State v. Riggins
| Decision Date | 30 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 42688 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Joshua A. RIGGINS, Defendant–Appellant. |
160 Idaho 723
378 P.3d 513
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,
v.
Joshua A. RIGGINS, Defendant–Appellant.
Docket No. 42688
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: June 30, 2016
Review Denied August 29, 2016
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
GRATTON, Judge
Joshua A. Riggins appeals from the district court's order granting the State's motion for reconsideration of its prior order granting Riggins' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During a traffic stop, officers found marijuana and paraphernalia in Riggins' car and methamphetamine in his pocket. Riggins was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Riggins pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a felony in violation of Idaho Code § 37–2732(c)(1), and the State dismissed the misdemeanor charges. During the sentencing hearing, Riggins informed the court that he was not taking his prescribed antidepressants when he pled guilty and requested a continuance to withdraw his guilty plea. The court granted the continuance. Riggins moved to withdraw his guilty plea and asserted his innocence. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the plea contained no constitutional defect because it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The State also argued that it would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the guilty plea because the delay would adversely impact its witnesses' memories and it had already dismissed the two misdemeanor counts with prejudice. In addition, the State highlighted that Riggins had already seen his presentencing investigation report (PSI) before his request to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court acknowledged the prejudice to the State, but nonetheless allowed Riggins to withdraw his guilty plea because he maintained his innocence and there was concern about his psychiatric condition when he pled guilty.
Two months later, and a little less than three weeks before trial was set to begin, the State filed a motion to reconsider the order granting Riggins' motion to withdraw his plea. In addition to its original arguments opposing the guilty plea withdrawal, the State informed the court that the arresting officer was unavailable because he had taken a job as an undercover agent and, as such, could not testify. The district court granted the State's motion and reinstated Riggins' guilty plea, explaining that "there is no meaningful indication in the record that Riggins' depression rose to a level that rendered his guilty plea constitutionally involuntary," and noting that the State had proven sufficient prejudice in the form of the two dismissed charges and the unavailable primary witness. The court reinstated Riggins' guilty plea and sentenced him to three years, with one year determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed him on probation. Riggins timely appealed.
II.
ANALYSIS
The issue before this Court is whether a trial court's reconsideration and reversal of an order granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea violates the defendant's constitutional rights. This is an issue of first impression in Idaho. Riggins objected to the motion to reconsider, but not on the grounds advanced on appeal. Riggins, therefore, acknowledges that he must demonstrate that the district court's reconsideration and reversal of its order granting withdrawal of his guilty plea was fundamental error. In State v. Perry , 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned the definitions it had previously utilized to describe what may constitute fundamental error. The Perry Court held that an appellate court should reverse an unobjected-to error when the defendant persuades the Court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
While the parties couch the argument as whether the district court had authority to grant the motion to reconsider, under the first prong of Perry , reconsideration and reversal
of the order granting withdrawal of the guilty plea must be shown to have violated one or more of Riggins' unwaived constitutional rights. This is a particularly important consideration in this case because, as will be seen below, most of the cases in which reconsideration of an order granting withdrawal of a guilty plea is challenged address the trial court's "authority" to reconsider under applicable rules, statutes, or the inherent power of the court, as well as policy considerations, not whether it is simply constitutionally impermissible to do so.
Riggins contends that he had the right to a trial by jury, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him as afforded by the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ; IDAHO CONST. art. 1 § 7. He acknowledges that when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives those fundamental rights, Parke v. Raley , 506 U.S. 20, 29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 523, 121 L.Ed.2d 391, 403–04 (1992), but asserts that once a guilty plea is withdrawn, automatically the defendant is returned to the status quo ante and regains his right to a trial by jury, to remain silent, to confront witnesses against him, as well as his innocence, as if the plea never existed. Consequently, he claims that a court may not constitutionally reconsider an order granting withdrawal of a guilty plea because, in doing so, the restored rights are taken away, guilt declared and, in turn, due process denied.
Riggins relies on a series of Florida appellate court cases. In Williams v. State , 762 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), the court held that "the trial court was without authority to reconsider the motion to withdraw appellant's plea. When a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is withdrawn and accepted by the court, it is as if the plea had never been entered ab initio." See also Miles v. State , 620 So.2d 1075, 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (same); State v. McClain , 509 So.2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (same). The basis for the holdings in these cases is Bell v. Florida , 262 So.2d 244, 245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The Bell holding on the issue is as follows:
When the appellant withdrew his plea of guilty and it was accepted by the court, it was as if a plea had never been entered ab initio. To hold otherwise would cause the trial courts to be apprehensive of accepting or allowing the withdrawal of a plea because such discretionary action might prevent justice from being carried out.
Id. Bell cited no precedential authority for its holding1 and is apparently based upon the policy consideration stated in the second sentence of the holding. None of the Florida cases base the repeated holding on applicable rules or statutes or constitutional considerations.
We are aware of other cases from jurisdictions outside Idaho that have refused to allow the trial court to reconsider the grant of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. In People v. McGee , 232 Cal.App.3d 620, 283 Cal.Rptr. 528 (1991), the court analyzed the authority of the court by looking to a statute, rules of civil procedure, and the inherent power of the court. The court concluded that authority for the specific motion could not be found in the terms of the statute and rules and that the inherent power to reconsider was limited to "procedural" rulings. Id. at 530–31. In People v. Franco , 158 A.D.2d 33, 557 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1990), the court, similar to the Florida cases, relied on previous cases holding that once a judgment of conviction is vacated, the prior plea and judgment are "beyond reinstatement." Id. at 8. In State v. Beechum , 23 Kan.App.2d 519, 934 P.2d 151 (1997), the State cited "various statutes" which it contended allowed reconsideration. Id. at 152. The court concluded that the applicable Kansas statute was similar to the statute in McGee which the McGee court determined provided no authority. Id. at 153. In Turner v. Com. , 10 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999), the court first looked to language in another case that noted...
To continue reading
Request your trial