State v. Hayes
| Decision Date | 06 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 7615SC263,7615SC263 |
| Citation | 31 N.C.App. 122,228 S.E.2d 460 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Gene HAYES. |
Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen. William B. Ray and Deputy Atty. William W. Melvin, Raleigh, for the State.
Hunt & Abernathy by George E. Hunt, Graham, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant assigns as error the denial of his motion for judgment as of nonsuit as to both charges. The State offered evidence tending to show the following:
On 11 March 1974 Trooper Nelson Gunn observed the defendant driving along North Carolina Highway 49. Having been informed earlier that defendant's license was revoked, he stopped defendant on Rural Road 1922 and asked to see his driver's license. Defendant produced what appeared to be a valid license. When asked if his license had not been suspended, the defendant said no, that he had gone to Raleigh and gotten it back. Trooper Gunn let the defendant proceed. After checking further, however, he arrested defendant on 13 March 1974 for driving while his license was revoked and for displaying a license known to be revoked.
The defendant's Driver's License Record with the Division of Motor Vehicles, which was introduced into evidence, and the testimony of Patrolman Frank Barnhart, together tended to show that defendant's license was revoked for one year, 20 September 1973 to 20 September 1974; that notices of suspension and revocation had been mailed to defendant on 12 July 1973, 5 September 1973, and 9 October 1973 in accordance with G.S. 20--48; and that a 'pickup notice' was served on defendant by Barnhart on 15 October 1973 but that defendant had told him then that he did not have his license because he had lost it. Officer Barnhart gave him a copy of the notice of revocation on 15 October which explained why his license was revoked.
The defendant offered no evidence on his behalf.
When this evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, it is sufficient to require submission of both cases to the jury and to support the verdicts. This assignments of error is not sustained.
Based on an exception to the charge duly noted in the record, the defendant contends, 'The trial court erred in its instruction regarding the manner of notice required to convict the defendant of operating a vehicle with license revoked . . .' In his brief, citing Judge Martin's dissent in State v. Atwood, 27 N.C.App. 445, 219 S.E.2d 521 (175), rev'd on other grounds, 290 N.C. 266, 225 S.E.2d 543 (1976), the defendant argues that G.S. 20--48 does not provide one with procedural due process with respect to the notice that one's driving privileges have been revoked or suspended. The instruction challenged by this exception is in accord with State v. Teasley, 9 N.C.App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838 (1970), cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459, 177 S.E.2d 900 (1970), wherein this court held that G.S. 20--48 does provide constitutional procedural due process. In State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 225 S.E.2d 543 (1976), the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but it did not overrule this court's decision in State v. Teasley, supra. Thus Teasley still stands for the proposition that G.S. 20--48 does afford the defendant procedual due process with respect to the manner of giving one notice of the revocation or suspension of his or her driving privileges.
In discussing the impact of State v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Finger
...of G.S. Sec. 20-48 have been applied by our Court in State v. Chester, 30 N.C.App. 224, 226 S.E.2d 524 (1976) and State v. Hayes, 31 N.C.App. 121, 228 S.E.2d 460 (1976). At no time before the close of all the evidence in this case did the State introduce any evidence that a letter was sent ......