State v. Hatfield.
| Decision Date | 15 December 1900 |
| Citation | 48 W.Va. 561 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | State v. Hatfield. |
The object of the law is, in all cases in which juries are impaneled to try the issue, to secure men for that responsible duty whose minds are wholly free from bias or prejudice either for or against the accused, or for or against either party in civil cases, (pp. 563, 564).
It is not error to exclude a juror from the panel in a felony case because of relationship between the juror and the prisoner, whether such relationship is by blood or marriage, (p. 564).
A juror who said the talk he had had about the case had made an impression on his mind as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and ne was still of the same op.inion as to such guilt or innocence, and was asked, "Do you feel tnai you could sit here as a sworn juror and decide the case according to the evidence adduced in open court, absolutely disregarding what you may have heard?" answered, "I possibly might, if the evidence was entirely different from what I have heard." Held not error to excuse him from the panel, (p. 564).
A person convicted of felony and sentenced therefor, except it be for perjury, may, by leave of the court, be examined as a witness in any criminal prosecution, though he has not been pardoned or punished therefor, (p. 567).
A party has no right to cross-examine any witness, except as to facts and circumstances connected with the matters stated in his direct examination. If he wishes to examine him on other matters, he must do so by making the witness his own, and calling him as such in the subsequent progress of the cause. A party cannot by his own omission to take an objection to the admission of improper evidence, brougnt out on a cross-examination, found a right to introduce testimony in chief to rebut it or explain it. (pp. 569, 570).
Where a homicide is proven, by the use of a deadly weapon, and the plea of self-defense is relied upon, the burden of proving such defense rests upon the prisoner; and, to avail him, the facts and circumstances showing such defense must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, (p. 571).
On a trial for murder, the necessity relied on to justify the killing must not arise out of the prisoner's own misconduct, (pp. 574, 575).
Error to Circuit Court, Mingo County.
Elias Hatfield, Jr., was convicted of murder in the second degree, and brings error.
Affirmed.
E. W. Wilson and H. K. Shumate, for plaintiff in error.
Edgar P. Pucker, Atty. Gen., and L. C. Anderson, for the State.
McWhorter, President:
Elias Hatfield was indicted in the circuit court of Mingo County for the murder of H. E. Ellis on the first day of June, 1899, and was convicted by the verdict of a jury of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to a term of twelve years in the penitentiary. The prisoner obtained from this Court a writ of error, and says the court erred in empaneling the jury "in this, that after selecting a panel of twenty jurors free from ex ception, the court proceeded and had examined eight other jurymen free from charge, and refused to permit the twenty jurors first selected to be empaneled." As set out in bill of exceptions No. 1 it appears that twenty jurors were drawn from those in attendance on the court, and being sworn on their voir dire. Berry Staton, one of the jurors said, "My sister married in the Hatfield family, and my mother is a little related to Anderson Hatfield's wife, but I don't know what it is." Could not tell his own relationship to the prisoner, was told to stand aside for the present, to which defendant excepted, which exception was overruled, and the court proceeded to select and empanel other jurymen, to which defendant also excepted. Thomas J. Farley, another of said panel, said he was related to Elias Hatfield, Jr., by marriage, that juror's wife and Hatfield's mother were second cousins, said to be, was told to stand aside for the present, and same ruling and exceptions as in case of Staton. A. B. Spratt, another of said jurors, said he was no blood relation to prisoner, but he married through the Justice stock, and it might be that he was a connection of the Hatfields, don't know what connection, might be second or third or fourth cousin by his wife through the Justice and Berry stock connection; that his mind was not Free, had recognized his relationship with Anderson Hatfield, the father of the prisoner and the family ever since witness was married, was told to stand aside, same exception. James Farley, another of said jurors, was no blood relation of the Hatfields, but his sister married a brother of Mrs. Hatfield, the mother of the prisoner. He was told to stand aside for the present, and same exceptions. William Davis, another juror, was no relative of prisoner that be knew of, thought he was related by marriage to deceased, H. E. Ellis; had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocense of the prisoner, and did not think that he could sit as a sworn juror and decide the case according to the evidence adduced in open court, absolutely disregarding the opinion that he had, putting that out of his mind, was told to stand aside, for the present, same exceptions. L. C. Carnes, another juror, said the talk that he had had about, the case had made an impression on his mind as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, it made an impression on him, and he was still of the same opinion as to his guilt or innocence. In answer to the question: "Do you feel that you could sit here as a sworn juror and decide the case according to the evidence adduced in open court, absolutely disregarding what you may have heard?" A. "I possibly might, if the evidence were entirely different from what I have heard," was told to stand aside for the present, same objection and exception. James Dempsey, another juror, had been told that he was related to the prisoner, but did not know what it was, that if he was related at all, it was blood relationship through the Vances, and had also been told that he was not related, said he was afflicted, had been shot and had to use morphine, had used morphine that day and the day before, sometimes suffered a great deal of pain, and when there was too much pain he generally used morphine, didn't know whether or not he would be physically able to serve on the jury that was liable to be kept in confinement several days, might be. The court directed said Dempsey to stand aside, and refused to swear him as one of the jurymen in the case. Exception taken by prisoner. Guy White, another of said, jurors, said his mind was unbiased for or against the prisoner, had never made up or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of prisoner, was asked if since he had been summoned as a juror in this case any one had asked him to remain upon tins case because he could give Elias Hatfield a fair trial, said he believed not, was then asked if he was acquainted with 'Squire M. Z. White, answered, yes, his father and M. Z. White are first cousins, said a few days ago 'Squire M. Z. White advised him not to cut himself off of the jury, did not know why he so advised him. When asked to use his exact language, he answered, "He said, 'Do not cut yourself off of the jury; I believe you can give Hatfield a fair and impartial trial.'" Did not remember the conversation until his attention was called to it, and was asked, "Do you now remember that you told other people about 'Squire M. Z. White trying to get you on tnat jury?" A. "Yes, sir." Q. "Do you remember now who you told that to?" A. Q. "You remember, however, that you were appealed to by 'Squire M. Z. White, and advised by him to not cut yourself off the jury, because you could give Hatfield a fair and impartial trial?" A. "Yes, sir." Said he understood from 'Squire M. Z. White that he wanted a man on the jury that would give Elias Hatfield a fair and impartial trial. The conversation was since the commencement of that term of the court, and did not come to his mind until called to his attention. He did not know that M. Z. White knew he had been summoned on the jury, but he knew that he had been drawn on the jury. The court directed the juror to stand aside for the present, but to remain in the court room. The prisoner by counsel excepted. And the panel was made up of twenty jurors without the eight so stood aside. The prisoner by counsel then moved to quash the said panel because the jurymen aforesaid who were told to stand aside, were not again called as part of said panel, and others selected instead, which motion the court overruled, and defendant excepted. The object of the law is, in all criminal cases and indeed in all cases in which juries are empaneled, to try the issue, to secure men for that responsible duty whose minds are wholly free from bias or prejudice either for or against the accused, because of the difficulty in obtaining such a panel, in particular cases, on account of the condition of the public mind in the community where an atrocious crime has been committed, and so careful is it that the accused shall have a fair and impartial trial that the law provides for a change of venue to a locality more remote from the scene in order that a jury can be had who may not be subject to the undue influence of the excited public mind, and while it is right that the interests of the prisoner should be protected to the extent of insuring to him a fair and impartial trial, it is no less important that the interests of society should be protected by the courts in so far as to see that no man finds his way into the jury box who is in any wise related to the accused either by blood or marriage ties to a degree that could influence his mind...
To continue reading
Request your trial