State v. Hansford
| Citation | 923 N.W.2d 113 |
| Decision Date | 21 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 20180179,20180179 |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Samuel Elliot HANSFORD, Defendant and Appellant |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Olivia L. Krebs (argued), Assistant State’s Attorney, and Christina M. Wenko, State’s Attorney (appeared), Dickinson, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.
Markus A. Powell, Dickinson, ND, for defendant and appellant.
[¶1] Samuel Hansford appeals from a district court’s order denying his motion to suppress following the entry of a criminal judgment after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition. We affirm, concluding Hansford was not in police custody when he made incriminating statements and his statements were voluntary.
[¶2] In January 2017, Samuel Hansford was arrested and charged with gross sexual imposition. Prior to his arrest, Hansford was interviewed by a law enforcement agent.
[¶3] Before trial, Hansford moved to suppress the written and verbal statements from the interview and requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Hansford argued the statements he made to the agent during the interview were coerced in violation of his due process rights. He also argued he was coerced to rescind his request for legal representation in violation of his Miranda rights, and that the interrogation violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and N.D. Const. art. I, § 12.
[¶4] In August 2017, a suppression hearing was held on the motion. Hansford and the law enforcement agent who conducted the interview both testified, and the State entered as exhibits: (1) an audio recording including conversation between the agent and Hansford taken during the drive from Hansford’s workplace to the police department; (2) the Voluntary Statement Form ("statement form") Hansford signed stating he was waiving his right to an attorney, acknowledging he wanted to continue speaking with the agent; and (3) a video recording with audio of the interview.
[¶5] At the suppression hearing, the agent testified his involvement in the case began when he was called to investigate whether 24-year-old Hansford had sexually assaulted a 16-year-old female who was unconscious at the time. The agent initially made contact with Hansford by going to Hansford’s workplace. The agent testified he told Hansford he wanted to interview him but due to privacy issues he did not want to conduct the interview at Hansford’s work place. After the agent suggested the interview take place at the police department, Hansford asked if the agent could give him a ride.
[¶6] The agent testified that before giving Hansford a ride, he explained to Hansford that he was not required to come to the police department and that he was not under arrest. Hansford rode unrestrained in an unmarked vehicle to the police station. During the ride, the agent and Hansford engaged in casual conversation.
[¶7] The agent testified that upon arriving at the police department, he and Hansford went into the interview room which was equipped with audio and visual recording capabilities. The agent testified he read a "soft version" of the Miranda warning. When Hansford expressed some confusion, the agent testified he provided Hansford with a card and read him "line for line" each element of the Miranda warning. After going through the card together, the agent testified Hansford acknowledged he understood the Miranda warning.
[¶8] The agent testified he talked to Hansford about the night of the alleged sexual assault for around 40 minutes, at which point Hansford "apologized and said he felt he needed to have an attorney with him." The agent told Hansford he would give him five or 10 minutes to "think about it" and he left the room. Hansford testified he stayed in the room because he felt he had no choice to leave without a ride or without explicitly being told he could leave.
[¶9] The agent testified when he returned to the room, Hansford wanted to continue to talk about the investigation and the agent reminded him he needed an answer whether Hansford wanted an attorney present or to waive that right. According to the agent, Hansford stated he wanted to speak to the agent without an attorney, and began to fill out the statement form. Midway through filling out the statement form, Hansford paused and again requested to speak with an attorney. The agent brought Hansford a phone book and Hansford began to make calls. The agent testified after Hansford’s final attempt to reach an attorney, Hansford said "I’ll just speak with you." The agent again stated if Hansford wished to waive his right he needed to do so on the statement form or verbally to the cameras in the room. Hansford did both. Hansford testified he filled out the statement form because he was under the impression he had to in order to leave. The agent testified that after Hansford signed the statement form indicating his waiver of the right to an attorney, he confessed to having sexual intercourse with a 16-year-old female.
[¶10] Following the hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress, finding Hansford stated he wanted to talk the matter out, and "clearly rescinded his request for legal representation," and that the rescission was not the result of manipulation by the agent. The court also found Hansford knew he was free to leave at any time. Hansford moved for reconsideration and the court denied that motion as well. After a jury verdict found Hansford guilty, the court entered a criminal judgment. Hansford appeals from the court’s order denying his motion to suppress.
[¶11] Hansford claims his incriminating statements should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, N.D. Const. art. I, § 12, his right to due process, and his rights under Miranda .
[¶12] When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress:
This Court defers to the district court’s findings of fact and resolves conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. This Court will affirm a district court decision regarding a motion to suppress if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the district court’s findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law.
State v. Knox , 2016 ND 15, ¶ 6, 873 N.W.2d 664 (quoting State v. Bauer , 2015 ND 132, ¶ 4, 863 N.W.2d 534 ). "Trial courts are in the business of judging credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence[;] [t]his court is in the business of assuring that a decision by the trial court complies with relevant legal principles." State v. Taillon , 470 N.W.2d 226, 230 (N.D. 1991).
[¶13] Hansford argues once he requested counsel and the conversation proceeded instead of ceasing, his Miranda rights were violated. Hansford argues he clearly invoked his Fifth Amendment rights when he initially requested an attorney. The State argues Hansford was never in custody for purposes of Miranda , and alternatively, even if he was, he properly waived his Miranda rights. It is undisputed Hansford was informed of his Miranda rights both verbally and in writing prior to the start of the interview.
[¶14] We have previously recognized the relationship between the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, N.D. Const. art. I, § 12, and Miranda as follows:
State v. Webster , 2013 ND 119, ¶ 9, 834 N.W.2d 283 (citations and quotations omitted). "A person is ‘in custody’ if there is a formal arrest or restraint on his freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest." Goebel , 2007 ND 4, ¶ 13, 725 N.W.2d 578. "Whether a person is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact and is fully reviewable on appeal." State v. Huether , 2010 ND 233, ¶ 14, 790 N.W.2d 901 (citation omitted). "When evaluating whether a person is in custody, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation." Id . (citation omitted). Furthermore, "it is well established that if a person asks for an attorney during custodial interrogation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Goebel , at ¶ 14.
[¶15] The State argues Hansford was not "in custody" because a reasonable person would have felt free to leave if (1) the door was closed but unlocked, (2) he was seated closest to the door, and (3) he was told he was free to leave at any time. We have recognized "[t]hat questioning occurred at the police station or in a ‘coercive environment’ is not by itself a requirement for Miranda warnings to be given." State v. Golden , 2009 ND 108, ¶ 15, 766 N.W.2d 473 (citation omitted). "Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer...
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