State v. Hayes
| Decision Date | 17 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 20110098–20110101.,s. 20110098–20110101. |
| Citation | 809 N.W.2d 309,2012 ND 9 |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Anna Maria HAYES, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Elizabeth L. Pendlay, State's Attorney, Crosby, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.
Benjamin C. Pulkrabek, Mandan, N.D., for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1] As a condition of bail, the district court required Anna Hayes to consent to a warrantless search at any time of her person, vehicle, and residence. Concluding the bail condition was invalid under N.D.R.Crim.P. 46(a)(3), we reverse her convictions of four drug-related charges resulting from the bail-condition search. We affirm her convictions of two prior unaffected charges.
[¶ 2] Divide County Sheriff's Deputy Rob Melby stopped Hayes for driving while her license was suspended on December 1, 2008. Deputy Melby testified he personally recognized Hayes operating a motor vehicle and he knew the Divide County Sheriff's Department included her on its monthly list of suspended drivers. Deputy Melby confirmed the status of Hayes' license with North Dakota State Radio, and he arrested her for driving while her license was suspended.
[¶ 3] An inventory search resulted in the discovery of marijuana on Hayes' person as well as $600 in cash. Law enforcement officers also found $2,133 in cash in Hayes' purse. Following her arrest, the sheriff's department released Hayes on a $1,500 cash bond. The State charged her with driving while her license was suspended in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39–06–42, a class B misdemeanor, and with possession of a controlled substance while driving a motor vehicle in violation of N.D.C.C. § 19–03.1–23, a class A misdemeanor. At Hayes' initial appearance on December 10, 2008, the State requested, in addition to a cash bond, that Hayes' bond order require her to submit to random drug-testing and warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and home. The district court characterized the random drug-testing as a “standard provision of bond” for a person charged with a drug violation, gave no explanation of the warrantless search requirement, and granted the State's entire request.
[¶ 4] Immediately after the district court imposed the bond conditions, law enforcement officers met Hayes outside the courtroom and requested she consent to a search of her residence. Narcotics Agent Derek Bernier testified he informed Hayes she could consent to a search of her residence or risk violating her bond conditions. Agent Bernier testified Hayes consented to a search of her residence, which she listed on her driver's license as 210 Adams Street in Noonan, North Dakota. Divide County Sheriff Lauren Throntveit, one of the law enforcement officers who met Hayes outside the courtroom, testified, however, that Hayes stated she did not reside at 210 Adams Street. Rather, Hayes testified at the suppression hearing that she informed the officers she resided at 211 Hagerud Street in Noonan and that she consented to a search of that residence, but not to a search of 210 Adams Street. Sheriff Throntveit testified Hayes did not inform the officers of her current residence.
[¶ 5] Law enforcement officers did not search 211 Hagerud Street. Instead, they relied on Hayes' driver's license and their knowledge of her residence to search 210 Adams Street. Upon entering, officers found the name “Anna” affixed to a sign in the garage and an electricity bill in the residence addressed to “Anna Hayes” at “210 Adams Street.” Hayes testified she placed her name on the deed to 210 Adams Street after her mother died, but she had moved out of the residence in September 2008, leaving her sister and her sister's children as the only occupants of the residence.
[¶ 6] As a result of the search, officers found various items of drug paraphernalia. After the search, officers questioned Hayes about her drug use after providing her with the warning required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Hayes admitted that she had used methamphetamine approximately two days before the December 10 search and that she would test positive for marijuana use. Hayes also admitted the drug paraphernalia discovered at 210 Adams Street belonged to her and not to her sister.
[¶ 7] After the search, the State brought four additional charges against Hayes: unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 19–03.4–03, a class A misdemeanor; ingesting a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 19–03.1–22, a class A misdemeanor; ingesting a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 19–03.1–22, a class A misdemeanor; and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, marijuana, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 19–03.4–03, a class A misdemeanor.
[¶ 8] Before trial, Hayes moved to suppress the evidence seized during the December 10 search. She argued the search violated her Fourth Amendment constitutional rights because the bond condition required her to submit to warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and residence. The district court denied her motion, and a jury thereafter found her guilty of all six charges.
[¶ 9] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27–05–06. Hayes timely appealed from the criminal judgment under N.D.R.App.P. 4(b). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 29–28–06.
[¶ 10] Hayes argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence seized during a December 10 warrantless search of 210 Adams Street as a result of pretrial release conditions imposed by the district court. She argues the district court erred in requiring her to consent to warrantless searches of her person, vehicle, and residence as a condition of her bond release. The State contends Hayes does not have standing to contest the search of 210 Adams Street because she did not live at that residence. The State alternatively argues that if Hayes has standing, the district court properly denied her motion to suppress because the authorization for a warrantless search was constitutional, Hayes consented to the search, and law enforcement officers relied in good faith on the amended bond order. The State also argues the two convictions resulting from the December 1 traffic stop of Hayes should be affirmed because they do not apply to Hayes' argument on appeal.
[¶ 11] Our standard of review of a district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence is well-established. We “defer to the district court's findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance.” State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 11, 691 N.W.2d 203. We will affirm a district court's decision if “there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578, 581 (N.D.1994). “Questions of law and the ultimate conclusion about whether the facts support a reasonable and articulable suspicion are fully reviewable on appeal.” Id. Hayes' argument on appeal implicates constitutional issues, which involve questions of law. See State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 9, 598 N.W.2d 147.
[¶ 12] The State argues the two convictions arising from the December 1, 2008, traffic stop of Hayes should be affirmed because they do not apply to Hayes' argument on appeal.
[¶ 13] Hayes appeals from a criminal judgment after the district court denied her motion to suppress evidence. Law enforcement officers discovered the evidence Hayes hoped to suppress during a search of 210 Adams Street on December 10, 2008, nine days after her initial arrest for a traffic violation. As a result of her arrest for a traffic violation, the State charged her with driving while her license was suspended and with possession of a controlled substance while driving a motor vehicle. Although the district court amended Hayes' cash bond at her December 10 initial appearance to include conditions, Hayes did not argue in her motion to suppress evidence, nor does she argue on appeal, that the district court erroneously admitted evidence discovered from her initial arrest. Rather, Hayes' argument concerns only the conditions of pretrial release the district court imposed upon her at her initial appearance that led to law enforcement officers searching 210 Adams Street without a warrant. Hayes based her motion to suppress on the four charges resulting from that search, and they are the basis for this appeal. Consequently, we affirm the two convictions arising from her arrest on December 1 because Hayes' motion to suppress evidence did not concern either charge. State v. Prigge, 437 N.W.2d 520, 521 (N.D.1989) (). We turn next to Hayes' four other convictions.
[¶ 14] As a preliminary matter, the State argues Hayes lacks standing to contest a search of 210 Adams Street because she does not live at that address. The capacity to claim Fourth Amendment protection depends upon whether a person has a legitimate subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990).
[¶ 15] At her suppression hearing, Hayes testified that she placed her name on the deed to 210 Adams Street after her mother died and that she moved out of the residence in 2008, leaving only her sister and her sister's children to live at the residence. Additionally, at trial, Sheriff Throntveit testified Hayes told him she pays the taxes for 210 Adams Street. “[L]egitimate presence in the area searched, possession or ownership of the area searched ..., prior use of the area searched ..., ability to control or exclude others' use of the property, and a subjective expectation of privacy” are relevant...
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