State v. Pinnock

• Decision Date: 14 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14154,14154
• Citation: 601 A.2d 521,220 Conn. 765
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Trevor PINNOCK.

Page 521

601 A.2d 521

220 Conn. 765

STATE of Connecticut v. Trevor PINNOCK.

No. 14154.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 24, 1991.

Decided Jan. 14, 1992.

G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Rita M. Shair, Asst. State's Atty., with whom were James G. Clark, Asst. State's Atty., and on brief, Michael Dearington, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and BORDEN, JJ. CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Trevor Pinnock, raises two issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him and raises several other issues arising from the trial court's rulings throughout the course of his criminal trial. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-54a, and attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 ¹ and 53a-54a. He was found guilty of both offenses by a jury, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seventeen years on the attempt count and to a term of twenty years on the conspiracy count, the sentences to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years imprisonment. Thereafter, he appealed to this court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. The defendant and David Lewis ² were friends. On September 18, 1988, they went to an athletic field contiguous to Goffe and County Streets in New Haven and played in a soccer game with other participants. Both left the game early. As they left the field together, they walked to Lewis' car, which was parked on County Street. They placed their soccer shoes in the car and each obtained an automatic handgun. Moments later, the defendant approached the car of Kenneth Pascoe. He raised the handgun, pointed it at Pascoe and said, "You're dead." Although the gun failed to discharge, Pascoe heard it "click" twice next to his ear. Immediately thereafter, Lewis, who was just across the street, fired his handgun at Fitzroy Pink, a good friend of Pascoe. At least three shots from Lewis' gun struck Pink, killing him. Following the shooting, the defendant and Lewis fled the scene together. In response to subsequent questioning by the New Haven police concerning this incident, the defendant attempted to deceive the police by giving a false name. At that time, he denied that he had played soccer on the date of the offense and denied that he had been in New Haven, or even in the United States, at that time. Further, he denied that he knew David Lewis. When an officer mentioned Pascoe's name, he reacted as though he was startled, but also denied knowing Pascoe. When Lewis was arrested one year after this offense, he was carrying an identification card bearing the name and photograph of the defendant.

The defendant claims that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either conspiracy to commit murder or attempt to commit murder; (2) the trial court violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment right to confront his accusers by preventing him from impeaching the veracity of a state's witness by eliciting the title of an offense of which the witness had previously been convicted, and by preventing him from eliciting information concerning the relationship between a plea bargain and that witness' testimony in this case; (3) the jury failed to follow the instructions of the trial court; (4) the jury should have been charged regarding the state's lack of evidence of motive; and (5) the court should not have delivered a "Chip Smith" charge.

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either conspiracy to commit murder or attempt to commit murder. Regarding the conspiracy count, he claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to agree with Lewis to cause the death of Pink or that he intended to cause the death of Pink. Regarding the attempt count, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he intended to cause the death of Pascoe. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on both counts.

"The standard of review of an insufficiency claim is clear. 'We first review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts expressly found by the trial court or impliedly found by the jury. We then decide whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the trial court or the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. Jarrett, 218 Conn. 766, 770-71, 591 A.2d 1225 (1991); State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 253, 575 A.2d 1003 (1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 430, 112 L.Ed.2d 413 (1990); State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641, 665-66, 526 A.2d 1283 (1987); State v. Garrison, 203 Conn. 466, 471, 525 A.2d 498 (1987)." State v. Lewis, 220 Conn. 602, 606, 600 A.2d 1330 (1991). While the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507, 590 A.2d 901 (1991). If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Grant, 219 Conn. 596, 604-605, 594 A.2d 459 (1991).

A

The defendant was charged in one count with the offense of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-54a. "To establish the crime of conspiracy under § 53a-48 of the General Statutes, it must be shown that an agreement was made between two or more persons to engage in conduct constituting a crime and that the agreement was followed by an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by any one of the conspirators." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Beccia, 199 Conn. 1, 3, 505 A.2d 683 (1986). To prove the offense of conspiracy to commit murder, the state must prove two distinct elements of intent: that the conspirators intended to agree; and that they intended to cause the death of another person. Id., 4, 505 A.2d 683. To convict the defendant of the offense as charged in this case, the jury, therefore, necessarily had to find that: (1) the defendant and Lewis intentionally agreed to cause the death of another person; (2) at the time of the agreement, the defendant intended that a death be caused; and (3) the defendant or Lewis committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by shooting and killing Pink. "While the state must prove an agreement, the existence of a formal agreement between the conspirators need not be proved because [i]t is only in rare instances that conspiracy may be established by proof of an express agreement to unite to accomplish an unlawful purpose.... State v. Ghere, 201 Conn. 289, 299, 513 A.2d 1226 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, supra, 220 Conn. at 607, 600 A.2d 1330.

There was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and Lewis conspired to kill Pink. From the actions of the defendant and Lewis close to the time of Pink's death, the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the two agreed to and intended to kill Pink, and that Pink was killed in furtherance of that agreement. The defendant and Lewis were together immediately prior to the killing of Pink. They played soccer together, left the game early together and walked to Lewis' car together. The jury could reasonably have inferred that the two men, who were wearing sweatsuits, were not carrying handguns while they played soccer, and that they obtained guns together from Lewis' car. Moments after securing the guns, the two men parted. The defendant approached Pascoe and Lewis killed Pink. The murder and the incident involving the defendant and Pascoe occurred only seconds apart and within approximately three car lengths of one another on the same street in the city of New Haven. The defendant and Lewis were friends and the two victims were close friends. Further, after their individual criminal actions, the defendant and Lewis ran from the scene together, and one year after the crimes, Lewis had the defendant's identification card in his possession. The jury could reasonably have found that the defendant's conduct in pointing a gun at Pascoe and stating, "You're dead," and Lewis' killing of Pink were not merely coincidental. Because of the proximity in time and place and the interaction between the defendant and Lewis, both before and after the incidents, and because of the similarity of their conduct with the handguns, the jury could properly have found that the actions of the defendant and Lewis were planned and agreed to at some prior time. The jury could also have found that the agreement was intended, that the men intended to cause the death of Pink, and that an overt act was completed in furtherance of the agreement.

The defendant also asserts that the state's failure to prove any motive in this case necessarily clouded the issue of the defendant's guilt with a reasonable doubt, requiring a judgment of acquittal. While motive is not an element of a crime that the state has the burden of proving, the presence of evidence of motive may strengthen the state's case. State v. Ruffin, 206 Conn. 678, 681, 539 A.2d 144 (1988). It is conceivable that the evidence adduced in a particular case would be so inconclusive...