State v. Hawkins, 38391

• Decision Date: 14 March 1967
• Docket Number: No. 38391,38391
• Citation: 70 Wn.2d 697,425 P.2d 390
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. John William HAWKINS, Appellant.

Page 697

70 Wn.2d 697

425 P.2d 390

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. John William HAWKINS, Appellant.

No. 38391.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

March 14, 1967.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1967.

Steven A. Memovich, John L. LaLonde, Vancouver, for appellant.

R. DeWitt Jones, Pros. Atty., C. Brent Nevin, Deputy Pros. Atty., Vancouver, for respondent.

HILL, Judge.

John William Hawkins was charged with first-degree murder in connection with the death of two minors. On count 1, involving the death of Fred Walch (15), the jury brought in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity or mental irresponsibility, with the further finding that he was not insane or mentally irresponsible at the time of trial but that there was such a likelihood of a relapse or recurrence of the insanity or condition of mental irresponsibility that he was not safe to be at large. On count 2, involving the death of Bonnie Walch (16), the jury brought in a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree with the recommendation that the death penalty be inflicted.

It is from the judgment of guilty on count 2 and the sentence of death imposed thereby that this appeal is taken.

The only possible defense was insanity. Hence, we trace the appellant's prior contact with a mental institution upon which his counsel placed great reliance.

The appellant had been involved in law violations in New Mexico commencing about 1957. In 1959, he was sentenced to the penitentiary for grand larceny and was paroled in 1961. He was married while on parole. In early August, 1962, the appellant and his wife separated and thereafter he kidnaped her at gun point. He was arrested and confined in the Bernalillo County Jail, where he attempted suicide on at least two occasions. A sanity hearing was conducted on September 14, 1962, and Dr. Alan Jacobson, a psychiatrist who examined appellant, testified that at that time he recommended appellant's commitment to the New Mexico State Hospital for two purposes: one for the treatment of appellant's then depressive condition; and the other for further investigation of the patient's mental status at the time of the commission of the crimes with which he was charged.

The court found that the appellant was mentally ill and on September 21 committed him to the New Mexico State Hospital for treatment, ¹ with instructions that he was not to be released without prior order of the court and the district attorney. After a treatment of less than three weeks, he was returned to the Bernalillo County Jail 'as having received maximum hospital benefits.' On October 22, while in that jail, he was again examined by Dr. Jacobson who found that 'Apparently the depression had completely disappeared.' He was then returned to the penitentiary as a parole violator. Two years later, on October 15, 1964, he was released from the penitentiary with instructions to leave the state within 48 hours. He and a brother left Albuquerque, New Mexico, about October 17, intending to go to Alaska where another brother resided.

En route to Alaska, they stopped in Portland, Oregon, where the appellant met Carol Walch who was then securing a divorce from her husband. (The appellant claims to have contributed $75 of the divorce costs.) In the latter part of October, he took up residence in the Walch home in Vancouver, Washington, where Mrs. Walch lived with three of her children: Bonnie, Fred, and Ranae (9 years of age). Some differences developed between the appellant and Mrs. Walch, and he returned to Albuquerque in November. Mrs. Walch, Bonnie, and Fred each wrote asking him to come back, and he returned to Vancouver about Thanksgiving time.

During his first sojourn in the Walch home he had slept on a settee in the living room, and Bonnie and Mrs. Walch had occupied one upstairs bedroom. After appellant's return to the Walch home from New Mexico, he and Mrs. Walch occupied this bedroom and Bonnie was given a room in the basement. The two older children apparently resented this arrangement.

Appellant's residence in the Walch home under these circumstances continued until the evening of December 10, 1964. Mrs. Walch left with Bonnie that evening at about 7:30 p.m., leaving appellant, Fred, and Ranae at the home. Bonnie, after visiting with friends, returned sometime after 11:00 p.m. Mrs. Walch came home shortly after 1:00 a.m. December 11. The appellant was there. After some discussion, he told her she had better call the police, and left. Mrs. Walch thereafter discovered Bonnie's body and notified the police.

After leaving the Walch home in the early morning of December 11, the appellant stole a car and, not having the key, wired the ignition. He abandoned the car at a service station about 5 miles south of Chehalis at about 10:00 or 11:00 a.m. December 11. From there, he rode with a truck driver to the north end of Seattle, leaving the truck at about 4:00 p.m. The same evening (December 11) at about 9:00 p.m., he was picked up by the border patrol and turned over to the Whatcom County Sheriff.

As to what transpired in the Walch home between 7:30 p.m. (December 10), when Mrs. Walch left, and shortly after 1:00 a.m. (December 11), when she returned, we have only the admissions made by the appellant while being transferred from the Whatcom County Jail to the Clark County Jail: that he had attacked Fred with a hammer and later, Bonnie; and the mute, but eloquent, evidence of the bodies and the bloodstained clothing of the appellant. While he at no time testified as to the stabbing, the appellant's statements to Mrs. Walch and to his psychiatrist show that the knew he had killed both Fred and Bonnie.

Additional facts will be noted as made necessary by a consideration of the various assignments of error.

We shall first consider the claimed errors relating to pretrial matters.

Re: Motion for change of venue.

The motion for a change of venue was made January 6, 1965, and denied January 17, 1965. The decree denying the motion specifically found that

none of the principals in connection with the criminal charges are particularly well known in this community, and that there is no feeling established on the part of the public generally that would indicate in any way that John William Hawkins could not receive a fair trial. * * *

The court affirmatively found that Hawkins,

can receive a fair and impartial trial in Clark County * * * and there is no reason in fact, to * * * grant a change of venue.

It was five months later that the case went to trial, and the appellant points to nothing that transpired in the examination of the prospective jurors, or at any other time, which indicates that he was in any way prejudiced by reason of anything that the prospective jurors had heard or read.

Change of venue in a criminal case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its determination will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of that discretion. State v. Sayward, 63 Wash.2d 485, 387 P.2d 746 (1963); State v. Beck, 56 Wash.2d 474, 488, 349 P.2d 387, 353 P.2d 429 (1960); State v. Collins, 50 Wash.2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957); State v. Bird, 31 Wash.2d 777, 198 P.2d 978 (1948). We find no abuse of discretion in this case.

Re: Trial court's order requiring the appellant to proceed to trial.

The basis for the contention that the appellant was not competent to stand trial was that he had been adjudicated as mentally ill on September 21, 1962. The extent and character of that mental illness is discussed later. The so-called adjudication has little relevance on the limited issue then presented of whether at that time the appellant fully understood what was taking place and had the mental capacity and ability to aid in his own defense. See State v. Bonner, 53 Wash.2d 575, 335 P.2d 462 (1959).

The hearing on the issue of whether the appellant was competent to assist in his own defense was held May 14, 1965 (trial began on May 17). The trial court, on the basis of the evidence presented and personal observation of the appellant in court and 'his responsiveness in respect to testimony given by various witnesses and statements made in connection with this hearing,' made the following findings:

(T)hat the defendant is aware of the nature of the crimes charged against him and while he has stated that he does not wish to discuss the crimes and wants to put them out of his mind, that this has been a deliberate, intentional and volitional idea and it is not established by any evidence that he could not, if he desired, fully relate to counsel, his doctors, or any other persons his actions in connection with the crimes charged against him and/or his previous history and matters which would relate to his special defense of insanity; that while the court finds that the defendant is antisocial and has demonstrated suicidal impulses, that all proof falls short of establishing inability of the defendant to assist in a proper defense of the charges against him; that the court finds that the defendant himself has, under conditions where he has been mentally alert and conscious of his statements, advised that he wanted the trial against him to proceed and did not want any further delays in the prosecution; that from the letters in evidence, ² it is clear to the court that he has voluntarily expressed a desire to have this trial proceed; that he recognizes and understands the nature of the case pending against him and has a sense of appreciation with respect to possible penalty in the event of conviction.

On the basis of these findings, an order was entered refusing any further continuance.

The special verdict of the jury, which had observed him throughout the trial, was that he was then mentally competent. ³

The appellant has presented nothing which contradicts the findings of the trial court and the verdict of the jury on the issue of his competency at the time of trial. We find no merit in this assignment of error.

From the pretrial...