State v. Hardy
| Citation | 347 P.3d 222,51 Kan.App.2d 296 |
| Decision Date | 27 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | 110,982. |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Marlon T. HARDY, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Kansas |
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.
Richard Ney, of Ney & Adams, of Wichita, for appellee.
Before SCHROEDER, P.J., BUSER and ATCHESON, JJ.
By statute, Kansas extends immunity from criminal prosecution to persons acting in self-defense. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5231. The statute, however, fails to describe how district courts should go about deciding a request for that protection. The Kansas Supreme Court has held the State must establish probable cause to show that a defendant has not acted in lawful self-defense. State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 845, 295 P.3d 1020 (2013). But the court expressly declined to outline the procedures for presenting or resolving immunity claims. This case requires us to fill that void. Drawing cues from Ultreras, we find a district court should conduct an evidentiary hearing procedurally comparable to a preliminary examination, so the rules of evidence apply and conflicting evidence should be resolved in favor of the State. Based on those standards, the Sedgwick County District Court erroneously granted self-defense immunity to Defendant Marlon T. Hardy. We, therefore, reverse and remand to the district court with directions that the charge of aggravated battery against Hardy be reinstated for further proceedings.
What we consider amounts to a matter of statutory interpretation and, thus, a question of law. State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 765, 267 P.3d 751 (2012). Our review owes no particular deference to the district court's determination on how to handle Hardy's motion for self-defense immunity. In re Care & Treatment of Quary, 50 Kan.App.2d 296, 301, 324 P.3d 331 (2014). And, given the issue, the factual circumstances out of which the criminal charges arose are largely irrelevant, save for some general context.
Hardy and another man stopped at a party to pick up a couple of female acquaintances. Some other partygoers came out and approached the convertible in which Hardy was riding. There are multiple versions of what happened. The gist seems to be that Javier Flores, the putative victim of the aggravated battery, approached the car and without provocation punched Hardy in the face several times. Hardy picked up a handgun from inside the car and fired a shot, striking Flores in the shoulder. Witnesses offered differing accounts as to whether Flores continued to threaten Hardy after punching him, whether Flores was being physically restrained when Hardy fired, and whether other partygoers menaced Hardy.
The State charged Hardy with aggravated battery, a severity level 4 person felony violation of K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5413. After he was bound over for trial at a preliminary examination, Hardy filed a motion for self-defense immunity, as provided in K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5231(a). The district court convened a hearing on the motion and wound up spending much of the time with the prosecutor and Hardy's lawyer trying to sort out what ought to be considered in deciding the request for immunity. The district court ultimately received and reviewed the transcript of the preliminary examination at which Flores and Yuliana Mejia testified, two police reports, transcripts of tape recorded police interviews with Hardy and with Mejia, and a few other documents. The district court heard no witnesses as part of the motion hearing, although neither side asked to present live testimony. In short, the district court held a nonevidentiary hearing and considered a good deal of material that would have been inadmissible at the preliminary examination or at trial.
Two days later, the district court made a detailed bench ruling granting Hardy's motion for immunity and dismissing the complaint. Given the ruling, the district court obviously recognized factual conflicts relevant to self-defense as portrayed in the materials submitted at the hearing. The district court also plainly resolved at least some of those conflicts in deciding the motion and did so favorably to Hardy, although the ruling doesn't describe those determinations with any particularity. The State has appealed the dismissal of the complaint, as permitted by K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–3602(b)(1).
Persons facing criminal charges for their use of force may assert a statutory immunity on grounds they acted lawfully. If warranted, the immunity would bar their arrest or prosecution. K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5231. Enacted in 2010, the self-defense immunity statute provides:
We refer to the statutory shield as self-defense immunity, although it extends to lawful force used to protect another person, a dwelling, a place of business, and an occupied vehicle or to prevent the unlawful interference with other property. The statute substantively goes beyond establishing a defense to criminal charges and imposes immunity from arrest and prosecution. Despite the breadth of that protection, the statute conspicuously lacks any guidance as to how procedurally a claim for immunity should be handled in the district or appellate courts.
In Ultreras, the court held that the State bears the burden of establishing probable cause to believe a person's use of force to be unlawful or unjustified to defeat a claim for self-defense immunity. 296 Kan. at 845, 295 P.3d 1020. The court drew the standard from the statutory language found in K.S.A.2014 Supp. 21–5231(b) and (c) permitting arrest and prosecution to go forward based on “probable cause” determinations. 296 Kan. at 844–45, 295 P.3d 1020. Accordingly, the State must negate a claim for self-defense immunity to establish “probable cause” that a crime had been committed and the defendant committed it. 296 Kan. at 844, 295 P.3d 1020. The court, however, declined to offer any guidance on “the procedures by which the immunity defense should be presented to or resolved by the district court.” 296 Kan. at 845, 295 P.3d 1020.[1]
FN[1] Given the posture in which the issue came up on appeal in Ultreras, the court didn't have to formally address the procedural mechanics of deciding self-defense immunity claims. The district court erroneously required Ultreras to prove entitlement to self-defense immunity by a preponderance of evidence and, therefore, improperly denied his request. But the court found the error to be harmless because a jury later convicted Ultreras of aggravated battery, thereby rejecting his claim of self-defense. The jury necessarily concluded that the evidence didn't even create a reasonable doubt about Ultreras' guilt. See State v. Johnson, 258 Kan. 61, 66, 899 P.2d 1050 (1995). Accordingly, the motion for self-defense immunity would have failed under the correct probable-cause standard—a significantly less rigorous burden for the State than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Jones, 298 Kan. 324, 334, 311 P.3d 1125 (2013).
In recognizing a probable cause evidentiary standard and allocating the burden of satisfying that standard to the State, the Ultreras decision effectively adopts the requirements imposed at a preliminary examination or hearing under K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2902. (The statute refers to the proceeding as a preliminary examination; but in common parlance, it is known as a preliminary hearing.). At a preliminary examination, the district court shall order the defendant to face trial on a charged felony “[i]f from the evidence ... there is probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed by the defendant.” K.S.A.2014 Supp. 22–2902(3).
Following that lead, we see no reason the procedural structure of a preliminary examination shouldn't similarly be incorporated for handling self-defense immunity claims. Nothing in either the self-defense immunity statute or Ultreras shouts out to the contrary. As we suggest, the preliminary examination and a request for self-defense immunity typically ought to be decided in a single hearing with a single set of ground rules. The district court, therefore, should hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim for self-defense at which the rules of evidence apply. That is how preliminary examinations now operate. State v. Cremer, 234 Kan. 594, 599–600, 676 P.2d 59 (1984) ; see In re H.N., 45 Kan.App.2d 1059, 1069, 257 P.3d 821 (2011). So the State would be obligated to call witnesses and lay appropriate foundations for documentary evidence; it could not rely on inadmissible hearsay.[2]
FN[2] The parties, with the district court's permission, could stipulate to the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence, just as they may in other proceedings. See Gannon...
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Appellate Decision
...evidentiary inferences in favor of the state, the party opposing this dispositive motion. Majority adopts reasoning in State v. Hardy, 51 Kan. App. 2d 296 (2015), pet. for rev. filed April 22, 2015, the only case thus far to address the process necessary to resolve immunity claims. Here, th......
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Appellate Decisions
...a district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion, and must view the evidence in light most favorable to the State. 51 Kan.App.2d 296 (2015). Hardy's petition for review granted ISSUE: Kansas self-defense immunity statute HELD: District court's grant of immunity and dismiss......