State v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 14 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2013–KA–00797–SCT.,2013–KA–00797–SCT.
• Citation: 145 So.3d 636
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Mississippi v. Hattie HAWKINS a/k/a Hattie M. Hawkins.

145 So.3d 636

STATE of Mississippi

v.Hattie HAWKINS a/k/a Hattie M. Hawkins.

No. 2013–KA–00797–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Aug. 14, 2014.

Office of the Attorney General by Patrick Joseph McNamara, Jr., attorney for appellant.

Michael R. Bonner, Vicksburg, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

COLEMAN, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the indictment, dismissing the case against Hattie Hawkins. The State appealed. We hold that the indictment was sufficient and that the trial judge erred by granting the demurrer.

Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2. Hattie Hawkins was a nursing assistant at Heritage House Nursing Center in Vicksburg. Deserie Edwards, a resident at Heritage House, suffered injuries while under Hawkins's care. An investigation revealed that Hawkins had lifted Edwards by herself, knowing that two people were required to lift Edwards. Hawkins then improperly placed Edwards into a lift/sling and left her unattended. Edwards fell from the sling and suffered injuries, but Hawkins did not call for assistance. Hawkins was indicted for simple assault of a vulnerable person. Several days before trial, defense counsel demurred to the indictment on the grounds that it did not comport with Mississippi Code Section 97–3–7(1) and was an improper statement of the law. The circuit court dismissed the case saying the indictment failed to state a cause of action against the defendant. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. The State appealed.

Discussion

¶ 3. The issue is whether the indictment was sufficient on its face such that the trial judge erred by sustaining the demurrer to the indictment. Whether the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to an indictment is a question of law. See State v. May, 208 Miss. 862, 45 So.2d 728, 728 (1950). Therefore, the standard of review is de novo. Tapper v. State, 47 So.3d 95, 100 (¶ 17) (Miss.2010) (“whether an indictment is defective is an issue of law and therefore deserves a relatively broad standard of review, or de novo review”) (citations omitted).

¶ 4. Hawkins was indicted for simple assault of a vulnerable person under Mississippi Code Section 97–3–7(1). The indictment read:

HATTIE M. HAWKINS on or about the 23rd day of June, 2010 ... commit[ed] the offense of Simple Assault of a Vulnerable Person in that Hattie M. Hawkins, while employed as a Certified Nursing Assistant at Heritage House Nursing Center, did willfully, negligently[,] and feloniously inflict pain and/or injury upon Deserie S. Edwards, a vulnerable person as defined by § 43–47–5(n), in that Deserie S. Edwards was a resident of Heritage House Nursing Center; to wit: Hattie M. Hawkins, while knowingly engaged in improper lifting procedures, being aware that the victim required two persons to be moved from her bed, acted alone in knowingly placing the victim in a lift/sling improperly, and then allowed the victim to fall from the lift/sling to the floor by leaving the victim unattended causing multiple serious injuries, and then failed to inform appropriate staff or seek out medical treatment for the injuries inflicted upon Deserie S. Edwards. This act being in violation of § 97–3–7(1), Miss.Code Ann. (1972, as amended), contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

The simple assault statute, Mississippi Code Section 97–3–7(1), referenced in the indictment, provides:

(a) A person is guilty of simple assault if he (i) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (ii) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; or (iii) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; and, upon conviction, he shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six (6) months, or both.

(b) However, a person convicted of simple assault ... (iii) upon a person who is sixty-five (65) years of age or older or a person who is a vulnerable adult, as defined in Section 43–47–5, shall be punished by a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.

Miss.Code Ann. § 97–3–7(1) (Supp.2013). Under Section 43–47–5, a “vulnerable person” includes “all residents or patients, regardless of age, in a care facility.” Miss.Code Ann. § 43–47–5(q) (Supp. 2013) (previously subsection (n), as referenced in the indictment). It is undisputed that Edwards was a resident in a care facility, thus, she was a vulnerable person under Section 43–47–5(q), and Hawkins would have been subject to the more severe sanctions of Section 97–3–7(1)(b).

¶ 5. Hawkins takes issue with the part of the indictment that says Hawkins “willfully, negligently[,] and feloniously” injuredEdwards, claiming that the indictment does not track the language of the statute because Mississippi Code Section 97–3–7(1)(a)(i) requires that one “purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly” caused bodily injury to another. Hawkins also asserts that there are no negligent felonies. The State responds that the indictment was brought under subsection (ii) of the statute, which provides that one “negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.” The State maintains that the indictment followed the language of the statute, complied with Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice, and gave Hawkins notice of the charge against her.

A. Sufficiency of the Indictment under Rule 7.06

¶ 6. Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice discusses indictments and enumerates seven items that must be included in every indictment:

The indictment upon which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise[,] and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation. Formal and technical words are not necessary in an indictment, if the offense can be substantially described without them. An indictment shall also include the following:

1. The name of the accused;

2. The date on which the indictment was filed in court;

3. A statement that the prosecution is brought in the name and by the authority of the State of Mississippi;

4. The county and judicial district in which the indictment is brought;

5. The date and, if applicable, the time at which the offense was alleged to have been committed. Failure to state the correct date shall not render the indictment insufficient;

6. The signature of the foreman of the grand jury issuing it; and

7. The words “against the peace and dignity of the state.”

The court on motion of the defendant may strike from the indictment any surplusage including unnecessary allegations or aliases.

URCCC 7.06. Each item listed in Rule 7.06 is included in the indictment at issue, therefore, there is no error as to the form of the indictment. See Carroll v. State, 755 So.2d 483, 487 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (where all of the requisites of Rule 7.06 were included in the indictment, court held there was “no error as to form”).

¶ 7. Rule 7.06 also requires that indictments provide “a plain, concise[,] and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged” and “fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation” against him. URCCC 7.06. See Farris v. State, 764 So.2d 411, 421 (¶ 28) (Miss.2000); Gatlin v. State, 724 So.2d 359 (¶ 32) (Miss.1998). The indictment against Hawkins included the “essential facts constituting the offense charged” as it described what actions Hawkins took that led to Edwards's injuries. The indictment also clearly stated that Hawkins was charged with simple assault of a vulnerable person under Mississippi Code Section 97–3–7(1). The indictment was sufficient to fully notify Hawkins of the “nature and cause of the accusation” against her.

¶ 8. The language used in the indictment, however, does not track the language of Section 97–3–7(1). “The rule in this state is that an indictment which states the statutory language is generally sufficient to inform the accused of the charge against him.” King v. State, 580 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Miss.1991) (quoting Cantrell v. State, 507 So.2d 325, 329 (Miss.1987)). Although use of the statutory language is generally sufficient, using the exact language from the statute is not necessary if the words used have substantially the same meaning and the indictment is specific enough to give the defendant notice of the charge against her. See Madere v. State, 794 So.2d 200, 212 (¶ 33) (Miss.2001); Ousley v. State, 154 Miss. 451, 122 So. 731, 732 (Miss.1929). As set forth above, Rule 7.06 provides that “[f]ormal or technical words are not necessary in an indictment, if the offense can be substantially described without them.” URCCC 7.06. Discussing that rule, the Court has held:

The rule pretermits any requirement that the indictment include the exact or formal wording of the statute under which the accused is charged. Certainly, the indictment need not (though it may) charge in the exact language of the statute said to have been offended. If from a reading of the indictment as a whole the accused is in fact given fair notice of that with which he has been charged, the indictment is legally sufficient. Applying the above rules of law to the facts, in this instance the form and content of the indictment, there can be no serious question but that the indictment is legally sufficient....

Harbin v. State, 478 So.2d 796, 799 (Miss.1985) (citations omitted).

¶ 9. The Court has held repeatedly that, “[s]o long as a fair reading of the indictment, taken as a whole, clearly describes the nature and cause of the...