State v. Hansford
| Decision Date | 13 November 1897 |
| Citation | 28 S.E. 791,43 W.Va. 773 |
| Parties | STATE v. HANSFORD. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The common-law power of all courts, except the supreme court of appeals, to punish for contempt summarily,--that is, without indictment and jury,--is curtailed by section 27, c. 147, Code 1891. Summary punishment, as at common law, can be imposed by such other courts only in cases therein allowed.
2. There is no right in citizens and taxpayers not parties to a suit to petition for a new trial or other action therein. There is no right to petition a court "for redress of grievances" by strangers to the case. That right is applicable only to political bodies.
3. An attorney at law is an officer of the court, under clause 3, § 27, c. 147, Code 1891.
4. The mere drafting by an attorney of a petition, by persons not parties to a cause, asking in respectful language a new trial, is not a contempt.
5. To punish an officer of a court for misbehavior under clause 3 § 27, c. 147, Code 1891, the act must be done in his official character.
6. If a person be present in court when fined for contempt, a rule need not be served upon him, but he must be allowed to make defense, except for acts done in the open presence of the court.
Error to circuit court, Tucker county; J. Homer Holt, Judge.
L Hansford was fined for contempt, and brings error. Reversed.
The Attorney General, for the State.
L Hansford was fined by the circuit court of Tucker county for a contempt, and comes to this court for reversal of the judgment. No brief or view or single citation of authority aids us in the decision of the case. I have given a careful examination to it, and am of opinion that the judgment is erroneous. The common law gives to courts the power to punish for contempts summarily; but this wide power has been curtailed in this state by section 27, c. 147, Code 1891 providing that courts and judges may punish for contempts summarily only in the cases there specified. I do not think that this case falls under any of the provisions of that statute, unless it be under its third clause: "Misbehavior of an officer of the court in his official character." Hansford was an attorney of that court. An attorney, though not a public officer of state, is an officer of the court. Ex parte Faulkner, 1 W.Va. 269; Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W.Va. 569; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 378; Weeks, Attys. c. 2. But though Hansford was an officer of the court, within the meaning of that Code provision, yet two questions present themselves to the mind. One is whether the act charged as a contempt is in law a contempt; and the second is, even if it be such, whether it can be said that it was done in his official character as an attorney; for, to be punishable, it must be such. The wrong imputed to Hansford is that a case was tried in said circuit court of the county court against Degler, in which a jury found a verdict against Degler; and with it there was some popular dissatisfaction, and certain citizens of Tucker county proposed a demonstration in his behalf, which Hansford, who was counsel for Degler, repressed. Then he was requested to draw a petition to the judge for a new trial. He objected to doing so, but was so importuned and charged with disloyalty to his client that he yielded, and drew the petition, and delivered it to Degler's father, and it found its way into the judge's hands. Hansford did not solicit signatures, nor did he present it to the court, and, after its drafting, heard of it for the first time in court. For his action in this matter he was fined. I have not been able to see in this, which is a punitive proceeding, where we ought to be clear, that the act is contempt. This petition is respectful in language, simply expressing the opinion of its signers that great injustice had been done Degler in the verdict of the jury, and asking a new trial. Did the preparation of such a petition constitute a punishable contempt? What is a contempt? Cooley's Bl. Comm. bk. 4, p. 283, says that contempts "are either direct, which openly insult or resist powers of the court or the persons of the judges who preside there, or else are consequential, which (without such gross insolence or direct opposition) plainly tend to create an universal disregard of their authority." Thus contempts are of two kinds,--direct and constructive. A direct contempt is one offered in the presence of the court, while sitting judicially. A constructive contempt is one which tends to obstruct and embarrass a court, though the act be not done in its presence. State v. Gibson, 33 W.Va. 97, 10 S.E. 58; State v. Frew, 24 W.Va. 469; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195. In Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, "contempt" is defined as an act in disrespect of the court or its processes, or which obstructs the administration of justice, or tends to bring the court into disrepute. In People v. Wilson, supra, it is said all acts which "impede, embarrass, or obstruct a court, or tend to produce such effects, whether done in or out of court, are to be considered as done in the presence of the court, and are contempts." I do not think that the act of drawing the petition can be made a contempt, under the above definition. It did not insult or revile the judge, or derogate from his respect or authority, or resist his processes or orders, or impede or embarrass the administration of justice. I have not found, in quite an extended examination, any definition of contempt which would brand this act as such, unless it be the principle stated in State v. Doty, 90 Am. Dec. 671, that "power of judicature implies the right to exercise that function undisturbed by improper influences affecting it extraneously; and an act done within the presence of the court by a person neither a party to a suit nor an officer to the court may amount to contempt." Now, no one but a party has a right to file a petition for a new trial, or for any other action in a court. A stranger has no rights therein. He has no right to exert any outside influences upon the judge, because that judge must decide upon the facts and law uninfluenced, untrammeled, uncompelled by popular clamor or any extraneous influences. A petition by strangers may justly be said to be improper intermeddling, having no other purpose or result than to unduly influence the...
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