State v. Hartsough, No. 88SC505
| Docket Nº | No. 88SC505 |
| Citation | 790 P.2d 836 |
| Case Date | April 30, 1990 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Page 836
State University Veterinary Teaching Hospital; Colorado
State University College of Veterinary Medicine and
Biomedical Sciences; Colorado State University College of
Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences Veterinary
Teaching Hospital; Dr. John Smith, D.V.M.; and Heidi
Hamlin, Petitioners,
v.
Mary Beth HARTSOUGH and Patrick J. Hartsough, Respondents.
En Banc.
Page 837
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., and Timothy R. Arnold, Deputy Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioners.
Zak, Fox, Pehr and Fuller, P.C., David W. Pehr, Westminster, for respondents.
Justice LOHR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This case arises out of the death of a llama owned by Mary Beth and Patrick J. Hartsough. The llama was put to death following severe injuries sustained during a routine examination by Dr. John Smith and student Heidi Hamlin at Colorado State University's veterinary hospital. The Hartsoughs filed an action in Denver District Court against the State of Colorado, Colorado State University and two of its colleges, the veterinary hospital, the doctor and the student, seeking damages for the loss of the llama. The district court dismissed the complaint because it concluded that the Hartsoughs' claims were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 24-10-101 to -120, 10A C.R.S. (1988). The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. Hartsough v. State, 762 P.2d 758 (Colo.App.1988). We hold that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act barred the Hartsoughs' claims and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
In 1971, we prospectively overruled prior decisions in this state that recognized the defense of governmental immunity in tort actions. See Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Flournoy v. School Dist., 174 Colo. 110,
Page 838
482 P.2d 966 (1971); Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113, 482 P.2d 965 (1971). In response to these decisions, the legislature enacted the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. Ch. 323, sec. 1, §§ 130-11-1 to -17, 1971 Colo.Sess.Laws 1204, 1204-11.The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act makes public entities and public employees immune from claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort, with some statutory exceptions. § 24-10-105, 10A C.R.S. (1988). This case presents the question of whether the operation of a veterinary hospital by a state university is among those exceptions. 1 The statute governing the resolution of this question is section 24-10-106(1)(b), 10A C.R.S. (1988), which provides in pertinent part:
Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from:
....
(b) The operation of any public hospital, correctional facility, as defined in section 17-1-102, C.R.S., 2 or jail by such public entity.
The district court dismissed the Hartsoughs' complaint based on the conclusion that the term "public hospital" in section 24-10-106(1)(b) does not include veterinary hospitals and therefore sovereign immunity has not been waived as to the operation of veterinary hospitals by public entities. The court of appeals reversed on the basis of its contrary conclusion that "public hospital" as used in that statute refers to all types of public hospitals, including veterinary hospitals. Hartsough, 762 P.2d at 759. We agree with the trial court's construction of the statute.
In Stephen v. City and County of Denver, 659 P.2d 666 (Colo.1983), we noted that because governmental immunity is in derogation of Colorado's common law, "legislative grants of immunity must be strictly construed." Id. at 668 n. 3. It remains true, however, that our primary task in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Kern 746 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo.1987). In determining the meaning of a statute we derive guidance from familiar principles of statutory construction. Words should be given their ordinary meaning. People v....
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Middleton v. Hartman, 00SC809.
...by Hartman's argument. In interpreting the CGIA, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo.1990). To discern the legislative intent, we look to the statutory language itself. Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo.1995).......
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People v. Thoro Products Co., Inc., 01SC419.
...of an undefined word in a statute may be determined by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. See State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo.1990). Six of the seven words in the statute, "discharge," "deposit," "injection," "dumping," "spilling," and "placing," all describe ......
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People v. Bergen, 91CA1629
...Badis, 842 P.2d 245, 249 (Colo.1992). Also, courts must look at the context in which statutory terms appear. State v. Page 538 Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 (Colo.1990). In order sensibly to effect the legislative intent embodied in an entire statutory scheme, statutes must be construed as a whol......
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City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Associates, 90SC645
...(a) All actions of debt founded upon any contract or liability in action." 2 Superseded by statute as stated in State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 3 Black's Law Dictionary 1069 (6th ed. 1990); see Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132, 58 S.Ct. 785, 788, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1937);......
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Middleton v. Hartman, 00SC809.
...by Hartman's argument. In interpreting the CGIA, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo.1990). To discern the legislative intent, we look to the statutory language itself. Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo.1995).......
-
People v. Thoro Products Co., Inc., 01SC419.
...of an undefined word in a statute may be determined by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. See State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo.1990). Six of the seven words in the statute, "discharge," "deposit," "injection," "dumping," "spilling," and "placing," all describe ......
-
People v. Bergen, 91CA1629
...Badis, 842 P.2d 245, 249 (Colo.1992). Also, courts must look at the context in which statutory terms appear. State v. Page 538 Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 (Colo.1990). In order sensibly to effect the legislative intent embodied in an entire statutory scheme, statutes must be construed as a whol......
-
City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Associates, 90SC645
...(a) All actions of debt founded upon any contract or liability in action." 2 Superseded by statute as stated in State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 3 Black's Law Dictionary 1069 (6th ed. 1990); see Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132, 58 S.Ct. 785, 788, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1937);......