State v. HEJ
Decision Date | 17 July 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 44863-3-I.,44863-3-I. |
Citation | 9 P.3d 835,102 Wash.App. 84 |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. H.E.J., Appellant. |
Dana M. Nelson, Nielsen Broman & Associates Pllc, Seattle, for Appellant.
Maureen A. Howard, Prosecuting Atty. King County, King County Prosecutor/Appellate Unit, Seattle for Respondent.
H.J., who exposed his erect penis during a class at his junior high school, argues that the trial court did not have the authority to order him to have a sexual deviancy evaluation. We disagree and hold further that the court did not abuse its discretion when it restricted H.J. from having any unsupervised contact with children younger than himself.
H.J. exposed his erect penis to one of his teachers and a counselor at his high school. He was charged with two counts of indecent exposure and was found guilty as charged. A judge ordered him to serve 5 days of confinement, 12 months of community supervision, and 8 hours of community service on each count. Additionally, the court ordered him to participate in a sexual deviancy evaluation, follow all treatment recommendations, and have no unsupervised contact with persons younger than himself.
H.J. argues on appeal that the trial court did not have the authority to order him to undergo sexual deviancy treatment. He contends that the court could order him to undergo that treatment only if he was convicted of a sex crime. We disagree.
When a juvenile is adjudicated of an offense, a standard range disposition is determined according to RCW 13.40.0357. The standard range disposition for H.J.'s crime of indecent exposure was what is known as "local sanctions," which may consist of one or more of the following: 0-30 days of confinement, 0-12 months of community supervision, 0-150 hours of community service, and a $0-$500 fine.
H.J. contends that although certain treatment programs were contemplated within the local sentencing option, sexual deviancy treatment was not one of the programs contemplated. He argues that sexual deviancy treatment was an option only under former RCW 13.40.160(4),1 the Special Sexual Offender Disposition Alternative (SSODA), which is available only if the offender was convicted of a sex offense. Indecent exposure is not a sex offense.
Under RCW 13.40.160(3), the court, after receiving a report from the evaluator and determining that the special sex offender disposition alternative was appropriate, could order the juvenile to participate in outpatient or inpatient sex offender treatment.
H.J. contends it is obvious that the Legislature intended to treat sex offenders differently from other offenders, and that if the Legislature had meant for "community-based rehabilitation" to include sex offender treatment, that type of treatment would have been mentioned specifically in the definition of "community-based rehabilitation," as was treatment for cruelty to animals.
H.J. does not cite any cases holding that a court may order a sexual deviancy evaluation only if the juvenile was convicted of a sex offense. Nor does he cite any cases holding that a court may order only such treatment or evaluations as are specifically described in RCW 13.40.020(1). Given the amount of discretion courts have to determine the appropriate disposition for juveniles, it seems unlikely the Legislature intended to limit the courts so: "The juvenile court [ ] retains discretion to tailor the disposition to meet the needs of the juvenile and the rehabilitative and accountability goals of the juvenile code."2
The court's disposition in this case was tailored to meet H.J.'s needs. The testimony at trial established that H.J. masturbated while sitting across a table from his teacher and then exposed his erect penis to her. He later did the same thing to a counselor. Under these circumstances, the trial court determined that H.J.'s exposing his penis was a "sexual event."3 Therefore, even though indecent exposure is not considered a sex offense, the court concluded a sexual deviancy evaluation was appropriate and that H.J. should follow whatever treatment recommendations the evaluator recommended.
H.J. argues,...
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