State v. Haws
| Decision Date | 09 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47800 |
| Citation | 472 P.3d 576,167 Idaho 471 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Darius Wayne HAWS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Eric D. Frederickson, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant Darius Wayne Haws. Kimberly Coster argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent State of Idaho. Kenneth Jorgensen argued.
Darius Haws appeals from the judgments of conviction entered against him upon his guilty pleas to delivery of a controlled substance and battery on a police officer. Haws’ guilty pleas were entered pursuant to plea agreements in which he waived his right to appeal his convictions or sentences. The district court sentenced Haws to two years fixed, with four years indeterminate, for the delivery charge; and one year fixed, with three years indeterminate, for the battery charge. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Additionally, the district court retained jurisdiction over Haws. However, after Haws performed poorly during the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction over Haws and ordered that the original sentences be served by Haws.
Haws appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction and that his sentences were excessive. In response, the State sought to have Haws’ appeal dismissed because Haws expressly waived his right to appeal his sentences in the plea agreements he signed. The Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing Haws’ challenge to his sentences and affirming the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction over Haws.
Haws filed a petition for review with this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that he had forfeited the right to address the validity of his plea agreements by not raising an issue of validity of those waivers in his opening brief. Instead, Haws contends that it was the State's obligation to assert the applicability of the appellate waiver, and that he should have had the opportunity to respond in his reply brief. Additionally, Haws contends that his appellate waiver was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the district court made a statement that conflicted with the written plea agreements by noting that Haws had the right to appeal his sentences.
For the reasons set out in this opinion, we dismiss Haws’ appeal from the sentences imposed. Further, we affirm the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction.
Fremont County law enforcement used confidential informants to make several purchases of controlled substances from Haws and his brother between April and May of 2015. While a number of sales were made, only three are relevant to this appeal. On April 21, 2015, Haws sold twelve hydrocodone pills to a confidential informant. On May 11, 2015, Haws’ brother sold a confidential informant morphine pills. That same day, Haws’ brother also sold marijuana to a confidential informant. During these two latter sales, Haws acted as the lookout.
Haws was arrested and charged by the State with three counts related to the sales of controlled substances between April and May of 2015. The State charged Haws with delivery of a controlled substance, related to the sale of the twelve hydrocodone pills on April 21, 2015. The State also charged Haws with two counts of aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance for acting as the lookout during his brother's sale of morphine
pills and marijuana.
While out on bond, Haws committed other crimes. On February 28, 2017, Haws went to the residence of a female acquaintance. The woman called the police to report that Haws was trespassing. The police responded to the woman's call. As a law enforcement officer approached Haws, the officer could "smell a strong odor of alcohol coming from [Haws’] breath." When the officer attempted to arrest Haws, Haws resisted, swinging his arm and hitting the officer. Based on this altercation, the State charged Haws with battery on a police officer, resisting and obstructing an officer, criminal trespass, and disturbing the peace.
On April 26, 2017, Haws entered into two plea agreements, one on the controlled substance charges, and the second on the battery and resisting charges. According to the plea agreement related to the controlled substance charges, Haws agreed to plead guilty to delivery of a controlled substance in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining aiding and abetting charges. Additionally, the State agreed to recommend that Haws be incarcerated for two years fixed with three years indeterminate. Further, the State would recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction over Haws. Similarly, according to the plea agreement relating to the battery charge, Haws agreed to plead guilty to battery on a police officer in exchange for the remaining charges to be dropped. The State would recommend that Haws be sentenced to two years fixed and three years indeterminate, to run consecutive with the sentence imposed in the controlled substance case. Again, the State would recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction over Haws.
Both plea agreements contained language regarding a waiver of certain rights. Among other rights, the plea agreements provided that Haws would waive his "right to appeal [his] conviction and the sentence[s] imposed." Further, both agreements contained language to the effect that the agreements were entered into intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.
Following a sentencing hearing, Haws was sentenced for both delivery of a controlled substance and battery of a police officer. The district court sentenced Haws to two years fixed, with four years indeterminate,1 for the delivery charge. As for the battery charge, the district court sentenced Haws to one year fixed, with three years indeterminate. The district court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
The district court retained jurisdiction over Haws. Additionally, the district court ordered that Haws be placed on a "treatment rider" to address his alcohol abuse and history of criminal behavior. Haws arrived at the facility at the end of July 2017. During the period of retained jurisdiction, Haws had few corrective actions, although his overall performance was poor. According to the addendum to the PSI, "Haws ... struggled in groups to meet the basic standard and continue[d] to have difficulty identifying appropriate new thinking, instead replacing it with yet more risky thinking." He was "passively resistant to doing the work, claiming he [could not] hear, [could not] see the board, [did] not understand the role-plays," and failed to properly participate in the role-playing assignments. "While Mr. Haws did for a short time increase his participation, his increased performance was not on a consistent basis[.]" "Haws ... struggled a great deal with engagement in his own recovery and [did] not appear to be motivated to complete even voluntary treatment options."
In late November 2017, the Department of Correction recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction over Haws. The recommendation was the result of Haws failing to obey a direct order to move to another bunk. Haws stated that "he would rather go to the hole than move where he had people on both sides" of him. His conduct resulted in responders being called to the facility.
Following a Rider Review Hearing, the district court entered an order on April 2, 2018, relinquishing jurisdiction over Haws based on the recommendation from the Department of Correction. The effect of the district court relinquishing jurisdiction was imposition of the original sentences.
Haws timely appealed from his sentences in both cases, and from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. The appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals. On appeal, Haws argued that the district court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence and by relinquishing jurisdiction. In response, the State argued that Haws’ appeal should be dismissed because he waived his right to appeal his sentences when he entered into the plea agreements. The Court of Appeals agreed, and dismissed Haws’ appeal from his sentences. State v. Haws , No. 46225, 2019 WL 8017375, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2019). Notwithstanding the dismissal of Haws’ appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed the arguments regarding the order relinquishing jurisdiction, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction. Id.
Haws filed a petition for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that he had forfeited the right to address the validity of his plea agreements by not raising an issue of validity of those waivers in his opening brief. Instead, Haws contends that it was the State's obligation to assert the applicability of the appellate waiver, and Haws should then have had the opportunity to respond in his reply brief. Additionally, Haws contends that his appellate waiver was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the district court made a statement that conflicted with the written plea agreements by noting that Haws still had the right to appeal his sentences.
This Court granted the petition for review.
"When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, we do ‘not merely review the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals.’ " State v. Glodowski, 166 Idaho 771, 774, 463 P.3d 405, 408 (2020) (quoting State v. Young , 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002) ). Rather, "this Court acts as though it is hearing the matter on direct appeal from the decision of the trial court; however, this Court does give serious consideration to the decision of the Court of Appeals." Id. (quotation omitted).
A. Haws was not obligated to raise the validity of the...
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