State v. Harbour
| Decision Date | 04 April 1922 |
| Docket Number | 34503 |
| Citation | 187 N.W. 454,193 Iowa 657 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. JAMES HARBOUR, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Pottawattamie District Court.--J. B. ROCKAFELLOW, Judge.
THE defendant, Harbour, together with one August Sierk and one Blanche Sierk, was indicted upon the charge of murder in the second degree, and upon trial, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate period not exceeding eight years. From that judgment he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. J Hess and Genung & Genung, for appellant.
Ben J. Gibson, Attorney General, and John Fletcher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Sierk and wife were living on a farm in Pottawattamie County, and the appellant, Harbour, was in their employ. George Mikesell and his wife, Ruth, lived in the town of Carson. Ruth Mikesell was formerly the wife of Harbour, from whom she was divorced, and later married George Mikesell. At the time of the alleged crime, a horse belonging to Mrs. Mikesell was being pastured on Sierk's farm. Sierk, not desiring to keep the animal longer, notified its owner to take it away. On June 2, 1920, Mikesell, his wife, mother, and a young girl drove to the farm in an auto, for the purpose of getting the horse, and there met Sierk and wife and the appellant. Sierk and wife and Mrs. Mikesell had some conversation in regard to payment for the pasturage, a matter of $ 2.50. The woman asserted a small counterclaim against Sierk. There does not appear to have been any serious quarrel, but evidently there was some degree of irritation over the matter of settlement. After this conversation. Sierk, with the assistance of one or two of the Mikesell party, caught the horse, and Mrs. Mikesell led it to the road, and called her husband. The party entered the car, and, with Mikesell driving, and Mrs. Mikesell leading the animal, started in the direction of home. As they drove away, Mrs. Sierk upbraided her husband for letting the horse go without getting pay for the pasturage, and said to him:
"If you haven't nerve enough to stop that horse and get your money, I have; and if you will back the car out, I will go down the road and either get the money or the horse."
The appellant then said:
"I will go with you; that is the way they have paid their debts all their life."
The husband then backed their car out of the garage. Mrs. Sierk went into the house and immediately returned, armed with a shotgun or rifle. Appellant and Mrs. Sierk and husband got into the car, and with the husband at the wheel, drove in the direction which had been taken by the Mikesell party. It appears that the latter had found some trouble in leading the horse, and when they had gone about half a mile, they stopped, and Mikesell mounted the animal, intending to ride it home. While they were engaged in making this change, Sierk, his wife, and appellant overtook them. The details of the occurrence at that place are the subject of direct conflict of evidence. The testimony was such that the jury could find that at least one of the Sierk party was armed with a "long gun" (a shotgun or rifle), and that the other two were armed with a revolver each, and that, as soon as they overtook the Mikesell car, Mrs. Sierk leveled a revolver at Mrs. Mikesell, and demanded payment or possession of the horse, and that almost immediately shots were fired, and Mikesell fell from the horse, with at least two severe gunshot wounds, from which he died on the following day. When arrested, appellant told the sheriff he had shot Mikesell; and, according to the State's testimony, all three of the defendants were engaged in firing at the deceased. It is the appellant's claim that Mikesell was armed, and himself opened the battle and that Mrs. Mikesell also took part in the shooting. For the prosecution, the testimony is that none of the Mikesell party had any weapons.
We shall not attempt any further statement of facts. It was enough to take the question of defendant's guilt to the jury. That the party with which he acted were the aggressors, and that they were armed with deadly weapons, is beyond question. They sought the conflict over a matter of the most trivial character, and manifested a most reckless disregard of the law. On no tenable theory can it be said that the verdict and judgment are not amply supported by the record. Indeed, appellant's counsel do not assert any lack of evidence as a ground for reversal, but base their complaint entirely upon alleged errors in the charge to the jury and certain rulings upon the admissibility of testimony. Of the assignments of error relied upon, some are entirely too general and indefinite to be considered on appeal. Others, reasonably sufficient in form and substance, are as follows:
I. The first and chief exception to the court's charge is that, while the indictment charged appellant with the crime of murder in the second degree only, the court's instructions were such only as were appropriate to a charge of murder in the first degree. The chief specification of error in this respect is that the court instructed the jury on the subject of conspiracy between the accused persons, and the common guilt of all concerned therein, if such conspiracy be found, and it be further shown that the alleged crime was...
To continue reading
Request your trial