State v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 06 April 1960
• Docket Number: No. 17638,17638
• Citation: 236 S.C. 246,113 S.E.2d 783
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. Winston HARRISON and Arthur Dillon, Appellants.

Page 783

113 S.E.2d 783

236 S.C. 246

STATE, Respondent, v. Winston HARRISON and Arthur Dillon, Appellants.

No. 17638.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 6, 1960.

Walker, Walker & Jenkins, Sidney B. Jones, Jr., Summerville, for appellants.

Julian S. Wolfe, Sol., Orangeburg, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

Appellants, both Negroes, were tried on an indictment charging in separate counts (1) rape, (2) assault with intent to ravish, (3) carnal knowledge of a female under 16 (Section 16-80 of the 1952 Code), commonly referred to as statutory rape, and (4) assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. The jury found them guilty of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. Each was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years.

The testimony of the alleged victim, a Negro between the ages of 14 and 16 and in the tenth grade in school, was to the following effect: One of the appellants lived next door to her and the other in the same neighborhood. She knew them well but had never gone out with them. About 4:00 o'clock on Sunday afternoon, October 12, 1958, she and another Negro girl about the same age, started to visit a friend. They were overtaken by appellants in a truck, who stopped and asked if they wanted a ride. When they declined the invitation, appellants said they would 'make them ride.' She and her companion started running. Her companion escaped but appellants caught her and forcibly put her in the truck. She commenced screaming. Appellants rolled up the windows of the truck. They drove for some distance until they reached a dirt road in a sparsely settled section where they stopped. Each appellant forcibly had intercourse with her in the truck while the other remained on the outside and watched. After this was done they threatened to kill her if she related what had occurred. Appellants then drove to the home of Frances Butler, a neighbor of the prosecutrix, where they let her out.

The testimony of the prosecutrix as to being forcibly placed in the truck by appellants was corroborated by her companion. Frances Butler testified that about 4:30 that afternoon the prosecutrix came to her home crying, with her hair disheveled. Her mother was promptly notified and arrived about 6:00 o'clock. She said that her daughter's clothes were 'all wrinkled up, her hair was tangled up and she was crying.' When asked as to what had happened, her daughter told her of the occurrence.

According to a deputy sheriff of Dorchester County, appellants when arrested the following morning readily admitted having assaulted the prosecutrix. The only discrepancy in their version and the testimony given by the prosecutrix was that appellant Arthur Dillon claimed in his confession to the deputy sheriff that after assaulting the prosecutrix he lost his nerve and did not have intercourse with her. A physician who examined the prosecutrix on October 14th, two days after the alleged assault, said he found no bruises or scratches on her body.

The first question for determination is whether the Court erred in refusing to quash the indictment upon the ground that it charged two separate and distinct offenses, namely, both common-law and statutory rape. It was held in State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701, that these two offenses may be joined in the same indictment. Decisions in other jurisdictions are to the same effect. State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N.E. 462, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 277; State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35; State v. Dixon, 143 Wash. 262, 255 P. 109; Commonwealth ex rel. Case v. Smith, 134 Pa.Super. 183, 3 A.2d 1007; State v. Hall, 214 N.C. 639, 200 S.E. 375.

It is next claimed that the Court erred in permitting the mother of the prosecutrix to relate the details of the complaint made by her daughter when she arrived at the home of Frances Butler, which was less than two hours after the alleged assault. It is well settled that the fact that the prosecutrix complained of a rape may be shown in corroboration of her testimony. State v. Sudduth, 52 S.C. 488, 30 S.E. 408; State v. Dawson, 88 S.C. 225, 70 S.E. 721; State v. Black, 204 S.C. 414, 29 S.E.2d 675. If the prosecutrix does not testify, such evidence is inadmissible. State v. Wallace, 122 S.C. 520, 115 S.E. 811. The particulars or details are not admissible but so much of the complaint as identifies 'the time and place with that of the one charged' may be shown. Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Section 1136; Lauderdale v. State, 227 Miss. 113, 85 So.2d 822. The testimony in controversy did not go beyond the foregoing limitations and certainly was not prejudicial.

Error is assigned in conducting the preliminary inquiry as to the voluntariness of the confessions in the presence of the jury. As pointed out in State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 88 S.E.2d 880, the better practice is to conduct this preliminary examination in the absence of the jury but where, as here, the confession is found to be admissible, the failure to do so is not reversible error. Equally without merit is the contention that the confessions to the deputy sheriff were made under duress. All of the evidence tends to show that the statements made to this officer were freely and voluntarily given. Indeed, there is no evidence to the contrary. The mere fact that they were made by appellants while in the custody of the deputy sheriff does not render them inadmissible. State v. Chasteen, supra; State v. Brown, 212 S.C. 237, 47 S.E.2d 521.

It is claimed that during the taking of the testimony, the Court erred in inquiring of the solicitor whether he had shown that the alleged crime occurred in Dorchester County. No prejudice resulted from this inquiry. The locus of the crime had previously been established but apparently the testimony to that effect...