State v. Hester, 362A91

• Decision Date: 10 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 362A91,362A91
• Citation: 411 S.E.2d 610,330 N.C. 547
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Patrick HESTER.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 610

411 S.E.2d 610

330 N.C. 547

STATE of North Carolina v. Patrick HESTER.

No. 362A91.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 10, 1992.

Appeal as of right by the defendant, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a), from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder, entered by Hight, J., at the 23 April 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Vance County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 December 1991.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Jane R. Garvey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Daniel R. Pollitt, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

MEYER, Justice.

On 2 January 1990, the grand jury of Vance County indicted defendant for first-degree murder. The case was tried noncapitally at the 23 April 1990 Criminal Session of the Superior Court, Vance County. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.

At trial, the evidence tended to show the following. On 10 December 1989, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Henderson police responded to a call at a Fast Fare convenience store in Henderson. The call originated with Edwin Bowen, Jr., who upon finding the front door of the store locked, looked inside and saw a great deal of blood and signs of a struggle. Mr. Bowen testified that after notifying the police he continued to observe the interior of the store, where he saw a young black individual moving about inside the rear office. Upon their arrival, the police discovered that the store's front door was locked and observed a large quantity of blood on the floor. Shortly thereafter, a white female covered in blood and naked from the waist down emerged from the rear office and unsuccessfully struggled toward the front door. The officers kicked in the door to gain entrance. The victim, later identified as Lynn Stainback, died en route to the hospital. The autopsy revealed four stab wounds: one to the chest, one to the abdomen, and two to the back. All of the wounds were consistent with a dagger-type hunting knife found lying on the floor of the store. The chest wound was determined to be the cause of death. No evidence of rape was detected.

Defendant, a sixteen-year-old black youth, became a suspect on 11 December 1989. On that day, defendant was taken to the Henderson police station and subjected to noncustodial interrogation. Defendant allegedly made an oral inculpatory statement in the presence of law enforcement authorities that afternoon. This alleged statement of 11 December was the subject of a motion to suppress prior to trial, and a voir dire was conducted in the absence of the jury. At voir dire, Henderson policeman Robinson testified that he and State Bureau of Investigation Agent Sims informed defendant that he was a suspect in the killing, relating that several witnesses placed him at the store minutes before the murder occurred, and, using a juvenile interrogation sheet, advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Robinson testified that defendant said that he understood his rights and that defendant wanted Agent Sims to leave the room so that defendant could speak with Robinson alone. Sims left the room and defendant thereafter confessed to the murder. Robinson further testified that he then told defendant to stop talking, that he inquired whether defendant wanted his parents or others present, that defendant replied "no," and that the interrogation continued after Agent Sims rejoined them. Robinson did not ask defendant to sign a written statement and did not tape-record the interrogation. Agent Sims testified to a similar factual scenario.

Defendant testified on voir dire that he and his friend, Troy Person, were taken to the police station on 11 December. Upon arrival, Person requested to be present during the interrogation of defendant but Robinson refused. Robinson commenced the interrogation by telling defendant that someone saw him kill Stainback and asking defendant when he would admit his guilt. Sims then left the room on his own initiative, and Robinson continued to assert that defendant killed Stainback and urge defendant to confess. Defendant responded that he was not involved. Robinson read defendant his Miranda rights, and defendant signed a waiver form. Robinson then asked a series of questions to which defendant did not respond. Person again asked to be present and Robinson again refused. Defendant specifically denied making the inculpatory statement that Robinson testified defendant had made.

Troy Person testified on voir dire that he was sitting outside the interrogation room and that he could hear the discussions because the door was ajar. According to Person, Robinson kept telling defendant that "you know you killed her" and that defendant kept responding that he "didn't kill her." After the interrogation, defendant told Person and others that he "ain't admitted nothing."

At the conclusion of the voir dire, the trial court ruled that the alleged statement was admissible. When before the jury, Robinson provided similar testimony, adding that defendant steadfastly denied any involvement in the crime at the outset of the interrogation. On direct examination, Robinson was asked by defense counsel about the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Defense counsel first asked why defendant's parent or guardian was not notified of the imminent interrogation. The trial court sustained the State's objection, and Robinson testified on an offer of proof that he proceeded to the Police Department without making any such contact. Defense counsel also asked Robinson why his written notes of the interrogation varied from Officer Sims' written notes of the same interrogation, and the court sustained the State's objection. When Robinson related that it was department policy "[m]ost of the time" not to have defendants sign statements, defense counsel asked what cases do not "fall into 'most of the time.' " The trial court sustained the State's objection. Defense counsel then asked Robinson whether a defendant had ever signed a confession in one of his cases, and the court sustained the State's objection. In response to an inquiry by defense counsel, Robinson stated that he "seldom" sound-recorded interrogations. Defense counsel further inquired whether that was department policy, and the court again sustained the State's objection. Finally, counsel asked Robinson whether he had ever videotaped an interrogation, and the court sustained the State's objection.

The central question before this Court is whether the trial court acted properly in sustaining the State's objections to the various questions asked of Officer Robinson regarding the circumstances surrounding the alleged statement of defendant.

Defendant first claims that the court erroneously precluded defense counsel inquiry into why the police failed to contact defendant's parent or guardian prior to the interrogation of the defendant, a sixteen-year-old. We find no merit in this claim. The record shows that during defendant's offer of proof on voir dire, Robinson testified that he specifically asked the defendant whether he wanted to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning. Defendant responded that he did not wish that a parent, guardian, or other person be present. On this basis, we conclude that the police fully complied with N.C.G.S. § 7A-595(a) (requiring that juveniles in custody must be advised of their right to have a parent or guardian present during questioning) and that the failure of the trial court to admit such testimony, even if error, was clearly harmless.

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's objections to a series of questions by defense counsel as to why Officer Robinson's notes of the interrogation of the defendant differed from those of Agent Sims. The trial court first sustained the State's objection to defense counsel's question of Officer Robinson regarding why the respective "perceptions" differed insofar as Robinson believed that defendant appeared to speak in normal tones, while Sims testified that defendant appeared nervous. We conclude that the trial court acted properly in excluding Robinson's response as Robinson was not competent to state why Sims perceived what he did. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 602 (1988). Therefore, this claim is without merit.

Further, defendant was allowed to fully explore other discrepancies between the accounts of Sims and Robinson. Defense counsel asked Robinson why his notes differed from those of Sims regarding whether defendant denied having been at the Fast Fare and riding a ten-speed bicycle on the evening of the killing. The court sustained the State's objection to this inquiry. A review of the record, however, reveals that the court's ruling, even if error, was harmless. Robinson testified that "for some reason" he had omitted these facts from his notes but that in fact defendant had denied both that he had been at the Fast Fare and that he had been riding a ten-speed bicycle on the evening of the killing. Robinson further testified that with the exception of such omissions, "in general it's the same report; same information." Therefore, any possible error by the trial court was cured by Robinson's testimony on the matter.

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's objections to the questions asked of Officer Robinson regarding police department policy as to the taking of suspects' statements and his own experience with written, signed, sound-recorded, and videotaped statements. We agree that the court erred in excluding this testimony for the following reasons.

As a threshold matter, it is beyond dispute that the trial court was empowered to make the preliminary determination regarding the admissibility of defendant's alleged statement. ¹ However, in the wake of this determination, defendant retained the right "to...