State v. Harrison
| Decision Date | 10 October 1949 |
| Docket Number | 41341 |
| Citation | 223 S.W.2d 476,359 Mo. 793 |
| Parties | State of Missouri, Defendant in Error, v. Hugh Norman Harrison, Plaintiff in Error |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Writ of Error to Audrain Circuit Court; Hon. Frank C Hollingsworth, Judge.
Affirmed.
Defendant's conviction of burglary and larceny and maximum punishment under the habitual criminal act is affirmed. The information and verdict were in proper form under the habitual criminal act. Instructions are not presented for review when defendant failed to file a motion for new trial and a bill of exceptions.
Hugh N. Harrison for plaintiff in error, per se.
(1) The information was and is insufficient to constitute a valid charge under the habitual criminal statute. Sec. 4854, R.S. 1939; Indictment and Information, Key 114 and Key 87 (7); State v. Sumpter, 73 S.W.2d 760. (2) The verdict of the jury specifically finding appellant guilty as a second offender and assessing punishment at the maximum imprisonment of 15 years is based upon erroneous Instructions S-2 and S-3, given them by the trial court, and said verdict is therefore erroneous. Criminal Law -- Key 884; State v. Sumpter, 73 S.W.2d 760.
J. E. Taylor, Attorney General, and Lawrence L. Bradley, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant in error.
(1) The information properly charges the crimes of second degree burglary and grand larceny with a former felony conviction, and is sufficient. Sec. 4854, Mo. R.S.A.; State v. Sumpter, 335 Mo. 620, 73 S.W.2d 760; State v. Krebs, 336 Mo. 576, 80 S.W.2d 196; State v. Oliver, 184 S.W.2d 1007. (2) The verdict is in proper form and is responsive to the information. Secs. 4440, 4445, 4448, 4456, 4457, Mo. R.S.A.; State v. Tyler, 349 Mo. 167, 159 S.W.2d 777.
Defendant was convicted of second degree burglary and of larceny. Because of a previous conviction he was punished under the habitual criminal act. In compliance with that act he was given the maximum penalty on each charge, ten years imprisonment for burglary, and five years for larceny.
In this review he raises no question about his conviction for burglary and larceny, but complains only about being charged and found guilty of a previous conviction. He claims he was not properly charged, tried or convicted as a second offender.
The habitual criminal act, Section 4854, R.S. 1939, Mo. RSA, provides that if a person has been convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, and has been discharged either upon pardon or upon compliance with the sentence, and shall subsequently be convicted of an offense committed after such pardon or discharge, he shall receive the maximum punishment fixed for such subsequent offense, up to life imprisonment.
Construing this act, we have pointed out that the following elements are necessary in order to bring a criminal prosecution within its terms. The information or indictment must allege and the proof must show the former conviction of the defendant, his discharge from the judgment of conviction by pardon or compliance with the sentence, and the offense charged therein was committed after the defendant was discharged from his previous sentence. State v. Sumpter, 335 Mo. 620, 73 S.W.2d 760; State v. Hamilton, 340 Mo. 768, 102 S.W.2d 642.
The information in this case specifically charged that defendant on the 31st day of October, 1931, was convicted of the crime of robbery; was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for 25 years; defendant was discharged upon compliance with his sentence; and that thereafter, on the 25th day of January, 1948, he committed the burglary and larceny.
A reading of the allegations of the information clearly shows it follows the requirement of the statute that the subsequent offense must be charged as being committed after the defendant had been discharged from the previous conviction. The fact the information failed to state the date on which defendant was discharged from his previous conviction does not affect its validity. It was sufficient to charge in the information that the second offense was committed after or subsequent to such discharge.
Defendant argues the information must allege in particularity that he was actually imprisoned in the penitentiary upon his previous conviction, and served time there until discharged upon compliance with his sentence. But the statute does not impose such a requirement that the information shall specifically allege imprisonment, nor is such a charge or proof thereof necessary for the application of the act. The act makes the previous conviction and a discharge therefrom the basis for the added punishment imposed by its terms. It does not specifically require incarceration in the penitentiary but only that the defendant has been discharged from his conviction. This must be so because the act applies where a defendant is discharged from his conviction by pardon. A discharge by pardon could occur without any confinement in the penitentiary. And we have held the act applied where there was imprisonment in a city workhouse under a conviction of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. We said of the act: "Had the framers of this section intended that it should apply only to persons who have been punished, for a previous offense, by imprisonment in the penitentiary, undoubtedly they would have said so." State v. Marshall, 326 Mo. 1141, 34 S.W.2d 29. And see State v. Hacker (Mo. Sup.), 214 S.W.2d 413. "Where not required by statute, it need not be shown that...
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State v. Foster
...in the amended information were sufficient to bring the prosecution within the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act, State v. Harrison, 359 Mo. 793, 223 S.W.2d 476; State v. Murphy, 345 Mo. 358, 133 S.W.2d 398, and to further charge all of the essential elements of the crime of grand lar......