State v. Hernandez
| Decision Date | 06 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1131,91-1131 |
| Citation | 589 N.E.2d 1310,63 Ohio St.3d 577 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HERNANDEZ, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
At approximately 11:40 a.m. on January 26, 1987, Lieutenant James B. Smith of the Columbiana County Sheriff's Office arrived at a location on Riffle Road, six-tenths of a mile east of Ohio Route 7 in Columbiana County near the village of Rogers. At that time, Lieutenant Smith discovered the lifeless body of a white male in a ditch on the north side of the roadway. The body was partially obscured by square, carpeted panels which had been placed over it. The body was later identified as that of Gerald Treharn. Following an investigation by the Columbiana County Coroner, it was determined that the death of the victim was the result of four gunshot wounds to the back of the head. The death was therefore ruled to be a homicide.
On July 10, 1987, defendant-appellant, Eddie Hernandez, was indicted by the Columbiana County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A). The indictment further included a specification that, during the commission of the offense, appellant had a firearm on or about his person or under his control in violation of R.C. 2929.71. On September 28, 1987, voir dire of prospective jurors was conducted in the Columbiana County Common Pleas Court. During voir dire of prospective juror Dorothy Lacy, the following discussion took place between counsel for the state and Lacy:
At a later stage in the proceedings, the following inquiry was made regarding the ability of Lacy to serve as a juror:
Thereafter, the state sought to challenge Lacy as a juror for cause based on her medical condition. This motion was overruled by the trial court. Later during voir dire, the state used a peremptory challenge to excuse Lacy. This challenge was contested by defense counsel on the basis that the prosecution was excluding Mrs. Lacy solely on the basis of her race inasmuch as she was the only black person in the jury venire.
In response to this contention, counsel for the state remarked:
Thereafter, the following inquiry of Lacy was made by the trial court:
Following this exchange, the court conducted an in camera hearing to consider the arguments of respective counsel. In response to the argument of defense counsel that the exercise of the peremptory challenge was racially motivated, the prosecuting attorney stated the following reasons for his actions:
Thereafter, the trial court ruled as follows:
On September 29, 1987, trial commenced in the Columbiana County Common Pleas Court. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the underlying offense of aggravated murder and the firearm specification. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced appellant to a term of incarceration of three years on the firearm specification to be served consecutively with and prior to a term of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after twenty years. On March 29, 1991, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.
Robert L. Herron, Pros. Atty., for appellee.
Christopher D. Stanley, Cleveland, for appellant.
The solitary issue presented for our review concerns whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge by the state which had the effect of excluding the only minority member of the jury venire from service on the trial jury was a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. In support of his contention that the exclusion of Mrs. Lacy was constitutionally infirm, appellant relies upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. The decision in Batson recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution precluded purposeful discrimination by the state in the exercise of its peremptory challenges so as to exclude members of minority groups from service on petit juries. Batson, supra, at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d at 82-83. In order to determine whether purposeful discrimination is present, the Supreme Court provided the following guidance:
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...A trial court's findings of no discriminatory intent will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 583, 589 N.E.2d 1310, following Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395.Jones was peremptorily chal......
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State v. Moore
...inference that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenge to exclude the jurors on account of their race. State v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 582, 589 N.E.2d 1310, 1313; State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 444-445, 653 N.E.2d 271, 282. If the accused makes a prima facie cas......
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State v. O'NEAL
...of its peremptory challenges so as to exclude members of minority groups from petit juries. See, also, State v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 581, 589 N.E.2d 1310, 1313. If a defendant makes a prima facie case of discrimination, the state must provide a race-neutral explanation. Howe......
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State v. Blackshear
...the defendant's race have been purposely excluded. Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305, 25 L.Ed. 664(1880); State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 589 N.E.2d 1310(1992); State v. Bryant, 104 Ohio App.3d 512, 516, 662 N.E.2d 846(6th Dist. 1995). The "equal protection clause forbids a ......