State v. Hartman

• Decision Date: 24 November 1931
• Docket Number: 40360
• Citation: 239 N.W. 107,213 Iowa 546
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. MILO HARTMAN, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

239 N.W. 107

213 Iowa 546

STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. MILO HARTMAN, Appellant

No. 40360

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

November 24, 1931

Appeal from Dickinson District Court.--F. C. DAVIDSON, Judge.

The defendant was jointly indicted with John Hartman, his father on a charge of conspiracy to injure the property, character and rights in property of Jasper Alexander and Frank Long under Section 13162 of the Code of 1927. The defendant, Milo Hartman, was tried separately, convicted by a jury, and from the judgment entered thereon, he appeals. The facts appear in the opinion.

Reversed.

H. E Narey, W. B. Bedell, and Coyle & Coyle, for appellant.

K. B. Welty and J. J. Hess, for appellee.

GRIMM, J. FAVILLE, C. J., and EVANS, KINDIG, and STEVENS, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GRIMM, J.

The scene of this trouble was on the shore of Lake Okoboji in Dickinson County. John Hartman, father of the defendant, was the owner of what is known as the "Eagle Boat Line," and Jasper Alexander and Frank Long were the owners of a competing line. Hartman had rented a concession from the owner of the land adjacent to the lake on the south side of the neck of water connecting East and West Okoboji, and had constructed several docks thereon, from which as a base he handled his boat traffic. The landward end of these docks was connected by a sidewalk and handrail running approximately east and west. Between two of his docks, a street belonging to the town of Arnold's Park terminated at the lake shore.

About July 1, 1929, Alexander and Long constructed a dock extending into the lake at the end of the street, and at the land end of their dock, they cut the handrail on the sidewalk constructed by Hartman and extended their dock over Hartman's sidewalk to the street; and immediately the trouble between these boat lines commenced. Each owned several different boats which were engaged in passenger traffic and competition became very bitter. Arnold's Park is a summer resort and there were many concessions, stands, amusements, dance hall, etc., which attracted a large number of people to the lake during the summer season. Threats were made by defendants that they would tear out the docks of Alexander and Long and would have all of the business to themselves. On the other hand, Alexander and Long and their associates and employees made similar threats against the Hartmans, each side indulging in vulgar and blasphemous language.

Many things were said by the owners or representatives of each of the boat lines derogatory to the boats, the patrons, and the individuals of the other boat lines. Much of this was done through megaphones and some of it in private conversation. Some of it was done in the presence of a few passengers or prospective passengers of some of the boats and many of these remarks were made in the presence of many assembled people.

This warfare, which was general on either side of the controversy, lasted from about the first of July to the 28th thereof. On that date, there was a collision between one of the boats of one line and one of the boats of the other line, resulting in a catastrophe.

The Hartmans had been in business for a considerable period of time before Alexander and Long came into the picture. It appears that about the fifth of August, one morning, Alexander and Long began installing their dock. In doing so, as previously stated, some of the sidewalk, railing and signs of the Hartmans were torn down or destroyed. The mayor and other officials were called into the controversy and the Alexander crowd defied them and, in substance, everyone else. There is an intimation in the record to the effect that the inspector was related to and friendly to some of the Alexander people. This possibly furnished the background for the courage and audacity with which the Alexander people acted in the premises.

I. The crime charged is a conspiracy. It may be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Sterling, 34 Iowa 443; State v. McIntosh, 109 Iowa 209, 80 N.W. 349. In State v. Manning, 149 Iowa 205, 128 N.W. 345, this court said:

"* * * neither the nature nor the existence of a conspiracy can be established by the acts or declarations of one conspirator in the absence and without the knowledge and concurrence of the other. Wiggins v. Leonard, 9 Iowa 194; State v. Weaver, 57 Iowa 730, 11 N.W. 675 * * * ."

In State v. Tedd, 196 Iowa 292, 194 N.W. 184, this court said:

"This rule, in substance, is that, when a conspiracy is proved, every conspirator is charged with knowledge and responsibility for the acts and statements of his coconspirators said and done pursuant to the conspiracy, and before its consummation. * * * The objective of the prosecution is not to show crime perpetrated pursuant to a conspiracy. The crime charged is the conspiracy itself, and without any reference to the overt acts perpetrated pursuant thereto. The only burden upon the State is to prove the conspiracy. If the conspiracy is proved by legal evidence, then the defendant is guilty. The acts and declarations of Hahn and Lucas in the absence of the defendant were not, and could not be, admissible as proof of the conspiracy."

In State v. Paden, 199 Iowa 383, 202 N.W. 105, this court said:

"A conspiracy involves concert of action, and the gist of the crime is the unlawful agreement with intent to do the thing charged in the indictment. Proof of the overt act charged, is not sufficient per se to warrant a conviction. It is probative, but not conclusive. Briefly stated, it is competent to prove overt acts, with other facts and circumstances, for the purpose of showing the common intent entertained by the defendants. State v. Madden, 170 Iowa 230, 148 N.W. 995. The trial court recognized this rule, and instructed the jury that: 'The doing of such overt act did not constitute the crime charged in the indictment unless there was an agreement and confederation between the defendant M. W. Paden, A. R. Drake, and John F. Smith, or either of them, to do such act prior to the time such act was done, if it was done.' This was the law of the case. It is the law of the state."

Other cases might be cited, but the foregoing will suffice.

II. There is here no direct evidence of any agreement or understanding between the Hartmans and, to say the least, there is a very distinct controversy as to whether any such agreement or understanding ever existed.

The defendant unequivocally denies there was any understanding or agreement of any kind or character between him and his father in reference to what was said or done by either of them. A careful reading of the entire record impresses one with the...