and Lisa R. Bogue, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

HUMPHREY, J.

[¶1] Gabriel J. Hansen appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1) (2018), entered by the trial court (Androscoggin County, MG Kennedy, J. ) after a jury trial, and from the sentences imposed. We affirm both the judgment of conviction and the sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The jury rationally could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Ouellette , 2019 ME 75, ¶ 2, 208 A.3d 399.

[¶3] Hansen was a longtime friend of the minor victim's family, having previously dated and been engaged to the victim's aunt, who is the sister of the victim's mother. The victim had a close relationship with her aunt, and also maintained a close relationship with Hansen. Even after Hansen and the victim's aunt ended their relationship, he continued to babysit the victim occasionally, sometimes at the victim's mother's house and sometimes at his house.

[¶4] On more than one occasion, when the victim was alone with Hansen at his home, he brought the victim to his bedroom, where he convinced her to lie down on his bed, removed her pants, blindfolded her with a blanket or pillow, got on the bed with her, and sexually touched her. The victim could not see what was touching her because she was blindfolded, but it was something that felt "hard and soft." During one of these incidents, Hansen forced the victim "[t]o do what he wanted [her] to do." The victim was six years old the last time she was alone with Hansen at his house. She "thought it was a game [she] played with him."

[¶5] Hansen was charged by indictment with two counts of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C) (2018), and two counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1).

[¶6] At trial, the State called the victim and the victim's mother as witnesses. During the victim's testimony, Hansen objected to leading questions asked by the prosecutor. The court overruled the objection. As the prosecutor continued to ask leading questions during direct examination of the victim, Hansen requested two different sidebar conferences. During these sidebar discussions, the court explained that it was satisfied that the State's questioning, although leading, was within permissible boundaries, given the age of the victim and the subject matter of the testimony.

[¶7] After the State rested its case, Hansen moved for a judgment of acquittal on the two counts of gross sexual assault (Class A), arguing that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty of those offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The State opposed the motion. The court determined that the jury could rationally find that the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict on those counts and denied Hansen's motion for a judgment of acquittal.

[¶8] The jury found Hansen guilty on both counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B) but acquitted him on the two counts of gross sexual assault (Class A).

[¶9] Hansen was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on the first count of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), and a consecutive ten years, all suspended, with five years of probation on the second count of unlawful sexual contact (Class B).1

[¶10] Hansen timely filed both a notice of appeal from the judgment, 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2018) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b), and an application for leave to appeal his sentences, 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151, 2153 (2018) ; M.R. App. P. 20. The Sentence Review Panel granted Hansen leave to appeal his sentence. 15 M.R.S. § 2152 (2018) ; M.R. App. P. 20(g), (h).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶11] Hansen first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on the two counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B).

[¶12] "When a defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder could rationally find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Ouellette , 2019 ME 75, ¶ 11, 208 A.3d 399 (quotation marks omitted). The jury is free to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented, and "we will vacate a judgment only where no trier of fact rationally could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[¶13] The crime of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1), occurs when a person "intentionally subjects another person to any sexual contact and ... [t]he other person, not the actor's spouse, is in fact less than 12 years of age and the actor is at least 3 years older." "Sexual contact" is defined as "any touching of the genitals or anus, directly or through clothing, other than as would constitute a sexual act, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire or for the purpose of causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact." 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(D) (2018).

[¶14] On this record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for the jury rationally to find that the State proved each element of the charged offenses of unlawful sexual contact (Class B) beyond a reasonable doubt. The parties stipulated at trial that the victim was not Hansen's spouse. See United States v. Tkhilaishvili , 926 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2019) (observing that when a defendant "affirmatively agree[s] to not put the government to its proof of an element of a crime," he "relinquishe[s] all other defenses, factual and legal, pertaining to the stipulated element" (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Brann , 292 A.2d 173, 185 (Me. 1972). The victim testified that she was seven years old at the time of trial, and the victim's mother testified that the last time the victim had been alone at Hansen's house was in the summer of 2017, at which time the victim was six years old. There is no dispute that Hansen, who was born in December 1977, is at least three years older than the victim. The victim's testimony that she felt something "hard and soft" touch her while she was alone with Hansen in his bedroom and blindfolded with her pants down was sufficient for a jury to rationally find that Hansen subjected the victim to sexual contact. 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(D). Finally, based on the victim's testimony, the jury could have reasonably inferred that when Hansen sexually touched the victim, he did so "for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire or for the purpose of causing ... offensive physical contact." Id. ; see also State v. Pozzuoli , 1997 ME 91, ¶ 7, 693 A.2d 745 (holding that a jury may consider, in determining whether a defendant committed offensive physical contact, "what a reasonable person might perceive to be offensive as well as the victim's subjective interpretation of the contact").

[¶15] We conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to have rationally found every element of the offense of unlawful sexual contact (Class B) beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. The Prosecutor's Use of Leading Questions

[¶16] Hansen also contends that the prosecutor's leading questions during the direct examination of the child victim compromised his right to a fair trial.

[¶17] Trial judges have "broad discretion in determining the scope" of the direct examination of a minor witness by the prosecution. See State v. Roman , 622 A.2d 96, 101 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). Similarly, "the State is accorded much latitude in attempting to elicit relevant testimony from a child witness." Id. In cases involving "embarrassing sex crimes, where a child would be hesitant to testify, leading questions may be particularly appropriate." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[¶18] Although the victim initially struggled to describe the nature of the sexual contact to which Hansen subjected her, she never denied that Hansen had sexually abused her, and her testimony remained internally consistent in many respects throughout. See State v. Spooner , 666 A.2d 863, 865-66 (Me. 1995) ; Roman , 622 A.2d at 101 ; State v. Murray , 559 A.2d 361, 362 (Me. 1989). To the extent that there were inconsistencies in the victim's testimony that could cast doubt on her credibility, "[t]he responsibility for weighing that testimony reside[d] with the jury." Murray , 559 A.2d at 362.

[¶19] On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State leeway to use leading questions in conducting its direct examination of the child victim, and the State's leading questions did not violate Hansen's right to a fair trial. See, e.g. , Roman , 622 A.2d at 101 (discussing the "broad discretion" afforded trial justices and the "latitude" given to prosecutors in cases involving testimony by a child victim of sexual abuse); Lisenba v. California , 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941) ("[D]enial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.").

C. The Mother's "First Complaint" Testimony

[¶20] Hansen next argues that the court allowed testimony by the victim's mother that violated the first complaint rule and constituted inadmissible hearsay. Because Hansen never raised an objection to this testimony, we review the trial court's actions for obvious error. State v. Hall , 2017 ME 210, ...

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    ...determine "whether [it] disregarded the relevant sentencing factors or abused its sentencing power." State v. Hansen , 2020 ME 43, ¶ 27, 228 A.3d 1082 (quoting State v. Stanislaw , 2013 ME 43, ¶ 17, 65 A.3d 1242 ). [¶11] By its nature, a double-counting claim relates to multiple steps of th......
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    • February 23, 2021
    ...to determine whether it disregarded the relevant sentencing factors or abused its sentencing power." State v. Hansen , 2020 ME 43, ¶ 27, 228 A.3d 1082 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we accord heightened deference to "the court's determination whether to suspend......

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