State v. Harkins
| Decision Date | 20 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90,90 |
| Citation | 811 S.W.2d 79 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Emily Rose HARKINS, Defendant-Appellee. 811 S.W.2d 79 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. & Reporter, Joel W. Perry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellant.
William D. Massey, Memphis, for defendant-appellee.
This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee from a judgment entered by the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the decision of the trial court revoking the community corrections sentence imposed upon Emily Rose Harkins, Defendant-Appellee. The sole issue on appeal is whether the revocation of a community corrections sentence is subject to a de novo standard of review as held by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Although we affirm the results reached below, we hold that the intermediate appellate court should have applied an abuse of discretion standard of review.
In 1988, the Defendant pled guilty to one count of receiving and concealing stolen property, and one count of shoplifting over $200.00. She was sentenced to a term of three years pursuant to the Tennessee Community Corrections Act of 1985, T.C.A. Sec. 40-36-101, et seq., and was placed under the supervision of a local community corrections program. Several conditions were made part of the sentence, including a provision prohibiting the Defendant from using drugs or alcohol, a requirement to report all arrests, obey all laws, and comply with all rules and policies necessary to implement the community corrections sentence. The Defendant agreed that failure to comply with any of these conditions would lead to a revocation of her sentence and result in incarceration for the balance of the sentence.
In 1989, a petition seeking to revoke the Defendant's community corrections sentence was filed by the Defendant's caseworker because the Defendant had been arrested for shoplifting and DUI. An evidentiary hearing was held which revealed that the Defendant was apparently not intoxicated with alcohol while driving, but was taking prescription pain medication because her lower teeth had been knocked out in an accident. Concerning the shoplifting arrest, the proof revealed that the Defendant was with a male companion (who testified at the evidentiary hearing) shopping. After realizing that she had forgotten to pick up a certain item, she gave several items that she was carrying and intended to buy to the companion to take to the counter. Instead of going to the counter, the companion concealed the items on his person, left the store, and drove away after store employees confronted him. Two hours later, the companion called the store and admitted that he was responsible for the crime and that the Defendant did not know anything about it. He also informed the prosecutor's office that he was the responsible party. According to the Defendant and her companion, Defendant did not see him conceal the merchandise and was unaware that he had even left the store. The State did not offer any evidence regarding the two offenses cited in the revocation petition.
The State's proof consisted solely of the testimony of Joyce Henderson who had been the Defendant's caseworker for approximately one year. Ms. Henderson stated that she filed the petition only to notify the court that the Defendant had been arrested as was her usual custom when one of her charges got into trouble. She stated without equivocation that it was not her intention for the trial court to revoke the Defendant's community correction sentence because the Defendant had been remarkably responsive to the program. She also noted that the Defendant had completed house arrest for 180 days, was employed full-time, had nearly completed her community service hours, had paid her court costs, and was attending alcohol and drug meetings. Ms. Henderson also indicated that the Defendant was taking steps to complete her education and, for the first time in her life, was supporting her five children at home. Finally, the caseworker testified that the Defendant had made noticeable improvement in all aspects of her life, opining that she would be an excellent candidate to continue in the program because substantial and meaningful steps were being made toward rehabilitation.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court revoked the community corrections sentence, indicating that the Defendant had used up her last opportunity for freedom when she was arrested. The court ordered her to serve the balance of her sentence: The trial court's written order indicates that the Defendant "violated the terms and conditions of the order of sentence", but fails to specify the precise nature of the violation or identify which condition or term was violated. After undertaking a de novo review, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the record reflects that the Defendant was in full compliance with the conditions of her community corrections sentence, and that her attitude and continued desire to rehabilitate herself "vividly portrays what a community correction sentence can do for an individual." The intermediate appellate court also indicated that a mere accusation, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify a revocation and that the State is required to establish at least some facts that would permit the trial court to make a conscientious and intelligent judgment as to whether the conduct of the Defendant violated the conditions of her sentence.
The State contends that the de novo standard of review applied by the Court of Criminal Appeals does not apply to the revocation of community correction sentences. According to the State, the proper standard of review is the same as that used in probation revocation cases, an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Williamson, 619 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tenn.Cr.App.1981) (); State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn.Cr.App.1980) (). The Defendant takes the position that the de novo review by the intermediate court was appropriate, consistent with precedent, and reflective of legislative intent considering the mandates of T.C.A. Sec. 40-35-402. Parenthetically, we should point out that the underlying motivation of the legislature in providing for a community corrections sentence was to direct the trial courts of this state to help alleviate the overcrowded conditions in the state's prison system. T.C.A. Sec. 40-36-103 proposes to "[e]stablish a policy within the state to punish selected, nonviolent felony offenders in front-end community based alternatives to incarceration, thereby reserving secure confinement facilities for violent felony offenders...." Two of the express goals of this particular sentencing alternative is to reduce the number of nonviolent felony offenders in correctional facilities and to provide opportunities for these individuals demonstrating special needs to receive services which enhance their ability to provide for their families and become contributing members of their community. T.C.A. Sec. 40-36-104.
The Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon T.C.A. Sec. 40-35-402(d) (Supp.1988) for the proposition that appellate review is governed by a de novo standard since the sentencing hearing in this case was conducted prior to November 1, 1989, when the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 became effective. The applicable statute at the time of the sentencing hearing was T.C.A. Sec. 40-35-402(a) 1, which provided in pertinent part that a criminal defendant "may appeal from the length, range, or the manner of service of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court." The statute also provides in subsection (d) that The Court of Criminal Appeals indicated that this standard of review has been extended to sentencing issues concerning the Community Corrections Act of 1985. See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 779 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tenn.Cr.App.1988); State v. Huff, 760 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tenn.Cr.App.1988); State v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tenn.Cr.App.1987). The most recent case to use a de novo standard of review in the context of a community corrections sentence appears to be State v. Grandberry, 803 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn.Cr.App.1990).
We are persuaded that an abuse of discretion method of appellate review is applicable to issues which address the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Cain
...added). The absence of mandatory words in TENN.CODE ANN. § 65-5-203(a), indicates an intentional legislative choice. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). Greer, 967 S.W.2d at Numerous other courts have likewise recognized the important distinction between the discretionary phra......
-
Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc.
...§ 29–26–121(a)(2)(E) violations as an indication that dismissal with prejudice for such violations is not compulsory. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn.1991) (“[I]t is a rule of statutory construction which is well recognized by our courts, that the mention of one subject in a statu......
-
State v. Walker
...Ann. §§ 40-35-310, -311 (2006). The revocation of probation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn.1991); State v. Stubblefield, 953 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997); State v. Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991). To ......
-
State v. Conner
...the record contains no substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that a violation has occurred. See State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn.1991); State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence used in revoking his probati......