State v. Hernandez

Citation391 P.2d 586,96 Ariz. 28
Decision Date22 April 1964
Docket NumberNo. 1321,1321
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Jose Santa Cruz HERNANDEZ, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Charles N. Ronan, County Atty. of Maricopa County, and Robert J. Corcoran, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for appellee.

Ronald G. Cooley, Phoenix, for appellant.

STRUCKMEYER, Justice.

Appellant Jose Santa Cruz Hernandez and one Daniel Vega Ponce, a seventeenyar-old boy, were charged with the offense of illegal sale of marijuana, a felony. Appellant was convicted and brings this appeal.

Appellant was employed as a truck driver between Phoenix, Arizona, and Juarez, Mexico. It was his duty to locate used tires, cut them into appropriate sizes and return with them to Mexico where they were used by appellant's employer as soles for Mexican huraraches. On the night of October 16, 1962, Joseph J. Villa, a police officer for the City of Phoenix assigned to the narcotic section, who speaks 'Mexican' Spanish, went to 41st Avenue and Weir Drive in the company of police officers Richard Newton and James Gardner. The latter two hid in the bushes about ten feet from Officer Villa. At about 7:30 p. m. appellant drove up in his truck, got out and walked over to Villa who asked him if he had the 'grifa' meaning marijuana.

After some conversation, appellant handed to Villa a package containing 1.2 pounds of a leafy green substance later determined to be marijuana. Villa gave $100.00 to appellant. Thereafter appellant was immediately arrested. Later that evening, upon being interrogated at the offices of the State Liquor Control, appellant admitted that he knew the contents of the package was grifa and that he had sold it for $100.00 to Villa.

Appellant urges that as a matter of law the evidence supports a defense of entrapment. The defense arises out of appellant's testimony to this effect: That on the day in question appellant and Ponce arrived in Phoenix from Mexico; that they were in the habit of using a lot on the Salt River bed in Phoenix as a place to sleep and cut up used tires; that they were at this location, going about their work when they were approached by one Ramon Guajardo who asked the appellant if he would deliver a package for him for the reason that he, Guajardo, had to be at work later on that day; that Guajardo took the appellant to the location at 41st Avenue and Weir Drive and told him to give the package to a man who would be there about 7:30 p. m.; that later that afternoon Guajardo left the package with him and told him that he was to receive $100.00 in return for it.

Guajardo testified at the trial that he had been convicted of the sale of marijuana and had received a five-year suspended sentence; that about noon he saw the appellant and Ponce near the Salt Rivert; that he went there for the purpose to see if appellant had any marijuana; that after arriving he told appellant he knew a person who would buy marijuana; that he had made arrangements for Villa and the other two police officers to be present at 7:30 p. m. at the meeting place; that he had never seen the package, a paper bag, or its contents and he did not ask appellant to deliver the package for him.

Appellant's position is that Guajardo planted the seed of the crime in appellant's mind and that the intent to sell marijuana originated in the mind of the state's informer. Appellant is correct in his argument that a crucial element of the defense of entrapment is that the intent to commit the crime must not arise in the mind of the accused. Hoy v. State, 53 Ariz. 440, 90 P.2d 623, and see Silva v. United States, 9 Cir., 212 F.2d 422; Lutfy v. United States, 9 Cir., 198 F.2d 760, 33 A.L.R.2d 879. However, the defense of entrapment does not arise where one is ready to commit the offense given but the opportunity, Bloch v. United States, 9 Cir., 226 F.2d 185; Cline v. United States, 9 Cir., 9 F.2d 621.

In the latter case, the court said:

'* * * the officers did nothing to induce the defendant to acquire the contraband. They merely offered to buy that which they were advised the defendant was ready to sell. This does not constitute entrapment * * *.'

In the instant case, the jury could believe, under the conflict in the evidence, that the informer Guajardo was merely the gobetween; that the appellant knew of the nature of the contents of the package; that the police officers did nothing personally to induce the appellant to acquire the marijuana; and that they merely offered to buy what the defendant was willing to sell.

It was the prosecution's burden to establish with whom the intent to sell the marijuana originated. The jury had before it all the evidence. It could view the attitude and demeanor of the witnesses. It was properly instructed on the defense of entrapment and decided the facts against appellant. On appeal, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be considered in the strongest light in favor of the verdict. State v. Hilliard, 89 Ariz. 129, 359 P.2d 66; State v. Milton, 85 Ariz. [96 Ariz. 32] 69, 331 P.2d 846; State v. Stephens, 66 Ariz. 219, 186 P.2d 346.

Appellant urges that the county attorney, in his argument, twisted one of the court's instructions on entrapment to appellant's prejudice by arguing, in effect, that to have entrapment the witness Guajardo must have given the package of marijuana to appellant. We do not so understand the prosecution's argument. This statement was made:

'If you find that he [Guajardo] gave this marijuana to these defendants and they did not know what it was, and they delivered it to Officer Villa and simply colleted a hundred dollars for it as a favor to Guajardo, you just find the defense of entrapment is good and bring in a verdict of not guilty.' (Emphasis supplied.)

This portion of the argument is consistent with the appellant's testimony to the effect that he obtained the...

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37 cases
  • State v. Boag
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1969
    ...is fundamental reversible error. State v. Dillon, 104 Ariz. 33, 448 P.2d 89; State v. Sowards, 99 Ariz. 22, 406 P.2d 202; State v. Hernandez, 96 Ariz. 28, 391 P.2d 586; State v. Woolery, 93 Ariz. 76, 378 P.2d Attorneys are given wide latitude in their arguments to the jury. State v. Dillon,......
  • State v. Hudgens
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    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • January 26, 1967
    ...is not supported by a proper objection will not be considered on appeal. State v. Graham, 97 Ariz. 408, 401 P.2d 141; State v. Hernandez, 96 Ariz. 28, 391 P.2d 586; State v. Cumbo, 96 Ariz. 385, 696 P.2d 11; State v. Favors, 92 Ariz. 147, 375 P.2d 260; State v. Hunt, 91 Ariz. 145, 370 P.2d ......
  • State v. Miranda
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    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • April 22, 1965
    ...to sustaining the verdict, and that where there is evidence to support a verdict we will not disturb a finding of a jury. State v. Hernandez, 96 Ariz. 28, 391 P.2d 586; State v. Maxwell, 95 Ariz. 396, 391 P.2d Defendant contends that admission into evidence of his written confession was err......
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    • April 18, 1974
    ...(1966); State v. Thurston, 100 Ariz. 297, 413 P.2d 764 (1966); State v. Gortarez, 98 Ariz. 160, 402 P.2d 992 (1965); State v. Hernandez, 96 Ariz. 28, 391 P.2d 586 (1964). In later cases we indicated that in addition to the subjective intent of the accused to commit the crime, the extent of ......
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