State v. Haworth

• Decision Date: 02 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. S–2011–754.,S–2011–754.
• Parties: The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. Billy Edward HAWORTH, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

283 P.3d 311

2012 OK CR 12

The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant,

v.Billy Edward HAWORTH, Appellee.

No. S–2011–754.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Aug. 2, 2012.

An Appeal from the District Court of Muskogee County; The Honorable Jeffrey Payton, District Judge.

Donn Baker, attorney at law, Talequah, OK, attorney for defendant at trial.

Larry Moore, Assistant District Attorney, Muskogee, OK, attorney for the State at trial.

Daniel Medlock, Assistant District Attorney, Muskogee, OK, attorney for appellant on appeal.

Donn Baker, attorney at law, Talequah, OK, attorney for appellee on appeal.

OPINION

C. JOHNSON, Judge.

¶ 1 The Appellee, Billy Edward Haworth, was charged by Information in Muskogee County District Court, Case No. CF–2010–1250, with First Degree Manslaughter in the Commission of a Misdemeanor (21 O.S.2001, § 711(1)). On the day of preliminary hearing, April 21, 2011, Haworth filed a demurrer to the Information and motion to quash. The magistrate denied the motion, and Haworth was bound over for trial as charged. On June 10, 2011, Haworth filed a supplement to his demurrer and motion to quash. A hearing on the motion was held August 3, 2011, before the Honorable Jeffrey Payton, District Judge. The court took the matter under advisement, and by written order issued August 16, 2011, sustained the motion to quash. The State filed notice of intent to appeal August 19, 2011, and timely filed its Petition in Error in this Court on October 11, 2011. The State's appeal is brought under 22 O.S.2011, § 1053(4), from a district court's grant of a motion to quash for insufficient evidence in a felony case.

¶ 2 In its sole proposition of error, the State claims the district court abused its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to quash for insufficient evidence. We review the district court's ruling to determine if it was clearly erroneous. State v. Heath, 2011 OK CR 5, ¶ 9, 246 P.3d 723, 725. Appellee was charged with First Degree Manslaughter in connection with a traffic accident in Muskogee County on December 15, 2010. For purposes of this appeal, it is not disputed that a vehicle driven by Appellee collided with an oncoming vehicle on a state highway, while Appellee was attempting to pass other vehicles in a marked no-passing zone. One person died in the crash.

¶ 3 Oklahoma's First Degree Manslaughter statute has been unchanged since before statehood. It punishes, among other things, any homicide “perpetrated without a design to effect death by a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor.” 21 O.S.2001, § 711(1); Jewell v. Territory, 4 Okla. 53, ¶ 6, 43 P. 1075, 1077 (1896). The Negligent Homicide statute, enacted in 1961, punishes the death of any person which is “a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle by any person in reckless disregard of the safety of others,” when the death occurs within one year of the injury. 47 O.S. Supp.2005, § 11–903.¹

¶ 4 First Degree Manslaughter is a felony with a punishment range of four years to life imprisonment. Negligent Homicide is a misdemeanor with a punishment range of not more than one year in the county jail. In this case, the misdemeanor alleged as the predicate for manslaughter is Passing in a No–Passing Zone (47 O.S.2001, § 11–307; 47 O.S. Supp.2007, § 17–101). Appellee claims the only appropriate charge for a motor-vehicle fatality under these circumstances is Negligent Homicide. He argues that because this latter statute was enacted more recently than the Manslaughter statute, and because it is more specifically aimed at traffic-related deaths, it must have been intended to supersede or partially repeal the First Degree Manslaughter statute in circumstances such as these. Appellee points to our decision in Short v. State, 1977 OK CR 44, 560 P.2d 219, as authority for this contention. The State, however, maintains that the First Degree Manslaughter statute means what it says—homicide in the commission of any misdemeanor—and that it is a question of fact for a jury to determine whether the misdemeanor was causally related to the death. In support of its claim, the State relies on our recent decision in State v. Ceasar, 2010 OK CR 15, 237 P.3d 792.

¶ 5 Over the 50–year history of the Negligent Homicide statute, this Court has grappled with its proper application many times. The statute is aimed at a limited class of homicides: those committed by a motor-vehicle driver acting in “reckless disregard of the safety of others.” Does this statute preclude application of other homicide statutes in our law, and if so, under what circumstances? Was the Negligent Homicide statute intended to restrict prosecutor discretion in selecting what charges to bring?

¶ 6 Scarcely a year after enactment of the Negligent Homicide statute, in Ritchie v. Raines, 1962 OK CR 101, 374 P.2d 772, we held that the new law did not prevent the State from seeking a First Degree Manslaughter conviction against the petitioner, who had been charged with manslaughter in the commission of several vehicle-related offenses, including driving under the influence of intoxicants. We reasoned that a manslaughter charge was appropriate because “driving under the influence of intoxicants” did not necessarily require the State to prove any “reckless disregard” on the motorists part.²Id., 1962 OK CR 101, ¶¶ 18–21, 374 P.2d at 776–77. We have recognized this exception ever since. See e.g. White v. State, 1971 OK CR 141, ¶ 11, 483 P.2d 751, 753;Lomahaitewa v. State, 1978 OK CR 67, ¶ 4, 581 P.2d 43, 44. Eventually, we extended the holding in Ritchie to another misdemeanor involving alcohol and motor vehicles: Driving While Impaired. Bell v. State, 2007 OK CR 43, ¶¶ 2–5, 172 P.3d 622, 623–24 (overruling State v. Breger, 1987 OK CR 98, 737 P.2d 1219).

¶ 7 In cases of motor-vehicle fatality that lack evidence of driver intoxication, the analysis has been more problematic. In Atchley v. State, 1970 OK CR 76, ¶ 11, 473 P.2d 286, 290, we held that due to the similarities between the crimes of Negligent Homicide and Second Degree Manslaughter, 22 O.S. § 716, the former statute (having been more recently enacted) superseded the latter in cases where the death was allegedly caused by “the criminal negligence of another by the driving of an automobile.” Underlying this result was the assumption that the Legislature could not have intended a particular course of conduct to be punishable under more than one statute.

¶ 8 In Hopkins v. State, 1973 OK CR 40, 506 P.2d 580, the defendant was tried for First Degree Misdemeanor Manslaughter after a fatal collision. Evidence suggested the defendant was speeding at the time of the crash; and while cans of beer were found in his vehicle, there was apparently no basis for concluding that he was intoxicated when the accident occurred. The defendant was ultimately convicted of Negligent Homicide as a lesser offense. On appeal, the defendant in Hopkins complained that the trial court should have sustained his demurrer to the manslaughter charge. In reviewing the history of our dealings with the Negligent Homicide law, we observed that while Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants was one example of a misdemeanor offense that could serve as a predicate for a First Degree Misdemeanor Manslaughter charge (a conclusion first reached in Ritchie ), it was not the only one. Hopkins, 1973 OK CR 40, ¶ 6, 506 P.2d at 582–83. Because the defendant in Hopkins was ultimately convicted of Negligent Homicide as a lesser related offense, we had no occasion to determine whether his conduct would have supported a conviction for First Degree Manslaughter. But we found no statutory impediment to such a charge.³

¶ 9 A few years later, in Short v. State, 1977 OK CR 44, 560 P.2d 219, the defendant was charged with First Degree Manslaughter in the commission of “Reckless Driving,” a traffic-related misdemeanor that includes, but is not limited to, speeding (47 O.S. § 11–901).⁴ The defendant in Short, being pursued by police, was driving at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour when he was involved in a fatal collision. The charge of “Reckless Driving” was predicated on the defendant's excessive speed. The question avoided in Hopkins was thus squarely before the Court. This Court noted that the Negligent Homicide statute is of more recent vintage than the manslaughter statutes, and is specifically directed at vehicular homicides. We interpreted the statutory definition of “Reckless Driving” to reflect same degree of culpability described in the Negligent Homicide statute. We concluded that allowing a First Degree Manslaughter charge for a death caused by, as we put it, “merely speeding” would leave little substance to the Negligent Homicide statute. Short, 1977 OK CR 44, ¶ 7, 560 P.2d at 221.

¶ 10 Ten years later, this Court limited the holding in Short. In A.L.G. v. State, 1987 OK CR 69, 736 P.2d 521, the defendant, being pursued by police for an outstanding warrant, drove at high speeds through a residential area and hit another vehicle, killing one of its occupants. He was charged with, and convicted of, First Degree Misdemeanor Manslaughter in the commission of Escape and Eluding an Officer. On appeal, he argued that Short precluded a charge of Misdemeanor Manslaughter, because his conduct fit within the kind of “reckless disregard” addressed in the Negligent Homicide statute. In rejecting this claim and affirming the conviction, we distinguished the holding in Short—not so much on its basic facts (which were quite similar), but on the particular charges brought and the legal elements to be proven:

To fall within the rule announced in Short, those two charges [Escape and Eluding an Officer] must be synonymous with “reckless disregard of the safety of others.” A comparison of the applicable statutes clearly reveals that the elements of the offenses are not the same.

A.L.G., 1987 OK CR 69, ¶ 3, 736 P.2d at 522.

¶ 11 Recently, in State v....