State v. Hatter

• Decision Date: 21 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 68839,68839
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bruce Allen HATTER, Appellant.

Page 851

342 N.W.2d 851

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bruce Allen HATTER, Appellant.

No. 68839.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 21, 1983.

Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and Patrick R. Grady, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Steven M. Foritano, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harold Denton, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and HARRIS, McGIVERIN, LARSON and CARTER, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Justice.

Defendant Bruce Allen Hatter appeals from his conviction of first-degree kidnapping in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1-.2 (1981), for the kidnapping and sexual abuse on December 1, 1981, of complainant, Deborah, contending, inter alia, that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to suppress the fruits of his warrantless arrest, on an unrelated charge, that was effected by means of an illegal entry into his home. We conclude that the warrantless arrest of defendant in his home was improper due to the nonconsentual entry of the arresting officers and the absence of exigent circumstances to otherwise justify entry without consent. The evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless arrest also must be suppressed because there did not exist any intervening events of significance which would purge the taint of the unlawful entry. We therefore reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

Without a search warrant or arrest warrant, the police entered defendant's home and arrested him for the kidnapping and sexual abuse on March 31, 1982, of a young woman named Karen.

Subsequent to his arrest, Hatter was advised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, he made oral inculpatory statements, signed a written confession, and relinquished a set of handcuffs with a key to the police. These items of evidence were then used by the State in the prosecution of the present case concerned with the kidnapping of another woman named Deborah. Defendant moved to suppress these items of evidence and the court overruled the motion.

I. Unlawful entry. The Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Const. amend. IV does not permit a warrantless entry into a suspect's home to arrest him or her on a routine felony charge unless an occupant has consented to the entry or exigent circumstances are present. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).

The Court in Payton recognized that an arrest warrant alone is sufficient to authorize the entry into a person's home to effect his arrest. The Court reasoned:

If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.

Payton, 445 U.S. at 602-03, 100 S.Ct. at 1388, 63 L.Ed.2d at 660-61. Accord State v. Luloff, 325 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Iowa 1982) ("Possession of an arrest warrant alone is constitutionally sufficient for entry into a suspect's own residence to effect his arrest.").

Relying on this authority, the defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence bearing on the present case that was obtained by the police after his warrantless arrest, on an unrelated felony charge, in his home on April 1, 1982. The trial court (Judge Kilburg) overruled defendant's motion even though it found that the officer's entry of defendant's residence had been made without a search or arrest warrant and without consent. The court found that "exigent circumstances" existed which cured the warrantless and nonconsentual entry and resulting arrest. We disagree.

Defendant asserts a violation of constitutional safeguards. Our review, therefore, is de novo which permits an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Campbell, 326 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Iowa 1982).

A. Consent. Our initial inquiry concerns the factual question of whether the arresting officers' entry of defendant's residence was consentual. We note that the State has the burden of proof to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that consent to enter was voluntarily given. State v. Folkens, 281 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1979). The Supreme Court has held that "[t]his burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968).

The arresting officers, two detectives from the Cedar Rapids police department, testified that they had received consent to enter defendant's residence from defendant's brother. The brother testified, however, that he had not given consent to enter but had told the officers to wait at the door while he summoned the defendant who was taking a shower. In recognition of the trial court's ability to observe the witnesses while they were testifying and thus better judge their credibility, we will in this case grant the trial courts' findings of fact considerable deference. The trial court found:

The brother of the defendant did not give actual consent to enter the premises and arrest the defendant, but neither did he deny the police officers access to the home. Entry was peaceable and no outrageous conduct by the officers was established.

(Emphasis added.)

Our findings on de novo review of the record concur with those of the trial court. We understand the court's finding that no "actual consent" was given to mean that consent to enter was not "voluntarily" given but rather was the result of "acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority."

We agree with the trial court that the detectives' entry was nonconsentual.

B. Exigent circumstances. A warrantless entry is presumptively unreasonable; thus, the burden is on the State to justify exigency in the initial entry. State v. Luloff, 325 N.W.2d at 105. The following criteria are considered in determining whether exigency exists:

(1) a grave offense is involved;

(2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;

(3) there is probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime;

(4) there is strong reason to believe he is on the premises;

(5) there is a strong likelihood of escape if not apprehended; and

(6) the entry, though not consented to, is peaceable.

Id. Although important, these guidelines are not all-inclusive and all of them do not have to be satisfied for a finding of exigency. Id. at 106. The ultimate issue, however, is whether an emergency or urgent need for the warrantless entry existed. State v. Holtz, 300 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Iowa 1981). A warrant will be required unless an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty afforded neither time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate. Id. We have found that exigent circumstances usually exist where there is danger of violence and injury to the officers or others; risk of the subject's escape; or the probability that, unless taken on the spot, evidence will be concealed or destroyed. Luloff, 325 N.W.2d at 105; Holtz, 300 N.W.2d at 893.

The events preceding the arrest of Hatter do not reflect the existence of exigent circumstances in that they do not suggest that an "emergency or urgent need" existed for the warrantless entry and arrest.

On April 1, 1982, the day of Hatter's arrest, the police were contacted at 9:00 a.m. by a young woman, Karen, who reported that she had been kidnapped and sexually assaulted the night before at approximately 9:00 p.m. During the morning hours, the victim was questioned by detectives in an attempt to create a composite of the perpetrator. The victim's car was searched because it had been used in the crime. A billfold not belonging to the victim was found in the search. The billfold contained a driver's license in the name of the defendant and the victim identified the picture on the license as being the perpetrator of the crime. During the course of making her statement, the victim described the perpetrator's vehicle, which she had observed, as being a small, blue car.

At noon, the detectives and the victim went out for lunch, taking twenty-five to thirty minutes.

After lunch, the detectives and the victim drove to the address they believed to be the perpetrator's residence. They observed a small, blue car that the victim said looked like the perpetrator's, although she could not make a positive identification.

Thereafter, the detectives took the victim home where they picked up certain physical evidence and then returned to the defendant's residence where they arrested him at approximately 3:00 p.m.

We fail to discern the presence of any exigency in the events leading up to defendant's arrest for the incident with Karen. They appear to amount to nothing more than a routine investigation of a felony.

There is nothing in the record to support a finding that defendant was attempting to escape or had planned to escape. Thus, there was not a strong likelihood that defendant would escape if not apprehended immediately.

Nor was this a case of officers being in hot pursuit of a suspect. Approximately twelve hours had passed between the commission of the offense and the victim's reporting of such offense to the police. Thus, the sense of emergency or urgency associated with an arrest made in hot pursuit was not present.

Furthermore, there was nothing in the record to suggest that a warrantless entry and arrest was necessary to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. The State contended in the trial court that the officers believed that the defendant must have been aware of the impending investigation and arrest because his wallet had been left at the scene of the crime. This would be a convincing argument if the officers were attempting to make a warrantless arrest...