State v. Hasty, 61519
| Decision Date | 05 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 61519,61519 |
| Citation | 158 Ga.App. 464,280 S.E.2d 873 |
| Parties | The STATE v. HASTY. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Stephen A. Williams, Dist. Atty., Dianne Cook, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellant.
James Michael Brown, Dalton, for appellee.
The state, who is the appellant here, brought a petition to revoke a suspended sentence handed down to Hasty in 1971 for child abandonment. The 1971 court order decreed that Hasty's "sentence is suspended until the 21st birthday of the youngest child ... or until such time as further ordered by the Court, upon condition that" Hasty pay certain amounts as child support.
At the hearing on the instant petition in 1980, Hasty contended that as the present age of majority in Georgia, since 1972, is 18 and not 21, he could not be required to pay child support after the youngest child turns 18. The trial court's order directed that "child support shall cease as each child reaches the age of 18 years." Held :
In 1972 the legislature enacted a change in the age of majority law from 21 years to 18 years (Acts 1972, pp. 193, 194; Code Ann. § 74-104) and provided contemporaneously that "nothing in this law ... shall have the effect of changing the age from 21 to 18 with respect to any legal instrument or court decree in existence prior to the effective date of this law, when said instrument refers only to 'the age of majority' or words of similar import." (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no more doubt in Georgia that this latter proviso means that any civil judgment, order or decree, or legal instrument or contract or agreement providing for child support until the child's age of majority or until the child reaches age 21, and entered into before the age of majority was changed to 18, continues in force until the child becomes 21. Javetz v. Nash, 244 Ga. 606, 261 S.E.2d 388; Christmas v. Langston, 241 Ga. 331, 245 S.E.2d 290; Hall v. Hall, 240 Ga. 28, 239 S.E.2d 356; Hinson v. Kinard, 237 Ga. 422, 228 S.E.2d 819; Spivey v. Schneider, 234 Ga. 687, 217 S.E.2d 251; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 233 Ga. 902, 903, 214 S.E.2d 368; Choquette v. Choquette, 232 Ga. 759, 208 S.E.2d 848. We deal in this case, however, with an order for child support arising out of a criminal prosecution for child abandonment, the terms of which are a condition for the suspension of a criminal sentence imposed against the appellee for the offense. The state concedes it has searched in vain for a case concerning the effect of Code Ann. § 74-104.1 upon criminal abandonment support orders, but nevertheless argues that the language of the statute includes child support orders based on criminal prosecutions. We see the matter in a different light, however, and do not concede that the broad language in the saving proviso of Code Ann. § 74-104.1 ensnares this appellee.
While the trial court, in 1971, convicted the defendant of child abandonment, it suspended his sentence on condition that he pay support until the youngest child reached 21 years, pursuant to Code Ann. § 27-2709. Because there is no magic in the age 21, we conclude that the obvious intent of the sentencing court was to provide support until the last child reached the age of majority. The trial court could not have intended to impose a further penalty upon the defendant beyond the prison sentence it imposed, but which it suspended on condition that the defendant fulfill his support obligations under the law. The order to support was not the punishment or sentence imposed, or we might be constrained to admit its inviolability (see Code Ann. § 26-103, and Barton v. State, 81 Ga.App. 810, 814, 60 S.E.2d 173); rather, the order to support to age 21 comprised the conditions upon which the defendant might keep himself from prison for the crime of abandonment he committed in 1971. Today there is no statutory obligation to support to age 21; yet it is contended the defendant must do so upon pain of imprisonment for an earlier crime.
From this it can be seen that it is not at all so simple as the state suggests, and as Code Ann. § 74-104.1 might seem to imply at first glance, to include a criminal abandonment support order in the category of "any legal instrument or court decree" which was in existence before 1972 and which is rendered enforceable under Code Ann. § 74-104.1. The intent of the saving proviso in Code Ann. § 74-104.1 is to preserve those vested rights and obligations established by contract or by appealable civil judgment, and to avoid the unconstitutional impairment of contracts (Constitution of Georgia, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VII; Code Ann. § 2-107). The trenchant reasoning behind the enactment and the Supreme Court decisions, which have all been in civil c...
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Burton v. Campbell
...included within its operation must "be resolved in favor of the general provision and not the exception. [Cit.]" State v. Hasty, 158 Ga.App. 464, 466, 280 S.E.2d 873 (1981). The usual function of such a clause "is not to create anything, but to preserve something from immediate interference......
- Blackman v. State, 61501
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In the Matter of Aldrich, Case No. 08-50311 RFH (M.D. Ga. 3/20/2009)
...with respect to any legal instrument or court decree in existence prior to the effective date of the new law. State v. Hasty, 158 Ga. App. 464, 280 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1981); Javetz v. Nash, 244 Ga. 606, 261 S.E.2d 388 2. Respondent contends that he received a "receivership" interest in the in......
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In re Aldrich, 08-50311 RFH.
...with respect to any legal instrument or court decree in existence prior to the effective date of the new law. State v. Hasty, 158 Ga.App. 464, 280 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1981); Javetz v. Nash, 244 Ga. 606, 261 S.E.2d 388 2. Respondent contends that he received a "receivership" interest in the inc......