State v. Hanslovan
| Decision Date | 25 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 33127.,33127. |
| Citation | 211 P.3d 775,147 Idaho 530 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Larry Dwight HANSLOVAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Dennis A. Benjamin argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.
Larry Dwight Hanslovan appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and the denial of his motion for reduction of sentence. We affirm.
In early March of 2005, Larry Dwight Hanslovan and his girlfriend, Barbara Lynn Dehl, sold nearly an ounce of methamphetamine to an undercover police officer and a confidential informant. Two weeks later, in an unrelated incident, Hanslovan and Ronald John Huntsman, Sr., forced two people into a car at gunpoint. The two victims were taken to Dehl's home, bound with packing tape, and beaten in an attempt to obtain confessions regarding items missing from Dehl's residence. John Albert Schmeichel was eventually implicated in the theft. Hanslovan and Huntsman took one of the victims with them to find Schmeichel. Huntsman then shot and killed Schmeichel on the return trip while Hanslovan drove the car. The two remaining victims were eventually released. As a result of these incidents, Hanslovan and Dehl were indicted by a grand jury for several felonies: trafficking in methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4), and two counts of kidnapping, I.C. § 18-4501. Hanslovan was also indicted for two counts of use of a firearm or deadly weapon, I.C. § 19-2520. Huntsman alone was indicted for the murder of Schmeichel.
Prior to trial on all counts, the trafficking charge was severed from the remaining charges and eventually amended to delivery of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2732(a). Dehl entered a guilty plea to the amended delivery charge on the Friday before trial. Hanslovan then moved for a continuance of his trial and for replacement of counsel, expressing extreme displeasure with his attorney's performance up to that point. The court denied both motions so as not to delay the joint trial of all three defendants on the kidnapping and murder charges, which was scheduled to begin in nineteen days. Hanslovan was given the option of proceeding to trial on the delivery charge with his current attorney, or proceeding pro se. The following Monday morning, prior to jury selection, Hanslovan informed the court through his attorney that he wished to plead guilty.
During the plea colloquy, Hanslovan told the court he was pleading guilty to the delivery charge because he had no defense due to his attorney's lack of preparation and that "if I took it to trial that the likelihood that I would get life is very much greater than if I just pled guilty." The court refused to accept the plea at that point because it would be involuntary. Hanslovan's attorney explained to the court that the perceived inadequacies were really due to a difference of opinion between himself and Hanslovan of how to proceed. The court allowed Hanslovan to consult with his attorney during a recess, after which Hanslovan reaffirmed his desire to plead guilty to the delivery charge. Hanslovan convinced the district court that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty, and admitted facts sufficient to support his guilty plea to the delivery charge.
Six months later, Hanslovan and Dehl appeared before the district court to enter guilty pleas to one count each of second degree kidnapping. Pursuant to an agreement with the state, all of the remaining counts were dismissed. Hanslovan and Dehl both agreed to testify truthfully against Huntsman if called at his trial, which had been delayed, and the state agreed to limit its recommendations at sentencing to eighteen years with ten years determinate for Hanslovan, to be served concurrently with the sentence for delivery, and eight years with three years determinate for Dehl, also to be served concurrently. Both Dehl and Hanslovan waived the right to appeal any decisions of the court to that point, as well as their right to appeal from the sentences imposed, although they reserved the right to file a Rule 35 motion. The plea agreement was only available, however, if both Hanslovan and Dehl pled guilty. Furthermore, if either Hanslovan or Dehl could later show "good cause" for the withdrawal of their guilty plea, the other person's plea would automatically be set aside as well. During his plea colloquy, Hanslovan expressed some reluctance to follow through with the agreement, noting that it was highly beneficial for Dehl, but not so appealing for himself. Hanslovan informed the court that if the two pleas had not been tied together, he probably would have gone to trial on the kidnapping charges. Nonetheless, he denied that there were any other promises or commitments made to him, or any threats or improper pressures affecting his plea. The court found a factual basis to support Hanslovan's guilty plea, and engaged in a similar plea colloquy with Dehl prior to accepting both guilty pleas to the kidnapping charges.
One month before sentencing on the two charges, and in the midst of Huntsman's trial, Hanslovan moved to withdraw his guilty plea to the kidnapping charge and his attorney moved to withdraw as counsel of record. During the hearing on his attorney's motion, the court was informed for the first time of a secret deal between Hanslovan and Dehl which contributed to Hanslovan's guilty plea for kidnapping. Both Hanslovan's and Dehl's attorneys knew of the secret arrangement, and allegedly counseled Hanslovan not to mention it to the court. The attorneys both asserted that they had clarified that Hanslovan could tell the court about it, but that he could not base his plea on the secret deal. Hanslovan was initially reluctant to accept the plea agreement from the state, concerned by how old he would be when released from prison and his employability at that age. In order to eliminate that concern, Dehl informed Hanslovan that her brother owned a farm and Hanslovan would have a job there and a place to live when he got out of prison.1 Dehl's brother also offered to put money on the books at the prison for Hanslovan so that he could purchase items while incarcerated. Dehl's attorney was not able to confirm the brother's offer for Hanslovan prior to the plea entry, but both attorneys informed him that this offer could not be put in writing and would not be enforceable. It was later discovered that Dehl's brother told Dehl to tell Hanslovan anything he needed to hear so that Dehl could take advantage of the plea agreement.
Hanslovan testified in support of his attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel of record, accusing him of coercion relating to the kidnapping plea and showing more concern for Dehl's welfare than for his own. Upon inquiry from the court, Hanslovan's attorney revealed that he filed the motion to withdraw the guilty plea at Hanslovan's request, but that he could not ethically support such a motion because it lacked a factual basis. Hanslovan's attorney was granted leave to withdraw as counsel of record, and new counsel was appointed to assist Hanslovan on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Two weeks later, the court heard Hanslovan's motion. He asserted four reasons to withdraw his plea to the kidnapping charge and identified one reason to withdraw his plea to the delivery charge, although withdrawal of that plea was not part of the original motion. His new attorney conceded that the only possible basis for withdrawing the delivery plea would be coercion, but could not identify any evidence in the record to support that claim. To support withdrawal of his plea to the kidnapping charge, Hanslovan relied on the state's breach of the plea agreement by requesting a polygraph test prior to testifying for the state,2 the level of ill will between himself and his former attorney at the time of the plea, his assertion of innocence, and coercion. Hanslovan claimed that he would not have taken the offer if Dehl had not been so adamant about him accepting it because it was a good deal for her. Dehl blamed Hanslovan for her situation and wanted him to take responsibility for what he had done. Hanslovan was advised by his former attorney that he was facing a life sentence if he took the case to trial. As such, Hanslovan felt he didn't have any option but to accept the state's plea offer. Furthermore, Hanslovan accused Dehl and her attorney of exerting undue pressure on him over the course of three days to convince him to accept the plea agreement, including offering him a job and a place to live after he was released from prison—the secret deal.
The state argued against allowing Hanslovan to withdraw his guilty pleas and also asserted the prejudice it would cause. The state had just completed a three-week trial against Huntsman and would have to try Hanslovan individually for the same kidnapping charges. During Huntsman's trial, the state had to counter the "empty seat" defense, and would once again be faced with that defense if Hanslovan were allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.3
The district court denied Hanslovan's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court first held that both guilty pleas were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. As to the delivery charge, the court found there was no evidence that Hanslovan's plea was coerced and that Hanslovan was merely second-guessing his original decision to plead guilty.
The court then considered the multiple bases for withdrawing his plea to the kidnapping charge. The court first rejected the polygraph request because the state took no action to rescind the plea agreement based on Hanslovan's refusal to take the test. Hanslovan's assertion of ill will was also deemed insufficient...
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