State v. Harbert

• Decision Date: 08 June 1923
• Docket Number: 534.
• Parties: STATE v. HARBERT.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

118 S.E. 6

185 N.C. 760

STATE v. HARBERT.

No. 534.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

June 8, 1923

Appeal from Superior Court, Buncombe County; Bryson, Judge.

H. B Harbert was convicted of the larceny of an automobile, and he appeals. Reversed.

Clark C.J., and Clarkson, J., dissenting.

Reynolds Reynolds & Howell and William A. Sullivan, all of Asheville for appellant.

James S. Manning, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

STACY, J.

The bill of indictment charges the defendant with the larceny of "one automobile, owned by and in the possession of Frank Rosenberg." All the evidence on the record shows that the stolen automobile was owned by and in the possession of Mrs. Elsie Rosenberg. There is no evidence that Mrs. Elsie Rosenberg was the wife of Frank Rosenberg, or that she was related to him, or in any way associated with him. The suggestion that if all the evidence had been sent up, it might have shown Frank Rosenberg to be the husband of the prosecuting witness and, therefore, in possession of the car as bailee, merits no serious consideration at our hands. This is only a surmise. Maybe it would and maybe not. Cases are to be determined here upon the record. State v. Wheeler (present term) 185 N.C. 670, 116 S.E. 413.

There is a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof. This was conceded on the argument by the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Nash, who always presents his cases with great frankness and candor; and the only question for our decision is whether the defendant may take advantage of this defect by his exception to the overruling of his motion for judgment as of nonsuit. We think he can, for there was a total failure of proof. Speaking to this question in State v. Gibson, 169 N.C. p. 322, 85 S.E. 9, Walker, J., said:

"You cannot amend an indictment--at least, against the will of the defendant. You must abide by its terms, and prove the charge as it is laid in the bill. A variance cannot be taken advantage of by motion in arrest of judgment. S. v. Foushee, 117 N.C. 766; S. v. Ashford, 120 N.C. 588; S. v. Jarvis, 129 N.C. 698. It is waived if there is no objection to it before the verdict is rendered, as those cases show. But a motion to nonsuit is a proper method of raising the question as to a variance. It is based on the assertion, not that there is no proof of a crime having been committed, but that there is none which tends to prove that the particular offense charged in the bill has been committed. In other words, the proof does not fit the allegation, and, therefore, leaves the latter without any evidence to sustain it. It challenges the right of the state to a verdict upon its own showing, and asks that the court, without submitting the case to the jury, decide as matter of law that the state has failed in its proof."

See, also, same case, 170 N.C. 697, 86 S.E. 774.

In all criminal prosecutions, the defendant has a constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him; and it is a rule of universal observance in administering the criminal law that a defendant must be convicted, if convicted at all, of the particular offense charged in the bill of indictment. "The allegations and proof must correspond. It would be contrary to all rules of procedure and violative of his constitutional right to charge him with the commission of one crime and convict him of another and very different one. He is entitled to be informed of the accusation against him and to be tried accordingly." Walker, J., in State v. Wilkerson, 164 N.C. 444, 79 S.E. 888, citing as authority for the position State v. Ray, 92 N.C. 810; State v. Sloan, 67 N.C. 357; State v. Lewis, 93 N.C. 581; Clark's Cr. Proc. 150. See, also, State v. Snipes (present term) 185 N.C. 743, 117 S.E. 500, and cases there cited.

In State v. Davis, 150 N.C. 851, 64 S.E. 498, the defendant was charged with obtaining a clay-bank mare by means of a false pretense as to the qualities of a "sorrel horse," and the proof was that he obtained the claybank mare in exchange for a bay "saddle horse." This was held to be a material variance; Hoke, J., saying that--

"Under the authorities cited, there would seem to be a clear case of variance between the allegation and the proof, and the jury should have been so instructed."

The charge related to one trade and the proof to another. Again it was held to be a fatal variance in State v. Hill, 79 N.C. 656, "where the defendant was charged with injuring a cow, and the proof was that the animal injured was an ox." See, also, State v. McWhirter, 141 N.C. 809, 53 S.E. 734; State v. Miller, 93 N.C. 511, 53 Am. Rep. 469; State v. Corbett, 46 N.C. 264.

The trial court should have sustained the defendant's motion and dismissed the indictment, but this will not prevent a conviction upon another bill charging the defendant with the larceny of an automobile, the property of Mrs. Elsie Rosenberg.

The present verdict will be set aside, the action dismissed, and the solicitor allowed to send another bill, if so advised.

Reversed.

CLARK C.J. (dissenting).

The assignment of error that there was not sufficient evidence to go to the jury and that the verdict was against the weight of evidence do not require any consideration. It was very full and complete and, if believed, justified the verdict rendered.

It appears in the record that the indictment was for the larceny of an automobile, the property of Frank Rosenberg. The evidence of Mrs. Elsie Rosenberg is that she was the owner of the car, and as to the steps taken to notify the authorities and the finding of the stolen machine. There was no exception at the trial, nor in the assignments of error, nor in plaintiff's brief, nor in the argument here, that this was a fatal variance in the proof of ownership. It may be that the evidence, if set out in full, would have shown that Frank Rosenberg was her husband, and that he was bailee and in possession of the car. If so, the property was sufficiently laid in him. State v. Allen, 103 N.C. 433, 9 S.E. 626, and cases there cited and citations to that case in Anno. Ed.

It is true that when ownership is alleged it should be proven as charged, and failure to do so is a fatal variance. But, as said in 25 Cyc. 88:

"Ownership in a particular person is not an essential element in crime. The allegation is merely part of the description and identification of the goods."

A motion for nonsuit or for arrest of judgment because the verdict is against the weight of evidence therefore does not bring up the question of variance...