State v. Hegg, 97-217

• Decision Date: 30 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-217,97-217
• Citation: 956 P.2d 754
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael C. HEGG, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 754

956 P.2d 754

1998 MT 100

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael C. HEGG, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 97-217.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 18, 1998.

Decided April 30, 1998.

Matthew J. Wald, Miles City, for Appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Cregg W. Coughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Garry P. Bunke, Custer County Attorney; Miles City, for Respondent.

TRIEWEILER, Justice.

¶1 The defendant, Michael C. Hegg, was charged in the District Court for the Sixteenth Judicial District in Custer County with multiple drug-related offenses, including criminal forfeiture. After the State presented its case at trial, Hegg moved to dismiss the criminal forfeiture charge. The District Court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Hegg of all counts. Hegg appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss. We reverse in part the judgment of the District Court.

¶2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred when it held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hegg owned or possessed property subject to criminal forfeiture and denied Hegg's motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶3 On July 21, 1995, Montana law enforcement officers searched Michael Hegg's house in Miles City. The warrant pursuant to which they did so had been obtained in reliance on a statement from another individual that Hegg supplied her with drugs.

¶4 The officers found and seized quantities of marijuana, methamphetamine, and hashish. In addition, they seized $7897 in cash, numerous loaded guns, a coin collection, a safe, and three scales. They arrested Hegg that same day.

¶5 On August 21, 1995, Hegg was charged by information with four counts of felony criminal possession with intent to sell, pursuant to § 45-9-103, MCA, one count of misdemeanor criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, pursuant to § 45-10-103, MCA, and one count of felony criminal forfeiture, pursuant to § 45-9-206, MCA. Two counts of felony criminal possession with intent to sell were eventually dropped in an amended information. The criminal forfeiture count alleged that Hegg "knowingly possessed, owned, used, or attempted to use property that is subject to criminal forfeiture that was used to facilitate a violation of 45-9-103, and/or intended for use in manufacturing, preparing, cultivating, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting a dangerous drug in violation of 45-9-103, and/or used as a container for money, raw materials, products, equipment." It then listed each item of property, including the cash, coins, scales, safe, and guns.

¶6 A three-day jury trial was held in January 1996. The State presented five witnesses, including three officers who were present when Hegg's house was searched and his property seized, a forensic chemist from the State Crime Lab, and the individual whom Hegg had supplied with drugs. At the close of their testimony, Hegg moved to dismiss the count that he criminally possessed and intended to sell the marijuana found in his possession, based on his assertion that the State had failed to establish that he intended to sell it, and the criminal forfeiture count, based on his assertion that the State failed to connect the property to the drug violations. The District Court denied the motions; however, it deemed the safe and coin collection withdrawn from the items to be forfeited. Hegg presented no witnesses.

¶7 The jury was given a special verdict form that listed each item of property subject to forfeiture. The jury found Hegg guilty of all counts, and determined by the special verdict that every item listed should be forfeited. The District Court sentenced Hegg to ten years for each felony offense, and six months for the misdemeanor offense, all of which were to run concurrently. In addition, the property was ordered forfeited to the State.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Did the District Court err when it held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hegg owned or possessed property subject to criminal forfeiture and denied Hegg's motion to dismiss?

¶9 Pursuant to § 46-16-403, MCA, a district court may, at the close of the State's case and after a motion from the defendant, dismiss charges against the defendant if the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. See § 46-16-403, MCA. We review a district court's refusal to grant a defendant's motion to dismiss to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mummey (1994), 264 Mont. 272, 276, 871 P.2d 868, 870. Our review is the same as when we consider whether sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction. See State v. Ahmed (1996), 278 Mont. 200, 206, 924 P.2d 679, 683; State v. Richards (1995), 274 Mont. 180, 184, 906 P.2d 222, 224.

¶10 Hegg concedes that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction of all counts other than criminal forfeiture. Regarding the forfeiture count, however, he asserts that the State failed to present any evidence that the property had been used or that he intended that it be used in a manner that would violate § 45-9-206, MCA, and that the limited circumstantial evidence before the jury was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a statutory connection between the property and illegal drug activity.

¶11 Section 45-9-206, MCA, states:

(1) A person commits the offense of use or possession of property subject to criminal forfeiture if the person knowingly possesses, owns, uses, or attempts to use property that is subject to criminal forfeiture under this section. A person convicted of the offense of use or possession of property subject to criminal forfeiture shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 10 years. Upon conviction, the property subject to criminal forfeiture is forfeited to the state and must be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of 44-12-205 and 44-12-206.

(2) The following property is subject to criminal forfeiture under this section:

(a) money, raw materials, products, equipment, and other property of any kind that is used or intended for use in manufacturing, preparing, cultivating, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting a dangerous drug in violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110 or of 45-4-102 when the object of the conspiracy was a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110;

(b) property used or intended for use as a container for property enumerated in subsection (2)(a);

....

(d) books, records, research products and materials, formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or intended for use in connection with a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110 or of 45-4-102 when the object of the conspiracy was a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110;

(e)(i) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a dangerous drug in violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110 or of 45-4-102 when the object of the conspiracy was a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110; and

(ii) all proceeds traceable to such an exchange;

(f) money, negotiable instruments, securities, and weapons used or intended to be used to facilitate a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110 or of 45-4-102 when the object of the conspiracy was a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110;

(g) personal property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110 or of 45-4-102 when the object of the conspiracy was a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110; and

....

(3) A conveyance is not subject to criminal forfeiture under this section unless the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance knowingly used the conveyance to violate or knowingly consented to its use for the purpose of violating 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110 or of 45-4-102 when the object of the conspiracy was a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110.

....

(5) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section may be seized under the following circumstances:

(a) A peace officer who has probable cause to make an arrest for a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110 or of 45-4-102 when the object of the conspiracy was a violation of 45-9-101, 45-9-103, or 45-9-110 may seize a conveyance obtained with proceeds of the violation or used to facilitate the violation and shall immediately deliver the conveyance to the peace officer's law enforcement agency, to be held as evidence until a criminal forfeiture is declared or release ordered.

(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section may be seized by a peace officer under a search warrant issued by a court having jurisdiction over the property.

This Court has not yet addressed the applicability of the statute and the State's burden pursuant to it.

¶12 The State contends here that the mere proximity of the guns, cash, and scales to Hegg's illegal drugs is sufficient evidence to prove that he used or possessed the items for one of the prohibited purposes. The State concedes that the evidence is circumstantial and that the jury was forced to infer from the items' presence in the house and its knowledge of the drug trade that the guns, cash, and scales facilitated Hegg's illegal drug operation in violation of § 45-9-206, MCA.

¶13 It is well-established that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove any element of an offense and/or to sustain a conviction. See State v. Treible(1996), 275 Mont. 59, 63,...