State v. Hathaway

• Decision Date: 16 November 1937
• Docket Number: 43681.
• Citation: 276 N.W. 207,224 Iowa 478
• Parties: STATE v. HATHAWAY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

276 N.W. 207

224 Iowa 478

STATE v. HATHAWAY.

No. 43681.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 16, 1937

Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; A. B. Lovejoy, Judge.

The county attorney of Black Hawk county, Iowa, filed an information against defendant, charging her with operating a house of ill fame in the city of Waterloo, in violation of Code § 13175. Defendant pleaded not guilty. Trial to a jury which returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant appeals. Opinion states the facts.

Affirmed.

Glenn B. Beers, of Waterloo, for appellant.

John H Mitchell, Atty. Gen., Burr C. Towne, Co. Atty. of Black Hawk County, and Ralph Wm. Travis, Asst. Co. Atty. for Black Hawk County, both of Waterloo, and Buell McCash, Sp. Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.

MITCHELL, Justice.

The county attorney of Black Hawk county filed an information against Anna Hathaway, charging her with operating a house of ill fame, contrary to provisions of section 13175 of the Code of Iowa. There was a trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant has appealed.

The evidence in this case consists of the testimony of two girls, who described in detail what they claimed took place at the house known as 634 Walnut street, Waterloo, Iowa. From their lips, employed as they claimed, by Mrs. Hathaway, is heard the story of how she operated the house. From the neighbors comes the story of the outside appearance. By policemen who raided the house is told the story of conditions they found there at that time. Opposed to this is the testimony of some of the roomers at the house, and Mr. Hathaway, the husband of defendant, who denied specifically what was testified to by the state's witnesses. Mrs. Hathaway, in her answers to the two questions asked her, denied that she was engaged in the business charged.

No good could be accomplished by setting out the testimony. The question was for the jury, and there was sufficient evidence to sustain its verdict.

I.

Appellant complains because the lower court overruled a motion for continuance, which was based solely upon the ground that her counsel did not have adequate time in which to prepare the defense. We have made a careful search of the record, but have been unable to ascertain at what time in the proceedings this motion for continuance was filed. The only showing is that contained in appellant's motion for new trial, which is as follows: " That there was error in overruling the defendant's motion for continuance, which motion was filed immediately before the trial of the cause."

The state infers that the motion was not filed until after part of the jury had been called to the box. We have no way from the record here submitted to us to ascertain what the situation was. Every defendant charged with a crime is entitled to time to prepare the defense that individual desires to submit, and courts are always anxious to see that proper time is given. But that does not mean that for the purpose of delaying trial continuances should be granted.

Let us look at the record in this case to see whether or not this appellant was given sufficient time to prepare.

She was placed on trial at the January, 1936, term, charged with maintaining a nuisance in the operation of a house of prostitution. The case was tried. The jury disagreed. Immediately thereafter, counsel representing her in that trial withdrew. She knew of this, but neglected to secure counsel. Her present attorney entered this case on the 20th of March, and the case was set for trial on the morning of the 23d. From the record before us no objection was made at that time to the placing of the case on the trial calendar. The case involved the same witnesses, the same house, and the same facts and circumstances that were involved at the former trial. There is no showing, by affidavit or in other manner, that the appellant suffered because of the overruling of the motion for continuance. She was represented by able and distinguished counsel, who has had years of experience in trial work, and at one time was the Assistant United States District Attorney for the Northern District of Iowa.

The matter of the allowance or refusal of a motion for continuance is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which, being more conversant with local conditions, the status of the docket, the capacity and disposition of counsel, and the background and general setting of the situation, which frequently do not become embalmed in the formal written record, is the better enabled to judge as to the motion for continuance. This court will not interfere or reverse for failure to grant a continuance, unless there is a clear abuse of judicial discretion.

In the case of State v. Maupin, 196 Iowa 904, at page 908, 192 N.W. 828, 830, 195 N.W. 517, this court said: " We have said so often that authorities need not be cited in support thereof, in substance, that an application for continuance is addressed peculiarly to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that its ruling thereon will not be interfered with on appeal unless it clearly appear that the trial court has abused his discretion and an injustice resulted therefrom. Attorney Woodson, as shown by affidavits, was not in good health, and doubtless the trial of the case was severe on him for that reason. However, it is evident from the record that the defendant did not suffer on account thereof. Defendant was given an able defense. We think the court did not abuse his discretion in overruling the motion."

In the case at bar, no one could read this record and say that the...