State v. Harrison, CASE NO. 8-14-16
| Decision Date | 13 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 8-14-16 |
| Citation | 2015 Ohio 1419 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. KANDALE L. HARRISON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. |
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Marc S. Triplett for Appellant
Eric C. Stewart for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kandale L. Harrison ("Harrison"), appeals the June 20, 2014 judgment entry of sentence of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas following his conviction for complicity to possession of drugs. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On June 11, 2013, the Logan County Grand Jury indicted Harrison and Gregory A. Abbott ("Abbott") on Count One of complicity to possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2923.03 and 2925.11(A), a fourth-degree felony, Count Two of complicity to possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2923.03 and 2925.11(A), a third-degree felony, and Count Four of complicity to possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2923.03 and 2925.11(A), a second-degree felony. (Doc. No. 11). The Grand Jury indicted Abbott only on Count Three of possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony. (Id.). The indictment contained forfeiture specifications as to Counts One and Two and as to Harrison and Abbott. (Id.).
{¶3} The trial court found Harrison indigent and appointed counsel to represent him. (Doc. No. 25). On June 14, 2013, Harrison entered pleas of not guilty to the counts and specifications in the indictment applicable to him. (Doc. No. 26).
{¶4} On October 1, 2013, the trial court granted Harrison's request to continue his trial. (Doc. No. 38). The trial court rescheduled trial for February 13 and 14, 2014. (Doc. No. 45).
{¶5} On October 2, 2013, Abbott pled guilty to Count Three of the indictment and agreed to forfeit the cash seized on the date of arrest, and the State agreed to dismiss Counts One, Two, and Four against him. (Doc. Nos. 40, 42). The trial court found Abbott guilty of Count Three and the forfeiture specification, and dismissed Counts One, Two, and Four against him. (Doc. No. 42).
{¶6} On January 13, 2014, the State moved to amend the indictment against Harrison so that the indictment would contain Count One of complicity to possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2923.03 and 2925.11(A), a third-degree felony, Count Two of complicity to possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2923.03 and 2925.11(A), a third-degree felony, and a forfeiture specification as to Count One.1 (Doc. No. 63). Count One stemmed from a March 16, 2013 traffic stop, during which officers discovered Oxycodone and Hydrocodone pills. (Doc. No. 64). Count Two stemmed from a May 12, 2013 traffic stop, during which officers discovered cocaine. (Id.). The trial court granted the State's motion onFebruary 4, 2014 and amended and renumbered the counts of the indictment as requested. (Doc. No. 84).
{¶7} On February 12, 2014, at the request of Harrison, who notified the trial court that he retained new counsel, the trial court continued Harrison's trial until March 20 and 21, 2014. (Doc. No. 90). (See also Doc. No. 94).
{¶8} On March 17, 2014, Harrison filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the traffic stops, arguing, among other things, that the Ohio Highway Patrol trooper who performed the May 12, 2013 traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. (Doc. No. 122). The trial court held a hearing on Harrison's motion on March 18, 2014. (Mar. 18, 2014 Tr. at 4). The trial court denied Harrison's motion to suppress and continued Harrison's trial until March 25 and 26, 2014. (Id. at 79-80, 88).
{¶9} On March 21, 2014, the trial court held a hearing after Harrison's trial counsel informed the trial court that Harrison wanted someone else to represent him. (Mar. 21, 2014 Tr. at 3). The trial court denied Harrison's request. (Id. at 22).
{¶10} On March 24, 2014, Harrison's counsel moved to withdraw as counsel, arguing, "Despite our conversations, and counsels [sic] advise [sic] thiswas not in his best interest our relationship has become untenable."2 (Doc. No. 136).
{¶11} Also on March 24, 2014, Harrison filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio an affidavit seeking the disqualification of the trial court judge. (Doc. No. 138). The trial court stayed the case and vacated the March 25 and 26, 2014 trial dates. (Doc. No. 139). The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Harrison's affidavit as untimely on March 31, 2014. (Doc. No. 141).
{¶12} On April 4, 2014, the trial court scheduled trial for May 8 and 9, 2014. (Doc. No. 142).
{¶13} Two days before trial, on May 6, 2014, Harrison, acting pro se, filed a letter to the trial court judge dated April 30, 2014. (Doc. No. 160). In the letter, Harrison stated, "I would like to dismiss my current Attorney * * * due to conflict of interest that we have been dealing with for the past month." (Id.). At trial, the trial court denied Harrison's request. (Trial Tr., Vol. One, at 124).
{¶14} A jury trial was held on May 8 and 9, 2014. (Trial Tr., Vol. One, at 5). The jury found Harrison not guilty of Count One and the corresponding forfeiture specification, but it found him guilty of Count Two. (Doc. No. 165). (See also Doc. No. 167).
{¶15} The trial court sentenced Harrison on June 13, 2014 and filed its judgment entry of sentence on June 20, 2014. (Doc. No. 172).
{¶16} On July 16, 2014, Harrison filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 187). He raises nine assignments of error for our review. We address Harrison's assignments of error out of order, and we address his ninth and second assignments of error together.
The trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion to suppress. [3/18/14 Tr. 79-80]
{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Harrison argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the trooper that pulled Harrison over lacked "an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Appellant had violated R.C. 4511.33." (Appellant's Brief at 6).
{¶18} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, "an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). Withrespect to the trial court's conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶19} At the March 18, 2014 hearing on Harrison's motion to suppress, the trial court found that the video of the May 12, 2013 traffic stop was "less definitive" than the video of the March 16, 2013 traffic stop, but nevertheless concluded "that the trooper's testimony establishes probable cause for the traffic stop." (Mar. 18, 2014 Tr. at 79-80). While the trial court did not make any specific factual findings aside from relying on the trooper's testimony, "[t]he extensive record of the suppression hearing is 'sufficient to allow full review of the suppression issues.'" State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio-7008, ¶ 96, quoting State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 443 (1992). See also State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130359, 2014-Ohio-3110, ¶ 10 (), citing State v. Shields, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100362, 2011-Ohio-1912, ¶ 9, citing State v. Brown, 64 Ohio St.3d 476 (1992), syllabus. Accordingly, we review the record to determine the facts and then determine whether those facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.
{¶20} At the suppression hearing, Trooper Andrew Rea ("Rea") testified that Harrison garnered his attention based on an "illegal marked lane violation" in Bellefontaine, Ohio. (Mar. 18, 2014 Tr. at 34). When asked by the State's counsel to describe what he observed, Rea responded, "He originally was in the left turn lane at the intersection to head north on U.S. 68, and then as the light turned green he transferred to the right through lane, crossing the solid white line." (Id.). In other words, instead of turning left, Harrison changed lanes and went straight through the intersection. (Id.). At the time he observed Harrison's lane change, Rea was traveling west as he approached the intersection, and Harrison was facing east. (Id. at 34, 44). According to Rea, he initiated his blue lights, turned around, and stopped the vehicle operated by Harrison. (Id. at 35).
{¶21} Rea identified State's Exhibit 2 as a copy of his cruiser's video recording of his traffic stop of Harrison, which Rea said included video of Harrison's "lane change." (Id. at 42-43). Rea testified that as Harrison was sitting in the left-turn lane, Harrison's vantage point would have possibly allowed him to see an "OVI checkpoint" that was "just north of this location." (Id. at 45). On cross-examination, Rea testified that he was approximately 300 feet away from Harrison's vehicle when he observed Harrison's lane change. (Id. at 52). There were no cars behind or to the side of Harrison when he changed lanes. (Id.).When asked by Harrison's counsel what the citation was, Rea responded, (Id. at 53).
{¶22} "Marked lane" and "lane change" violations are governed by R.C. 4511.33, which provides, in relevant part:
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