State v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 15 April 1970
• Docket Number: No. 21,21
• Citation: 276 N.C. 430,173 S.E.2d 291
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Curtis HENDERSON and Moses Price, Jr.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 291

173 S.E.2d 291

276 N.C. 430

STATE of North Carolina v. Curtis HENDERSON and Moses Price, Jr.

No. 21.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 15, 1970.

Beech & Pollock, by D. D. Pollock, Kinston, for defendant appellant Henderson.

Brock & Gerrans, by C. E. Gerrans, Kinston, for defendant appellant Price.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

Although they present their fourteen assignments of error in a joint statement, each defendant filed a separate brief.

Assignments of Error Nos. 2 and 4 are based on defendants' exceptions to the denial of their motions under G.S. § 15--173 for judgments as in case of nonsuit.

In the consideration of these assignments, we apply the well-established and oft-stated rules summarized in 2 Strong's North Carolina Index 2d, Criminal Law § 104, as follows: 'On motion to nonsuit, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the state, and the state is entitled to every reasonable intendment thereon and every reasonable inference therefrom. Contradictions and discrepancies, even in the state's evidence, are for the jury to resolve, and do not warrant nonsuit. Only the evidence favorable to the state will be considered, and defendant's evidence relating to matters of defense, or defendant's evidence in conflict with that of the state, will not be considered.'

The Credibility of the State's crucial evidence, particularly the testimony of Williams Miller and Thomas, was sharply challenged by cross-examination and by defendants' testimony and by evidence offered in their behalf.

Williams, who identified both Price and Henderson in his testimony at trial, did not know either defendant By name on the night of the attempted robbery and the murder of Stanley. Miller, who identified Price in his testimony at trial, did not know him By name on the night of the attempted robbery and the murder of Stanley.

As witnesses for the State, various officers, namely, a Kinston Police Officer (Loftin), two Kinston Detectives (Brooks and Gay), a Private Detective (Whaley) and an SBI Agent (Campbell), testified to statements made by Williams in response to their inquiries. Portions of this testimony tended to corroborate Williams' testimony at trial. Other portions thereof tended to show discrepancies and conflicts between Williams' testimony at trial and statements previously made by him. Conflicts between the testimony of certain of the State's witnesses and the testimony of Detective Long, a witness for Henderson, are noted in our preliminary statement. The testimony of Thomas was contradicted by each defendant in his personal testimony and also by the testimony of Mrs. Annie Belle Shaw ('Miss Annie'). Testimony of Thomas, under cross-examination, tended to show Thomas' prior criminal record; that he had 'pulled five years' in prison and in addition had 'pulled some time just around the city jail'; and that he was in custody for forgery when he told the officers of overhearing the conversation at 'Miss Annie's house' and under a probationary sentence for forgery when he testified for the State against defendants. Too, each defendant offered alibi evidence. This evidence tended to show the defendants were not together on the night of October 5th and that each was at a location in Kinston other than the premises of the Supermarket.

The statement from the opinion of Stacy, C.J., in State v. Satterfield, 207 N.C. 118, 176 S.E. 466, is applicable: 'Counsel for the defendant assailed the state's case with force and vigor, pointing out the apparent contradictions in the testimony and the equivocation of some of the witnesses; but these were matters bearing upon the weight of the evidence or its credibility, and not upon its competency. The jurors alone are the triers of the facts.'

Considered in the light of applicable legal principles, the evidence was sufficient to require submission to the jury and to support the verdict. Hence, the assignments of error with reference to nonsuit are without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 1 contains nothing of sufficient significance to require discussion and is overruled.

A preliminary hearing was conducted November 1, 1968, in the Municipal-County Recorder's Court. The solicitor of that court, P. H. Crawford, Jr., as a rebuttal witness for the State, testified to his conversation with Williams, in the presence of several law enforcement officers, in the judge's office adjoining the courtroom, preparatory to the hearing. A portion of his testimony is the subject of Assignment of Error No. 3.

Mr. Crawford testified in part as follows: 'At the beginning of my conference with him he indicated a very pronounced reluctance to talk, he replied to questions in monosyllables and I had difficulty in bringing him out. I insisted to him that what I wanted him to tell me was exactly what he knew about the facts and what happened, and one or two of those present made similar statements to him about telling me what happened, to tell the truth. One of those present, I think it was Mr. Whaley, made the statement to him--if there are not the words it is the substance; he said 'Tell it to Mr. Crawford just like you told it to me.' (And almost suddenly the boy began to talk and he was very forthright and complete--Objection overruled--and gave an articulate statement) DEFENDANTS' EXCEPTION NO. 3. Yes, sir, immediately after my conference with him he testified at the hearing.'

Although the words 'Objection overruled' appear in the record as indicated, the record does not show the question to which the objection was addressed. Nor does the record show that defendants made a motion to strike any particular portion of Mr. Crawford's testimony.

In their briefs, defendants call attention to 'DEFENDANTS' EXCEPTION NO. 3,' on which they base Assignment of Error No. 3. Their only point seems to be that Crawford was testifying to an opinion or conclusion as distinguished from facts. We perceive no error prejudicial to defendants. Crawford's testimony that Williams was reluctant to talk when the conference began and later talked freely constituted what may well be considered a shorthand statement of fact. Stansbury, N.C. Evidence, Second Edition, § 125. If deemed desirable, counsel for defendants could have explored in depth exactly what Williams said at various stages of this conference.

Assignment of Error No. 14 asserts 'the court erred in overruling the defendants' motions to set aside the verdict for that the evidence was overwhelmingly against the verdict, for errors made during the trial, and for arrest of judgment.' No ground for the arrest of judgment is suggested other than defendants' contentions that the verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence. Since this was a matter for determination by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion, this assignment is deemed formal.

In his brief, Henderson expressly abandons Assignments of Error Nos. 6 and 7. Since Price's brief states no reason and cites no authority in support thereof, these assignments will be taken as abandoned by him. Rule 28, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 254 N.C. 783, 810; Freeman v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 113, 116, 159 S.E.2d 327, 329.

Assignments of Error Nos. 5--13, inclusive, quote excerpts from the charge and assert the court erred in so charging the jury. In these assignments, defendants do not indicate in what particular any of the quoted excerpts is erroneous. They ignore the requirement of Rule 19(3), Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 254 N.C. 783, 797, as interpreted in numerous decisions of this Court, that 'always the very error relied upon should be definitely and clearly presented, and the court not compelled to go beyond the assignment itself to learn what the question is.' State v. Mills, 244 N.C. 487, 94 S.E.2d 324.

The excerpt on which Assignment of Error No. 5 is based is the only portion of the charge assigned as error which relates to an instruction with reference to a legal principle. Other portions of the charge assigned as error involve either the court's review of evidence or statement of contentions.

With reference to Assignment of Error No. 5, Price contends that the court used the words, 'if you find from the evidence,' instead of the words, 'if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.' In other portions of the charge, the court fully and correctly instructed the jury that the burden was on the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendants or either of them before such verdict(s) could be returned. The contention advanced by Price is without merit.

Henderson's contention with reference to Assignment of Error No. 5 is that the instruction given in the quoted excerpt was 'unclear and ambiguous.' This...