State v. Heald

• Citation: 232 A.2d 79
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Augustus F. HEALD.
• Decision Date: 28 July 1967
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Page 79

232 A.2d 79

STATE of Maine v. Augustus F. HEALD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 28, 1967.

Roger F. Blake, County Atty., Belfast, James S. Erwin, Atty. Gen., and Richard S. Cohen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Maine, for appellant.

Francis C. Marsano, Belfast, for appellee.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, MARDEN, DUFRESNE, and WEATHERBEE, JJ.

TAPLEY, Justice.

On appeal. The appellant was indicted by a Grand Jury in the County of Waldo and State of Maine for the crime of murder. The indictment was returned at the April Term, 1965 of the Superior Court. A jury trial was had and on June 17, 1965 the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter. The presiding Justice continued the case for sentence to June 18, 1965. On June 18, 1965 the Justice below imposed sentence on the appellant, following which the warrant of commitment was issued as of that day and the court then adjourned the April Term.

On the 13th day of July, 1965 the appellant presented a motion for a new trial to the presiding Justice. A hearing was had on the motion, after which, on July 14, 1965, the Justice dismissed the motion for the reason that it was not filed in accordance with provisions of Title 15, Sec. 2117, M.R.S.A., (repealed by Chap. 356, Sec. 64, P.L.1965) the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

'* * * All motions for new trials in criminal cases, as against law or evidence, shall be filed during the term at which verdict is rendered, but in no case later than 30 days after verdict rendered.'

The court below found it had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion. It further appears in the record that previous to the sentencing of the appellant the Justice was informed by the attorneys of record for the defendant that he, the defendant, did not desire to file a motion for a new trial, and was ready to have the sentence imposed. The defendant personally informed the Justice that he had no remarks to make respecting imposition of sentence. After sentence the term was finally adjourned. From this order of dismissal the defendant seasonably appealed.

Appellant contends the presiding Justice erroneously construed the pertinent portion of Sec. 2117 when he found that there was no jurisdiction to entertain the motion for a new trial after final adjournment of the court.

The real question before us is one of jurisdiction to entertain the motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. The answer to this question is determinative of the appeal.

The effective statute, in stating the time when the motion must be filed, contains the following language:

'shall be filed during the term at which the verdict is rendered, but in no case later than 30 days after verdict rendered.'

Appellant contends that he had 30 days after rendition of the verdict to file a motion, regardless of when the term adjourned, while appellee argues that the 30 days after verdict provision applies only to a situation where the term of court continued more than 30 days after the verdict. At the time the motion for a new trial was filed the following pertinent portion of Rule 17 of the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts was effective:

'* * * Motions made to have a verdict set aside as against the law and the evidence, whether addressed to the presiding justice or to the Law Court, must be filed during the term at which the verdict is rendered but in any case never more than thirty days after the rendition of such verdict * * *.'

In McLendon v. State, 90 Fla. 272, 105 So. 406 the court granted an extension of 15 days to file a motion for a new trial under a statute requiring motions to be filed 'within four days after the verdict * * * and during the same term.' The court held that...