State v. Harris, 77-1896
| Citation | 357 So.2d 758 |
| Decision Date | 18 April 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1896,77-1896 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert Hugh HARRIS, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Paul H. Zacks, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert G. Murrell of Sam E. Murrell & Sons, Orlando, for appellee.
Appellee was arrested on March 20, 1977, for aggravated battery, interference with a police officer, aggravated assault, false imprisonment and reckless driving. Subsequently, appellee was charged in one information in the County Court of Orange County with resisting an officer without violence and in another information in the County Court of Orange County he was charged with reckless driving. Pursuant to appellee's motion, the two County Court cases were consolidated. On May 18, 1977, appellee pleaded guilty to the information for reckless driving and the court dismissed the information relating to resistance of a police officer.
On June 16, 1977, appellant filed an information in the circuit court against appellee charging him with aggravated assault. Appellee moved to dismiss that information pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.151(c). The trial court's order granting said motion is the subject of this appeal.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in dismissing the information because the offenses charged in the several informations involved in this case were not "related offenses" as those terms are defined in Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.151(a). The reason they are not related appellant suggests is because they are not "triable in the same court." Appellee's position is that the offenses were triable in the same court even though some were misdemeanors and some felonies, pursuant to the authority of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.150(a).
We agree with appellee that the offenses involved are "related offenses" within the definition of Rule 3.151(a). They are based upon the same act or transaction and they could have all been filed in one information and tried in the Circuit Court. However, the fact that they were related offenses did not justify a dismissal of the information in this case.
Paraphrasing subsection 3.151(c) () we find it provided that when a defendant has been tried on a charge of one of two or more related offenses the charge of every other related offense shall be dismissed on the defendant's motion unless certain conditions are met which are not applicable here. Subsection (d) provides that a defendant can plead guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of one offense on condition that other related offenses be dismissed, or that no charges on other related offenses be instituted.
As we will demonstrate hereafter by discussion of the rationale behind Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.151 and the commentary on the ABA Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance, Approved Draft, 1968 1, this case is controlled by subsection (d) of the Rule and not by subsection (c) as appellee contends and the trial court held.
The Commentary under ABA Standard 1.3, "Failure to join related offenses," states that the purpose behind a rule such as our Rule 3.151 is "to protect defendants from 'successive prosecutions based upon essentially the same conduct.' " However, the Commentary points out that the Standard deals separately with cases in which 1) the defendant knows before the first trial that related offenses have been charged, 2) the case in which there is a subsequent attempt to try the defendant for a related offense not charged (or not known by the defendant to have been charged) prior to the first trial, and 3) the case in which there has been a prior plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a related offense.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the thrust of subsections (c) and (d) are different. In order for a defendant to rely upon subsection (c) for dismissal of related charges he must first have been subjected to a trial of one of the related offenses. 2 If he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, he falls under subsection (d) and he is not entitled to a dismissal of related charges. As the Commentary states:
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Forrest v. State, 90-1122
...finding that appellant waived the right to consolidation of the charges against him. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.151(b); State v. Harris, 357 So.2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Having done so, he was not entitled to subsequent discharge on the related felony charges after trial on the misdemeanor The trial......
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Scalf v. State, 89-2727
...charge. In support of this argument, the state cites State v. Feldman, 362 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and State v. Harris, 357 So.2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). In our judgment, the provisions of rule 3.151 are inapplicable to double jeopardy claims. Among other things, the rule presumes t......
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State v. Varnum
...in DUI manslaughter case where defendant was acquitted of similar charge arising from the same automobile accident); State v. Harris, 357 So.2d 758, 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). In Paul v. State, 385 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1980), the Florida Supreme Court established the "episodic" requirement for det......
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Grubbs v. State, 5D99-3319.
...where he pleads guilty or nolo contendere to charges, he is not entitled to a dismissal of subsequently filed charges. State v. Harris, 357 So.2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), approved; State v. Gibson, 682 So.2d 545 (Fla.1996); see also, Malik v. State, 640 So.2d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA AFFIRMED. W. ......