State v. Hern

Decision Date27 March 2013
Docket NumberCAAP–12–0000528.,Nos. CAAP–11–0000644,s. CAAP–11–0000644
Citation323 P.3d 1241,133 Hawai'i 59
Parties STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Dennis HERN, Defendant–Appellant. State of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joseph B.A. Ledbetter, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtHawaii Court of Appeals

Richard L. Holcomb, (Holcomb Law, LLLC), on the briefs, for DefendantAppellant Dennis Hern and DefendantAppellant Joseph B.A. Ledbetter.

Stephen K. Tsushima, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, on the briefs, for PlaintiffAppellee in both appeals.

NAKAMURA, CHIEF JUDGE, FOLEY and FUJISE, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by NAKAMURA, C.J.

In these consolidated appeals,1 the District Court of the First Circuit (District Court) dismissed the charges against DefendantAppellant Dennis Hern (Hern) and DefendantAppellant Joseph B.A. Ledbetter (Ledbetter) (collectively, "Defendants") without prejudice for violation of the speedy trial requirements set forth in Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 (2000).2 HRPP Rule 48(b) provides that "the court shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the charge, with or without prejudice in its discretion, if trial is not commenced within" the time required by HRPP Rule 48.

On appeal, Defendants contend that the District Court erred in dismissing their charges without prejudice, instead of with prejudice. They also contend that the District Court erred in failing to make adequate findings to justify its dismissals without prejudice. In Hern's case, the District Court stated that it was following its "typical practice" in dismissing the charge without prejudice. In Ledbetter's case, the District Court did not provide any reason for its dismissal without prejudice.

We conclude that, pursuant to the Hawai‘i Supreme Court's decision in State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 625 P.2d 1040 (1981), in determining whether to dismiss a case with or without prejudice for violation of the time limits set forth in HRPP Rule 48, the trial court is required to consider, among others, each of the following three factors: "[ (1) ] the seriousness of the offense; [ (2) ] the facts and the circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and [ (3) ] the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [ HRPP Rule 48 ] and on the administration of justice" (hereinafter, the " Estencion factors"). Estencion, 63 Haw. at 269, 625 P.2d at 1044 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) of the federal Speedy Trial Act).3 We further conclude that the trial court must " clearly articulate [the] effect" of the Estencion factors and any other factor it considered in rendering its decision. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988). We need not automatically remand every case in which the trial court's findings are deficient, if the record is otherwise sufficient for this court to determinate whether the trial court abused its discretion. However, we will remand the case for the trial court to make the appropriate findings where: (1) the record affirmatively shows that the trial court failed to consider the Estencion factors; (2) the record is inadequate to permit meaningful review of the trial court's exercise of discretion; or (3) the trial court's findings are deficient and an inordinate burden would be placed on this court to conduct a searching review of the record necessary to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Applying these principles, in Hern's appeal, we conclude that the District Court erred in relying on its "typical practice," rather than considering the required Estencion factors under the particular circumstances of Hern's case, in its dismissal of the charge without prejudice. In Ledbetter's case, the District Court failed to provide any explanation for its decision, and we conclude that the record is inadequate for this court to meaningfully review whether the District Court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the charge without prejudice. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments dismissing the charges without prejudice and remand the cases with instructions that the District Court (1) consider the required Estencion factors; and (2) make findings that clearly articulate the effect of the Estencion factors and any other factor it considered in rendering its decision.

BACKGROUND
I.

On January 21, 2011, Hern was arrested and PlaintiffAppellee State of Hawai‘i (State) charged him by complaint with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII), in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E–61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3) (Supp. 2012). On that same date, Hern was arraigned in the District Court and released to appear. Hern filed the following pretrial motions: (1) an April 18, 2011, "Motion to Compel Production of Laser Device Manuals and/or Materials" (Motion to Compel—Laser); an April 25, 2011, "Motion to Compel Breath Sample or, in the Alternative, Cobra Data, or to Impose Sanctions Including the Exclusion of BrAC Result" (Motion to Compel—Breath); and a May 13, 2011, "Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction" (Motion to Dismiss—Jurisdiction).

At a hearing held on May 17, 2011, the District Court granted the Motion to Compel—Laser, subject to a protective order; denied the Motion to Dismiss—Jurisdiction; and ordered the State to submit a supplemental memorandum in opposition to Hern's Motion to Compel—Breath. At a hearing on June 29, 2011, the District Court denied the Motion to Compel—Breath.

On August 18, 2011, Hern filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial time limits set forth in HRPP Rule 48. On August 23, 2011, the District Court held a hearing on Hern's motion to dismiss for violation of HRPP Rule 48. The District Court acknowledged that in setting the trial date, it had believed that the time needed to rule on the Motion to Compel—Breath was excludable under HRPP Rule 48. However, upon further review, the District Court concluded that this time period was not excludable4 and that as a result, the time limits of HRPP Rule 48 had been violated. The District Court granted Hern's motion to dismiss "in part" and dismissed the OVUII charge without prejudice.

In response, Hern orally requested that the District Court reconsider and dismiss the case with prejudice:

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I would ask you to reconsider and dismiss it with prejudice just for the sheer volume of time that has passed since this was charged, and we have been back a number of times, as you know, on this case already.

The District Court denied Hern's request to dismiss the case with prejudice, stating:

THE COURT: Well, you've been back, but primarily that has to do with your motions, and that's why we've been here a lot of times. And I wanted to get a good record for—especially for your motion to compel. So—and my typical practice on Rule 48, as you know, is to dismiss without prejudice, so that's—that's what I'll rule.

(Emphasis added.) The District Court entered its judgment dismissing the charge without prejudice on August 23, 2011.

II.

On August 29, 2011, Ledbetter was arrested for OVUII and released after posting bail. On September 7, 2011, the State charged Ledbetter by complaint with OVUII, in violation of HRS § 291E–61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). On December 6, 2011, Ledbetter filed four motions to compel. On December 9, 2011, the parties appeared in court and the State stated it was ready for trial. Ledbetter stated that he had not received discovery. The District Court (Judge David W. Lo) continued the case and charged the time to the State.

At a hearing held on February 13, 2012, the State served Ledbetter with its memorandum in opposition to Ledbetter's motions to compel. The proceedings were continued to March 1, 2012, for a hearing on Ledbetter's motions to compel. On March 1, 2012, the District Court (Judge Lono J. Lee) denied Ledbetter's motions to compel and set trial for April 30, 2012.

On April 27, 2012, Ledbetter filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial time limits set forth in HRPP Rule 48. Ledbetter claimed that 221 countable days had elapsed under HRPP Rule 48, which exceeded the six months permitted under the rule. On April 30, 2012, the District Court (Judge Lono J. Lee) held a hearing on Ledbetter's motion to dismiss. The State stated that it was not ready to proceed to trial because two police officers were sick, and it represented that the HRPP Rule 48 time period did not run until May 12, 2012. The parties argued about the appropriate HRPP Rule 48 computation. After hearing the argument, the District Court indicated that in reliance on Judge Lo's previous ruling, which charged time to the State, it was determining that HRPP Rule 48 has been violated. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, but did not state a reason for its dismissal without prejudice. The District Court entered its judgment dismissing the charge without prejudice on April 30, 2012.

III.

On February 14, 2012, this court filed an order dismissing Hern's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We ruled that the District Court's judgment dismissing Hern's charge without prejudice was not a final appealable judgement because there was no final adjudication on the merits and no sentence imposed against Hern, citing State v. Kilborn, 109 Hawai‘i 435, 127 P.3d 95 (App.2005) (holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence), and United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that the dismissal of a criminal charge without prejudice under the federal Speedy Trial Act was not a final decision that could be appealed).

The Hawai‘i Supreme Court accepted Hern's application for writ of certiorari and vacated this court's order dismissing Hern's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The supreme court concluded that the District Court's judgment dismissing Hern's case without prejudice was an...

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