State v. Hatfield

Decision Date02 December 2019
Docket NumberNo. 77512-0-I,77512-0-I
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesTHE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. GERALD LOCKET HATFIELD JR., Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HAZELRIGG-HERNANDEZ, J.Gerald Locket Hatfield Jr. seeks reversal of his convictions for burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, alleging that numerous errors by the trial court individually and collectively denied him the right to a fair trial. Because we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors were individually and cumulatively harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, we affirm.

FACTS

On March 12, 2015, Stephen Dillenburg approached Charles Brown at the home of a mutual friend and asked if he would be interested in making some money. Dillenburg said he planned to rob some acquaintances of drugs and money and wanted Brown to be a lookout. Brown agreed, and the two men were joined by Gerald Hatfield as they left the apartment. The three men got into a light-colored sport utility vehicle (SUV), and Hatfield drove them to Lake City.

Kevin Boggs was renting a house in Lake City from his parents and subletting the basement to Adrien Diaz. Diaz sold drugs, primarily heroin, out of the house and paid rent to Boggs in the form of drugs. Boggs would occasionally act as a go-between when buyers come to the house because the basement was off-limits to guests.

When the men arrived at Boggs' house, Boggs recognized Dillenburg because they had previously met through a mutual friend and invited the men in despite the late hour. They told Boggs they wanted to buy heroin and gave him cash. Brown testified that Boggs told them to follow him downstairs, so he and Hatfield went downstairs while Dillenburg stayed upstairs. However, Boggs testified that he told them all to wait upstairs and went to the basement to get the drugs from Diaz. When Boggs heard footsteps and turned to tell them to return to the main level, he saw Hatfield descending the stairs holding a semi-automatic handgun. Boggs shouted to Diaz that they were being robbed. Diaz handed Hatfield a small quantity of money and drugs, which was all they had on hand. Boggs said that Brown demanded their hidden stash of drugs and money, but they denied having a stash. Brown started gathering laptops and phones from the basement and putting them in a pillow case. Boggs testified that, at one point, Hatfield grabbed a pillow off the floor and covered the muzzle of the gun as if to silence a shot with it.

A security camera downstairs captured a portion of the incident. The video showed Hatfield holding a gun, shoving Boggs three times, hitting or threatening to hit Boggs with the gun, and covering the muzzle of the gun with a pillow andpointing it at Boggs. The recording ended when Hatfield appeared to notice the camera and reached for it.

After the men had been downstairs for a few minutes, Boggs said he heard Brown ask Diaz what he was doing, and the two began grappling. Boggs saw a second gun and heard a loud click. Brown ran out of the room, and Boggs saw Diaz level a silver revolver at Hatfield. Diaz may have fired a shot; Boggs was unsure whether he had heard one or two shots. Hatfield fired a shot, which hit Diaz in the right upper thigh.

Brown denied getting into a scuffle with anyone and said that he was in the downstairs bedroom when he heard gunshots and fled. Brown thought there were two guns fired because the shots sounded like they came from two different locations. Brown and Hatfield ran up the stairs, and the three men ran back to the vehicle. As they drove away, Hatfield said that Diaz had shot at him, so he shot back. The men pulled into a parking lot, divided the stolen items, and parted ways.

Boggs called 911. Diaz was taken to the hospital and treated for the gunshot wound to his leg and a second graze wound on his inner thigh. Diaz admitted to emergency personnel that he used heroin and cocaine. Police found a spent nine millimeter bullet on the floor on the basement and a hole in the basement ceiling that appeared to be from a bullet.

Five days later, officers returned to the house to collect the digital video recorder (DVR) containing the video footage from the downstairs security camera. When they arrived, Diaz gave them a spent nine millimeter shell casing. Diaz was reluctant to turn over the DVR to police because he believed the video would alsoshow him using drugs and having sex with his girlfriend. He asked the officers to constrain their review of the video to the time frame of the incident. After they agreed, Diaz turned over the DVR. The lead detective asked a Seattle Police Department video technician to download a portion of the video in a one-hour time frame surrounding the incident.

During the course of the investigation, Boggs gave police Dillenburg's name and later identified him as one of the robbers in a photo montage. Officers determined that Hatfield was a person of interest in the case. When presented with a photo montage including Hatfield's picture, Boggs also identified Hatfield as one of the men who robbed him.

Hatfield was apprehended in his vehicle, which was impounded and searched. The vehicle contained a nine millimeter semi-automatic SIG Sauer pistol and nine millimeter ammunition. Arresting officers also found nine millimeter ammunition on Hatfield's person. When Hatfield was interviewed by detectives, he admitted that the man in the video recording looked like him but denied that he had committed the robbery. Hatfield was charged with burglary in the first degree, robbery of Diaz in the first degree, robbery of Boggs in the first degree, and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree.

Hatfield made a general motion in his trial brief to exclude all out-of-court statements under the evidentiary rule prohibiting hearsay and the confrontation clause. In his oral argument on the motion, he specified that he was seeking exclusion of hearsay statements from Diaz and the three other residents of theLake City house, none of whom were expected to testify at trial. The court indicated that the ruling would be reserved for trial testimony.

Hatfield's trial brief included a separate "Motion to Exclude Hearsay by Police Officers," which argued that "[a]ll statements by police officers regarding why they did what they did" were irrelevant at trial. Hatfield argued orally that this motion was "specifically geared toward law enforcement as to information they may [have] receive[d] from . . . dispatch." He argued that the police officers' responses to "[i]nformation they receive[d] from other witnesses that does not fall within the hearsay exception, any information from in-car computers, from other officers or from anybody else" were "no longer relevant" and were "hearsay, and potentially [raised] confrontation issues as well." The remainder of the discussion focused on the statements that the dispatcher had relayed to the responding police officers on the night of the incident. The court denied the motion in part and granted it in part as to statements provided by the dispatcher, noting that "statements are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but responding officers may testify to what was said to them to explain how and why they acted in the manner they did," but reserved ruling as to information provided by other witnesses.

Hatfield also moved in his trial brief to exclude the shell casing that Diaz had turned over to investigating officers on the grounds that chain of custody had not been established. In the concluding paragraph of his written argument, he wrote:

In this case, the shell casing is not readily identifiable as [the] shell casing from the alleged incident. Police did not recover the shellcasing from the scene despite several officers being present. The casing was not turned over the same date as the alleged incident but four to five days later. Only Diaz can say the item is the same item that he recovered at the house from the date of the incident. Uncertainty of the shell casing's origin is a major issue. At the time of this writing, the Defense has not interviewed Diaz and does not expect him to testify at the trial. Any statements that Diaz recovered the shell casing from the house and that the shell casing was involved in the alleged charged offenses is hearsay and violates the Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to confront Diaz about these statements.

During oral argument on the pretrial motions, Hatfield argued that the State could not establish the chain of custody for the shell casing before it was delivered to law enforcement. He made a brief reference to Diaz's statements, saying "[a]ny statements that he made with regard to the shell casing I think would not be admissible absent his testimony." The State's response and Hatfield's rebuttal focused entirely on the chain of custody argument. The court denied the motion to exclude the shell casing on the grounds that any uncertainty about the origin of the shell casing went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. The court did not mention any hearsay or confrontation grounds in its ruling.

At trial, Boggs identified Hatfield as the man who shot Diaz. Brown, who had plead guilty to robbery in the first degree and burglary in the first degree, also testified at Hatfield's trial and identified Hatfield as the gunman. The State called Dillenburg as a witness but he took the stand and refused to testify. Diaz and the other occupants of the house could not be located at the time of trial and so did not testify.

Officer Jeffrey Mitchell testified that he and Detective Michael Magan had met with Diaz five days after the incident at the house in Lake City to collect theDVR. He testified that Diaz gave them a shell casing that he said he had found after the investigating officers left. Hatfield objected on hearsay grounds. The State responded that the statement was not offered for the...

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