State v. Hatch, Cr. N
Decision Date | 23 February 1984 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Citation | 346 N.W.2d 268 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Dennis HATCH, Defendant and Appellant. o. 929. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Charles J. Gilje, argued, States Atty., Jamestown, for plaintiff and appellee.
Mackenzie, Jungroth, Mackenzie & Reisnour, Jamestown, for defendant and appellant; argued by James A. Reisnour, Jamestown.
This is an appeal by the defendant, Dennis Hatch, from a judgment of conviction entered by the District Court of Stutsman County on March 30, 1983, upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of the crime of theft of property, a class C felony, in violation of Section 12.1-23-02(2) of the North Dakota Century Code. Hatch was charged with committing the offense of theft of property by obtaining benefits under the North Dakota Unemployment Compensation Law in an amount exceeding $500 between November 1, 1980, and December 31, 1980, by falsely informing Job Service North Dakota that he was not employed during the week ending September 6, 1980. We affirm the conviction.
Dennis Hatch had been employed by Marvel Steel in Jamestown, North Dakota, until this employment was terminated in March, 1980. Thereafter, Hatch became eligible for benefits under the North Dakota Unemployment Compensation Law, 1 which required him to file, on a weekly basis, a continued claim form with Job Service North Dakota which renews a worker's registration for work and continues a worker's claim for benefits. 2
Hatch filed a continued claim form in which he claimed benefits for the week ending September 6, 1980. The claim form included questions pertinent to an individual's eligibility and disqualification for unemployment benefits. Hatch answered "No" to the question, "Did you work for any employer(s) or in self employment during the week claimed?" He also left space blank on the claim form for the "name and address of employer(s) and why you are no longer working, total hours, dates worked, and gross earnings." In answering these questions, Hatch failed to mention his employment with a Jamestown contracting firm, Everetts & Associates, Inc. [Everetts], during the week ending September 6, 1980.
Hatch testified he was employed by Everetts during the week ending September 6, 1980, and, although work was available, quit. He was employed 26 1/2 hours at Everetts and earned $123. Hatch assigned the following reason at trial for his omission of information concerning his employment with Everetts:
The continued claim form contained the statement, Hatch signed this form on September 8, 1980, and thereafter was paid, through a check drawn on the Unemployment Compensation Benefit Fund, his weekly benefit amount of $70. Hatch endorsed the check in space provided thereon above which was set forth, "By signing below, I now CERTIFY, under penalty of law, that any and ALL WAGES earned in the week covered by this check were FULLY reported on my claim."
Hatch thereafter initiated a claim for extended benefits pursuant to Chapter 52-07.1, N.D.C.C. The extended benefit program was established to provide for the payment of extended unemployment compensation benefits to qualified workers who during periods of high unemployment have exhausted their rights to regular benefits under the unemployment compensation law. Section 52-07.1-01, N.D.C.C. Hatch received extended benefits in the amount of $70 per week from the week ending November 1, 1980, to and including the week ending December 27, 1980, totaling $630.
Chris Huber, head of the investigation and collection unit for the Job Insurance Division of Job Service, testified that Hatch's omission was discovered through a computer "cross match" utilizing wage information that had been received from Everetts in April, 1981. On November 23, 1981, the following determination was made by the Job Insurance Division concerning Hatch's claims:
Huber testified that several attempts were made to contact Hatch after the determination was made but no response was ever received.
Disqualification for benefits is governed by Section 52-06-02, N.D.C.C., pertinent provisions of which, in effect on the date of the Job Service determination, provided as follows:
a. Can demonstrate that he has earned remuneration for personal services in employment equivalent to at least eight times his weekly benefit amount ... and
b. Has not left his last work under disqualifying circumstances.
Section 52-07.1-05, N.D.C.C., provides in part that to be eligible for extended benefits the bureau must find, with respect to each week, that an individual "has satisfied the requirement of this chapter for the receipt of regular benefits that are applicable to individuals claiming extended benefits, including not being subject to a disqualification for the receipt of benefits." [Emphasis added.]
Hatch was found guilty on December 28, 1982, of the crime of theft of property with a value that exceeds $500, a class C felony.
Hatch contends that the combined application in this case of the unemployment compensation law and Section 12.1-23-02(2), N.D.C.C., deprives him of due process of law because "the conduct prohibited or permitted is expressed in terms so vague that men may differ as to its application."
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited or permitted and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983). See also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193-94, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371-72 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 611-12 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford 08 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115 (1972); State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D.1980). The United States Supreme Court has recently recognized "that the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine--the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' " Kolender v. Lawson, supra [quoting Smith v. Goguen, supra, 415 U.S. at 574, 94 S.Ct. at 1247-48, 39 L.Ed.2d at 613.].
Hatch was convicted of theft of property in violation of Section 12.1-23-02(2) which reads:
Section 52-06-38, N.D.C.C., which was repealed in 1975, specifically provided a penalty for the making of a false statement or for failing to disclose a material fact to obtain or increase unemployment benefits. A review of the legislative history surrounding the repeal of Section 52-06-38 discloses the Legislature's intent to repeal or amend existing sections of the Century Code in favor of the general criminal sections contained in the new criminal code. The broad definition of theft in the criminal code encompasses all of the former offenses wherein the property of one person is unlawfully taken. The criminal code also contains Section 12.1-11-02 which...
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