State v. Harden.
| Decision Date | 08 June 1907 |
| Parties | State v. Harden. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Intoxicating Liquors License Power of Municipal Authorities.
The power reserved to the legislature, by section 46 of Art. vI. of the Constitution of this State, to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, sustains legislation, vesting in the councils of cities and towns sole power to grant or refuse state licenses for such sales within the corporate limits thereof. (p. 319.)
2. Same.
So much of section 24 of Art. VIII, of the Constitution as commits to county courts the superintendence and administration of the internal police and fiscal affairs of their counties, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and provides that no license for sales of intoxicating liquors in any municipal corporation shall be granted without the consent of the municipal authorities, is operative, as to the jurisdiction to grant or refuse licenses for such sales, only so long and to such extent as the legislature, by committing to county courts such jurisdiction, makes the function a part of the police affairs of the counties, (p. 320.)
3. Statutes Construction.
In ascertaining the intention of the people in adopting a constitution all parts of the constitution must be considered, every article, section, clause, phrase and word allowed some effect, and all parts, clauses, phrases and words harmonized, if possible.
No part or word in it can be ignored, disregarded, treated as meaningless or denied purpose and effect, unless there be irreconcilable contradiction and repugnancy. (p. 321.)
4. Intoxicating Liquors Regulation.
As section 24 of Art. VIII, gives jurisdiction to county courts, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, a construction, denying power in the legislature to withhold, or take, from them the power to grant or refuse licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, would render the word "regulating" in section 46 of Article VI, useless and ineffective of any purpose, contrary to a rule of interpretation, universally observed by courts, (p. 322.)
5. Constitutional. Law Construction by Legislature.
A contemporaneous construction or interpretation, given to a constitution by the legislature, and acquiesced in by the the people and the courts for a long period of time, will not be disturbed or overthrown, unless it be plainly wrong. (p. 323.)
6. Same Interpretation of Framers.
In determining the meaning of a constitutional provision, the interpretation put upon it by its framers in drafting it, and the people in putting it into operation, as shown by existing conditions and laws, left undisturbed and expressly recognized and continued, ought to have great weight. (p. 323.)
7. Statutes Construction Repeal.
A statute revising the whole subject matter of a former one, or a former series of statutes, becomes, by reason of its scope and purpose, to the full extent of the terms used and necessarily implied, the exclusive rule and law, governing the subject, and is, therefore, a substitute for the former statute or statutes, repealing such parts thereof as are inconsistent with the new act, and not a mere amendatory act, adding to or detracting from the former law. (p. 324.)
8. Same.
The purpose of such a statute is the provision of a new, complete and comprehensive system of law for the government of its subject matter, and the method of drafting and passing it is not the erection, upon former laws as a substructure, of a mere superstructure, but the laying of new foundations and the erection of a new and complete structure, using only such of the old materials as are deemed suitable, so that the work consists, not of mere alteration and remodeling nor of exclusion, nor of the double process of exclusion and inclusion, but of inclusion only, by means of express and implied enactments and re enactments and express and implied adoptions of existing laws. (p. 328.)
9. Same.
The language of such a statute, relating to a given subject within the scope and purpose of the act, is presumed to be the full and complete expression of the legislative will and intention, respecting that matter; and for the law on that subject resort cannot be had to other statutes, unless the language used is incapable of conveying any meaning or has expressly or impliedly adopted them. Statutes formerly in effect relating to the same matter are not considered as laws in pari materia. (p. 329.)
10. Same Intent of legislature.
However awkward, informal and unusual the language of a statute may be, the legislative will and intention manifested by it must be ascertained by the court and enforced as the law. The intention expressed is paramount to form and must have the force of law. (p. 330.)
11. Same.
Awkwardness, informality and terseness of expression in a statute cannot be imputed to incompetency or lack of wisdom on the part of the legislature, nor to the perpetration of fraud and trickery upon it. (p. 330.)
12. Same Presumption.
An interpretation of a statute or clause thereof which gives it no function to perform, and makes it a mere repetition of another clause, must be rejected as unsound, for it is presumed that the legislature had a purpose in using every word and clause found in a statute, and intended the terms used to be effective. (p. 333.)
13. Same Ambiguity.
Ambiguity in a statute or other instrument consists of susceptibility of two or more meanings and uncertainty as to which was intended. Mere informality in phraseology or clumsiness of expression does not make it ambiguous, if the language imports one meaning or intention with reasonable certainty. (p. 350.)
14. Same Implications.
That which is necessarily implied in a statute, or must be included in it in order to make the terms actually used have effect, according to their nature and ordinary meaning, is as much a part of it as if it had been delcared in express terms. (p. 352.)
15. Intoxicating Liquors Licenses Powers of Town.
Tested by these well settled rules of interpretation and construction, section 35 of chapter 40 of the Acts of 1891, the declared and manifest object of which was the provision of a complete system of law for the government of the town of Point Pleasant, as shown by its title and enactments, reading as follows: "The council shall prescribe, by ordinance. the manner in which licenses of all kinds shall be applied for and granted, and it shall require the payment of the taxes thereon before delivery to the person applying therefor;" vests in the council of said town sole power to grant or refuse state as well as municipal licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors. (p. 346.)
16. Same.
The language of said section is not ambiguous, but, if it were, it could mean nothing else, when read in the light of section 40 of the same act, showing knowledge on the part of the legislature of an alleged previous amendment made to the charter of said town purporting to confer such authority upon the council in express terms. (p. 350.)
17. Statutes Construction.
In seeking the meaning and intent of a statute, regard must be had to its subject matter and all the surrounding circumstances, known to the legislature. (p. 350.)
18. Same Presumptions.
The legislature is presumed to have had full knowledge of the subject matter of statutes passed by it. (p. 350.)
19. Constitutional Law Legislative Powers.
The province of the legislature is to make and repeal laws, not to determine what is, or has been, the law, for that is judicial action within the exclusive province of the courts. (p. 351.)
20. Statutes Construction Presumptions.
Courts will not presume that the legislature, in referring to all the amendments made to the charter of a town, did not take notice of one of them, because, since the passage of the act, making such reference, its validity has been denied, for it was not within the domain of legislative action and power to pass upon the question of its validity. (p. 352.)
(McWHorteR, and MILLER, Judges, dissenting.)
Error to Circuit Court, Mason County.
John Harden was convicted of an illegal sale of liquors, and brings error.
Reversed.
L. C. somerville, W. R. GUNN, john L. whitten, Henry m. Russell, J. S. Spencer, and Mollohan, McClintic & Mathews, for plaintiff in error.
Clarke W. May, Attorney-General, L. S. Echols, Lace Marcum, and Rankin Wiley, for the State.
Whether the defendant John Harden, had a valid license to sell, at retail, spirituous liquors, wine, porter, ale, beer and drinks of like nature, at the time he made the sale of liquor, charged in the indictment against him, as having been unlawfully made, is the sole question presented by this record. That he made a sale of liquor in the town of Point Pleasant, Mason county, West Virginia, within one year next preceding the finding of the indictment, is fully proven and not contested. Whether his license was valid or not, must be determined by the application, to the provisions of the charter of the town of Point Pleasant, which the defendant insists conferred upon the council of said town, sole authority and power to grant such licenses for such sales within the corporate limits of said town, of principles of law and settled rules of interpretation. The question is purely a legal one. It is in no sense a moral question or a question of public policy. It is to be determined solely by legal tests, and not by the personal views, opinions or preferences of anybody, assuming to speak for the general public. It is a question of what the legislature had the power to say and what it did say, as determined by rules of law. In construing statutes, courts have nothing to do with, and cannot consider, matters of public policy, moral justice or expedieny, except in so far as the legislature, by some language used in the statute, has evinced an intention to pursue or advance some particular policy. ...
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