State v. Harper, 84-448
Decision Date | 21 December 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 84-448,84-448 |
Citation | 359 N.W.2d 806,218 Neb. 870 |
Parties | STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Ernest HARPER, Appellant. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Effectiveness of Counsel. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
2. Criminal Law: Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In making that determination the court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.
3. Criminal Law: Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.
Anthony S. Troia, Omaha, for appellant.
Paul L. Douglas, Atty. Gen., and Linda L. Willard, Lincoln, for appellee.
Ernest Harper appeals from an order entered by the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, denying his request for post conviction relief sought pursuant to the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-3001 et seq. (Reissue 1979). Specifically, Harper maintains that because his trial counsel failed to object to the introduction of evidence of a subsequent crime admittedly committed by Harper in Iowa, he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his constitutional rights. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court was correct in denying Harper's request for post conviction relief.
Harper was initially charged by information with one count of robbery, one count of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and two counts of first degree sexual assault, all in violation of Nebraska statutes. Following trial to a jury, he was convicted on all counts and appealed to this court. On direct appeal his conviction was affirmed. See State v. Harper, 215 Neb. 686, 340 N.W.2d 391 (1983) (Harper I ). The basis of Harper's direct appeal was that the district court erred in permitting the introduction into evidence of the subsequent crime committed by Harper in Iowa. We refused to consider that assignment on the merits in Harper I because Harper's trial counsel did not object to the introduction of the evidence and therefore waived any objection. Harper now maintains that the failure of trial counsel to object to the introduction of the evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby entitling him to post conviction relief.
The specific crime for which Harper was convicted in Harper I involved the robbery of a restaurant, during which Harper sexually assaulted an employee of the restaurant. The evidence which was offered at trial concerned a subsequent robbery committed by Harper and three others. During the robbery, one of the restaurant's female employees was forced to disrobe, before Harper, anxious about the amount of time spent at the restaurant, ordered his companions to flee.
In attempting to determine whether Harper's counsel failed to provide him with effective assistance, it is necessary that we consider the standards by which effective assistance is measured. In State v. Robinson, 218 Neb. 156, 159-60, 352 N.W.2d 879, 881-82 (1984), quoting from the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we said:
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
....
....
Further, in State v. Robinson, supra at 160-61, 352 N.W.2d at 882, we said:
....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Presley v. State
...by the strength of the state's case. Krist v. Foltz, supra; McAdoo v. United States, 515 A.2d 412 (D.C.App.1986); State v. Harper, 218 Neb. 870, 359 N.W.2d 806 (1984). Such consideration has been expressed in a syntax of which the following are typical. "This overwhelming evidence of guilt ......
-
State v. Nielsen
...trial strategy and then complain if it proves unsuccessful. State v. Evans, 218 Neb. 849, 359 N.W.2d 790 (1984); State v. Harper, 218 Neb. 870, 359 N.W.2d 806 (1984). The fact that a trial strategy adopted by defense counsel (and the defendant) proves to be unsuccessful in that the defendan......
-
State v. Fries, 86-339
...State v. Pearson, 220 Neb. 183, 368 N.W.2d 804 (1985); State v. Manchester, 220 Neb. 41, 367 N.W.2d 733 (1985); State v. Harper, 218 Neb. 870, 359 N.W.2d 806 (1984); State v. Clark, 216 Neb. 49, 342 N.W.2d 366 The Otey two-part test was given a slightly different, yet unexplained, articulat......
-
State v. Lee
...if the objecting party later introduces similar evidence. See, State v. Andersen, 232 Neb. 187, 440 N.W.2d 203 (1989); State v. Harper, 218 Neb. 870, 359 N.W.2d 806 (1984); Tyrrell v. State, 173 Neb. 859, 115 N.W.2d 459 (1962); Johnson v. Airport Authority, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d 426 (196......